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Abstract 
 
The thesis analyses the change in the way that violence was addressed in English law between the 
late ninth and early thirteenth centuries. It attempts to explain how a system largely based on 
feud, in which violence was a matter primarily for the parties involved, became one in which all 
serious violence was punished by the crown as crime. It does so through the examination of all 
the relevant legal material in the period: mostly royal law-codes and private legal compilations 
alongside more limited records of real-life cases. The central argument is that the concept of 
protection – or “protective power” – is crucial to understanding both how violence was regulated 
as a whole and how royal jurisdiction over violence grew. It emphasises not just royal jurisdiction 
but the real power that was exercised by other parties such as lords, churches, guilds and 
kindreds. 
The thesis is split into two parts, divided chronologically by the Norman conquest of England in 
1066. Part one begins by assessing the situation at the beginning of this period, outlining the core 
elements by which a case of homicide would be settled in the system of feud. It criticises the 
arguments for the introduction of a royal crime of homicide under the Anglo-Saxon kings, arguing 
instead that the core elements of feud remained relatively unchanged before 1066. The second 
chapter then examines the ways in which royal jurisdiction over violence did advance in this 
period, and finds that these almost invariably involved the extension of specific limited 
protections, such as that which made violence in a house an offence punishable by the king. This 
picture of expanding royal jurisdiction is combined with the evaluation of the significance of feud 
from the first chapter to produce a new model of the regulation of violence in pre-conquest 
England. The third chapter applies these findings to the wider debate about the distribution of 
legal power under the Anglo-Saxons. It concludes that a misunderstanding of the role of 
protection has, in part, led historians to underestimate the significance of the powers exercised 
by ecclesiastical institutions, lords and free kindreds, skewing assessments of legal power heavily 
in the king’s favour. 
Part two opens with an assessment of when we can first securely demonstrate the existence of a 
royal prohibition of homicide. Using a variety of sources it identifies a significant shift at around 
the time of the Assize of Clarendon in 1166. The fifth chapter looks at a number of possible legal 
mechanisms that might have contributed to the shift from a system of protections to a general 
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royal prohibition on violence. The development of the murder fine; the introduction of the 
concept of infamy for those defeated in judicial duels; the significance of the protection inhering 
in charters; and the possibility that specific royal protections merged and expanded into a general 
peace are all examined. The picture that emerges is once again one in which protective power 
plays a major role. The final chapter looks at wider ideological trends, such as the Peace 
Movement and the representation of crime as treachery to the king, examining the likelihood of 
their influencing legal developments. It argues that the ideal of a general peace against violence, 
which was central to the Truce of God, may well have been important in twelfth-century England. 
Overall, it is argued that, throughout the period, royal jurisdiction over violence increased through 
the expansion of royal protective power within a wider system of protections. When that 
expansion reached a point where the system was wholly dominated by royal protections, 
however, protection was swiftly replaced by a general prohibition of “violent crime”. 
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Introduction 
 
The legal position of violence in English society underwent a major shift between the ninth and 
thirteenth centuries. From a point where it was expected to result in feud – and thus either 
further violence or a settlement between the parties involved – we arrive at a situation where all 
killings and the more serious forms of violence were punished by the crown as “felonies”, with 
felons forfeiting both their lives and their property. Though this transition was certainly not a 
black-and-white matter, there being elements of royal punishment for violence in the ninth 
century, just as there was room for some private compensation in the thirteenth, its significance 
remains hard to overstate. This was the period in which feud ceased to be legitimate and in 
which, for the first time, it becomes reasonable to use the term “violent crime” in a way similar to 
that which is familiar today. We should not, as Paul Hyams emphasised in a recent study, believe 
that men ceased to resent perceived wrongs or to desire vengeance as a result of these legal 
changes, but nor should we underestimate their real effect. This is a point that Hyams makes well 
when summing up his view of thirteenth-century England: 
During the period of a flourishing eyre system that brought royal justice into the shires as 
a solemn, periodic part of normality, the king’s men managed to keep themselves 
informed of virtually all unnatural death and to deter concealment along with most 
efforts at private settlement out of court. For these reasons, overt feud action, whether 
for blood or money, became so much rarer—a feat to be accounted no small success for 
the king and his law.1 
There can be no doubt that, in terms of the practical operation of the law, there was a significant 
shift over the course of the tenth, eleventh and twelfth centuries. It is this long-term process of 
legal change that is investigated here. The thesis is, fundamentally, an attempt to describe and 
explain the transition from a system in which violence was addressed primarily through “feud” to 
one where royal law sought to punish all serious forms of violence as “crime”. 
First, however, we need a clear understanding of the terms “feud” and “crime”. On feud there are 
currently two competing interpretations, resulting from an attack on the traditional broad 
                                                          
 
1
 Hyams (2003), p. 265. 
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definition of feud by Guy Halsall. Halsall argues that  historians have used the term “feud” much 
too broadly. Instead, he suggests a more precise definition of feud – as “a relationship of lasting 
hostility between groups, marked by periodic, cyclical, reciprocal violence” – based on the 
understanding of feuding in the modern world. On this basis, he points out, feud was “not 
generally practised in the early Middle Ages”.2 What was present in the medieval period is what 
many other scholars have termed feud and what Halsall hoped to rename “customary 
vengeance”; that is, situations in which compensation serves as an alternative to violence, with 
the threat of vengeance serving as motivating force for the payment of such compensation in a 
composition settlement.3 This is, as Halsall acknowledges, fairly close to what was meant by early 
medieval Germanic terms such as faithu, faida and, for the Anglo-Saxons, fæhðe.4 Halsall’s 
contribution is valuable in drawing attention to the potential for confusion in the existence of two 
different understandings of the term. However, many scholars, among them Hyams, have chosen 
to continue to use “feud” in this early medieval sense, avoiding confusion by being explicit in what 
they understand by the term.5 This is the approach taken here; “feud” does not necessarily 
require long-term enmity or tit-for-tat killings but can, rather, include much more limited 
examples of wrongs followed by compensation payments where the threat of vengeance is 
merely implied. If for instance, one man kills another in a fight and then, fearful of vengeance, 
offers compensation to the kinsmen of the slain man – and if they then accept it and take no 
further action – in the terms employed here we are still looking at an example of feud. It is, of 
course, still a feud if the slain man’s kinsmen reject compensation and resort to violence which 
then settles into a prolonged enmity lasting several generations, but for this study, at least, this is 
not compulsory.  
“Crime” is another difficult concept to apply here. The Roman distinction between criminal and 
civil law, and the related common law categories of crime and tort, after all, only emerge in 
English sources towards the end of the twelfth century. And indeed, even the common law 
distinction was, in Hyams’s assessment, only “incompletely assimilated into the English system” 
                                                          
 
2
 Halsall (1998), pp. 19-20. 
3
 Halsall (1998), p. 22.  
4
 Halsall (1998), p. 28; DOEonline, sv. “fæhþ, fæhþu”. 
5
 Hyams (2003), pp. 6-11, 32-33. 
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even in the 1290s.6 Yet the term has frequently been used by historians of earlier periods to refer 
to offences that were primarily subject to punishment by authority, provided that any element of 
compensation to the victim was relatively minor.7 Patrick Wormald, arguing that Anglo-Saxon 
England had a “developed notion of crime and punishment”, illustrated the distinction: 
There is a very significant difference between buying security of life from an injured party, 
with a cut for the king whose peace had also suffered, and redeeming one’s life from an 
angry king though without (as yet) ignoring one’s victim.8  
This is rather subtle. Offences which are solely punished by a central authority are, in his view, 
clearly worthy of being termed “crime”, whilst on the other hand those involving only 
compensation between the parties involved plainly do not qualify. In the terminology used here 
they would be seen as matters purely for “feud”. It might help to imagine “crime” as 
characterised by the “vertical” relationship of punishment by authority and “feud “ by the 
“horizontal” relationship of roughly equal parties coming to a negotiated agreement. In between 
the two categories, however, is a substantial grey area occupied by offences involving both 
punishment by authority and compensation between equals, and in practice much of early 
medieval law looks like this, containing both horizontal and vertical elements. Wormald’s 
contention here is that where it is perfectly clear that punishment by the king is the dominant 
relationship, with those compensations that do exist playing a minor role, we should not be afraid 
to think in terms of “crime”. Broadly speaking, this interpretation is accepted here, though out of 
caution the neutral term “offence” tends to be preferred where there is any doubt, “crime” being 
reserved for situations where the compensatory element is either negligible or entirely absent. 
The transition between feud and crime in English laws on violence, then, was not necessarily a 
sudden or dramatic one. We should probably think in terms of a continuum between the two 
concepts. This thesis attempts to chart the steps that English society took along this continuum – 
in both directions – as it underwent this long-term shift in its approach to violence from one 
characterised by feud to one dominated by crime. The fundamental premise underlying this 
attempt is that what I term “protective power” is not only helpful for explaining the shift in 
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 Hyams (2003), pp. 223-24. See Hyams (2000), pp. 126-28; Donahue (2003). 
7
 See Keynes (1991); Pollock and Maitland (1968), pp. 558-557; Wormald (1999e). 
8
 Wormald (1999e), p. 342. 
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England’s understanding of violence, but essential.  The thesis seeks to show not only how royal 
protective power was the means by which the crown’s thirteenth-century criminal jurisdiction 
over violence was established, but also how protection fitted into the earlier system based on 
feud. That system, it argues, is itself best interpreted as one of protective power. 
a) Protective Power 
So, what is protective power? The end result of the centuries-long process under investigation 
here may have been in effect a prohibition on violence but, it is argued here, the route that was 
taken to reach this stage was far more “protective” than it was “prohibitive”. The distinction 
between these two concepts is a crucial one. Both protective and prohibitive power can be found 
in law, but they can be used in other contexts and, consequently, are best understood on a more 
general basis. Each of them is used to influence the behaviour of others by the use of a deterrent: 
their aim is to stop people doing certain things or harming certain people and each achieves its 
aims by imposing a penalty on those who violate their orders. The distinction is based on how an 
offence is defined. Using prohibitive power, it is a specific act that is defined. It does not matter 
who commits the act or who is its victim – if indeed there is a clear victim at all; what is significant 
is whether or not the offender committed the deed that is prohibited. In the case of protection 
the act is much less significant than the protected status of the victim. Protection can be very 
general indeed, possible to violate by a wide range of different acts, often but not necessarily 
involving violence. Though clearly there must be some definition of what acts constitute a breach 
of protection, it is not the precise nature of the act that matters, it is simply the fact that it has 
been committed against a protected person.9  
                                                          
 
9
 The concepts deployed here are drawn from medieval sources, not from the vast literature on sociological 
and philosophical approaches to power. Protection and prohibition do, however, fit rather well with the 
work of Talcott Parsons, in that the efficacy of both protective and prohibitive power depends not on the 
capacity of the protector or prohibitor to use force but on the perceived likelihood of their doing so. True 
power, as Parsons saw it, was altering people’s actions simply by maintaining the credibility of the threat of 
force (Parsons (1967), pp. 264-96). To my mind, at least, this seems helpful, but Parsons’ work has been 
criticised heavily for a number of reasons. Key among these is that his conception of power is limited to 
power over others, to attempts to change others’ behaviour, which is precisely the context we are 
interested in here anyway, but his implication that all power is necessarily legitimate is more troublesome. 
See Giddens (1968), pp. 264-68; Barnes (1988), pp. 12-20; Lukes (2005), pp. 29-37; Clegg (1979), pp. 65-68. 
More modern interpretations of power – for example, the emphasis on knowledge in Barnes (1988), that on 
“Design” and “Concept” in van Ginkel (1999), the linguistic approach in Morriss (2002), and the multi-
dimensional one in Lukes (2005) – seem less likely to be helpful here. 
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Structurally, then, protection and prohibition are very different. For protection a protector must 
define a protected person or group against whom any harm constitutes a breach of protection. If 
anyone then does harm to a member of the protected group the protector has a duty to inflict a 
penalty on that person. The identity of the attacker in this scenario should be irrelevant: in its 
purest form a protection protects against the entire world. For prohibition the prohibitor defines 
the act which is forbidden, but his power will be limited to a group that he can command. For 
small scale examples the difference is obvious enough: a mother can prohibit her child from 
chewing gum but she cannot do so for other children, let alone for adults. Nor would she naturally 
feel any right to do so, those outside her care being evidently beyond her authority. Should 
anyone, however, attempt to harm her child such restrictions would be utterly meaningless. 
Though authority to prohibit may be limited, protection is absolute. It is only when these ideas 
are scaled up to the level of a kingdom or state that the dividing lines blur. A protection from 
violence covering the entire population of England, for example, is virtually identical to a 
prohibition on all violence within the country. The only way we could tell the difference would be 
to look at exceptional cases: what happens when a someone who kills in England escapes abroad? 
How is violence to people who are present illegally in England regarded? What is the reaction 
when an English person is harmed overseas? Today the answers to these questions seem 
overwhelmingly prohibitive – if a killer is beyond the reach of English justice he is generally not 
hunted down for vengeance by the state, and protection from violence extends to illegal 
immigrants just as much as to British citizens – but if we look hard enough in the modern world 
we can still find protective mindsets. Take, for example, the case of Jean Charles de Menezes, the 
Brazilian man mistaken for a suicide bomber and shot by British police in 2005, whose 
immigration status was clearly felt by some people to be pertinent to how the killing should be 
viewed.10 Alternatively, we might look at Israel’s policy of assassinating those it held responsible 
for the massacre of its athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics, or perhaps its pursuit of Nazis such 
as Adolf Eichmann after the Second World War.11 The idea that states protect their legitimate 
inhabitants from violence, rather than prohibiting violent acts within their borders, does still exist 
in spite of modern law’s overwhelmingly prohibitive character. 
                                                          
 
10
 Examples of this mindset can still be found in online sources, for example 
<http://hardright.blogspot.com/2005/08/jean-charles-de-menezes-was-illegal.html> and 
<http://devilskitchen.me.uk/2006/03/jean-charles-de-menezes.html> (viewed 08/05/2009).  
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Today, then, we are familiar with the idea that the state prohibits violence just like it prohibits 
theft, fraud, dangerous driving and the consumption of certain species of mushroom. Protective 
power, if we think of it at all, is an extra-legal concept. We might associate it with the “protection 
rackets” by which criminal gangs exert their power over territories. The protection involved here 
may well often be a fiction for what amounts to little more than extortion, but some sociologists 
have argued that long-established groups such as the Sicilian mafia do, in fact, provide a valued 
service in return for their payments.12 We might, otherwise, be familiar with protective power 
from its role in modern international relations and the concept of the “protectorate”, or from 
alliances that were clearly of a protective nature. Britain’s entry into the twentieth century’s two 
world wars can easily be interpreted as having been prompted by breaches of its protection, first 
over Belgium in 1914 and then Poland in 1939. Protection as a legal concept, however, is not so 
familiar. Indeed, to modern minds protective power is almost the very opposite: something that 
thrives in situations where law has little influence.13 Law today is very much about prohibition; we 
expect legal power to consist of a recognised authority prohibiting specific acts. Indeed, we tend 
to see this sort of prohibitive law as “advanced” whereas more protective models might be 
termed “archaic” or at least associated with a degree of lawlessness and disorder.  
This general impression of the relative merits of protection and prohibition can, perhaps, be 
detected even in modern scholarship on the Middle Ages. Wormald, at any rate, explicitly linked 
his case for the extensive use of prohibitive power by Anglo-Saxon kings to the argument that 
England in this period was unusually advanced and deserving of the title “state”.14 The idea that 
protective power was always seen as more archaic than prohibition, however, is questionable: 
Wendy Davies, in any case, suggests that in certain contexts it only became common in the tenth 
century, so it might be more just to view at least some manifestations of protective power as 
novel and innovative.15 There is also quite a strong tendency to interpret royal law as prohibition 
wherever possible, even when a protective interpretation is more plausible. For example, when 
we find a law setting a royal penalty for attacking someone in a house, we have two options: we 
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could look at it as an example of protection with “people in houses” being the protected group, or 
we could see it as a prohibition where the prohibited act is “attacking someone in a house”. If we 
understand it as a prohibition we have the sort of legal power we are comfortable with – a 
situation roughly equivalent to the current model of the “state” punishing “crime” – and this is 
what many historians have done.16 If we look at it as protection, on the other hand, we are 
confronted with something that feels much more alien and archaic; something, to borrow a 
phrase from the late Patrick Wormald, that “pulsates to the rhythm of feud”.17 
Protective power seems to have been linked to emotional concepts far more than prohibition. 
Davies drew this out well in an article looking at the protection offered by churches in Wales, 
where it is clear that a breach of protection was conceptualised as an insult (the Welsh word is 
sarhaed) to the protector, which legally required compensation to be paid to him according to his 
status.18 As Davies has pointed out, there are many parallels to this conceptual framework 
surrounding protection in other cultures, though some are more explicit than others.19 The link 
between protection and honour is, in fact, very well known. Many scholars have remarked upon 
its presence in literature, a notable example being Stephen White’s recent examination of 
“warranty” in the Chanson de Roland. White shows that “warranty” in this context is explicitly 
about the protection that lords were meant to offer their men, and draws out how the poet 
juxtaposes honourable vengeance with shameful inactivity and neatly balances the breaches of 
protection made and the vengeance taken by both sides.20 Indeed, protection’s connection with 
honour and shame is extremely logical. How else could it be understood?  A breach of protection 
does not directly harm the protector, he has no claim to have suffered materially as a result of it, 
but it does cast the efficacy of his protection into doubt, openly challenging his power and his 
ability to avenge the breach. It would be extraordinary for it to have been understood in 
emotionally neutral terms; indeed the sort of anger displayed by King Harthacnut upon hearing of 
the killing of two of his huscarls whilst collecting taxes in Worcester seems far more natural. Of 
                                                          
 
16
 See Hurnard (1949), pp. 289-310; cf. Colman (1981). 
17
 Wormald (1999a), p. 39. 
18
 Davies (1995), pp. 144-47. 
19
 Davies (1995), pp. 146-7; Davies (1996). 
20
 White (2009); Lambert (2009a), pp. 3-8. 
Introduction 
8 
 
course, not everyone can make their sense of outrage felt through the merciless slaughter of the 
local population, but it seems unlikely that their feelings in cases close to their own hearts would 
have been any less acute.21  
Protection as a concept is thus a long way from the dry impartiality that we currently expect from 
the workings of our legal systems, but this is just another sign that emotional concepts like 
honour and shame have not always been as repressed as they are in modern Western societies.22  
Indeed,  John Beckerman has noted, in a remarkably insightful article on the concept of insult in 
the English common law, that these ideas are central in rather a surprising way. In one sense, 
insult is notably absent from the common law tradition, which awards compensation for damage 
or loss suffered but ignores affronts to honour entirely. Beckerman shows that this is both an 
English peculiarity – other European legal traditions that emerged from Roman law making free 
use of the concept of insult or outrage – and that it dates from the thirteenth century, when 
records of compensation for wounded honour disappear.23 However, on another level he also 
shows that these ideas are absolutely central: 
Though royal justice would protect subjects against losses occasioned by violent and 
forcible wrongs on the theory that they were acts of dishonor to the king, the royal courts 
had no interest at all in the personal honor of the king’s subjects. On the criminal side, as 
the writ de odio et atia taught so clearly, royal justice was not supposed to be used for 
purposes of private retribution. On the civil side, the king’s courts provided no remedy by 
which subjects could vindicate personal honor. ... Throughout the Middle Ages the 
common law ignored dishonor to anyone but the king. 24 
Thus, Beckerman argues, it was precisely because royal jurisdiction was founded upon the idea of 
affront to the king’s honour that, for everyone else, honour and shame ceased to be legally 
meaningful categories. This theory may seem today like an innocuous legal fiction, but for the 
king’s honour to have so completely displaced that of all others it must have been real enough in 
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the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. If, as seems certain, this idea of dishonour to the king was 
based on the allegation of the breach of his peace (i.e. his protection), a necessary precondition 
for royal jurisdiction in both felony and trespass cases,  we can see again how intimately 
connected with protective power ideas of honour, shame and insult were. 
With this context in mind, it is easy to see how protection fits in with feud. The urge to avenge a 
slain kinsman fits rather neatly into our definition of protective power – the kindred collectively 
protecting its members from all external attackers – as well as carrying with it all the associated 
ideas of honour and shame that, as Beckerman demonstrated, existed even on the grandest scale 
with the idea of the king’s peace. This association of protection with feud is not controversial, 
indeed it is a commonplace of the literature, just like the association of protection with the king’s 
peace; the difficulty comes in combining the two.25 Vengeance and compensation in feud are not 
things that we tend to associate with the workings of a legal system. We are comfortable with the 
king’s peace as something approaching a legal fiction, just as we are comfortable enough with the 
idea of feud as a more or less illicit activity that the law aimed to eradicate. Indeed, if we look at 
them in this way they never really have to meet; we can see royal jurisdiction as essentially 
prohibitive power and feud as one of the many bad things that it came to prohibit. But if we look 
at both as examples of protective power, as I am proposing here that we should, we get a rather 
different picture. We have to consider that royal jurisdiction could take the form of a protection, 
and thus involve the same range of emotional concepts, as feud could. Conversely, we have to 
accept that the protective power being exercised by kindreds in feud was, in an important sense, 
equivalent to royal protective jurisdiction. By making this conceptual leap and focusing on the 
exercise of protective power without privileging any particular group, I believe we can come much 
closer to understanding violence and the way that its regulation changed in English society over 
this period. 
b) Research Context 
Though in some ways the focus on protective power here is innovative – it does, at any rate, draw 
on some relatively modern ideas26 – in others it is rather old-fashioned; concerned, as it is, with 
overarching systems and fundamental long-term shifts in their operation. I make no apology for 
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this, agreeing for the most part with S. F. C. Milsom that “the orthodoxy of the last half-century by 
which most kinds of historian project essentially still and close-up pictures, assembling all the 
evidence for narrow subjects in short periods, is inimical to comprehending the largest legal 
developments.”27 Milsom’s opinion of those who come to medieval law from historical rather 
than legal backgrounds is clearly not the highest – and his characterisation of modern historians 
may be slightly unfair as a result28 – but his main point is a good one: fundamental, long-term 
legal changes need to be analysed directly, not inferred from a series of detailed but narrow 
studies. My approach, however, is also rather old-fashioned in that it requires considerable use of 
normative sources, mainly law-codes and other legal compilations, if only because there is a 
serious lack of sources in this period showing how people behaved in practice. This scarcity is easy 
enough to illustrate. If we turn to compilations of case-narratives from England in the central 
period of this investigation – the tenth, eleventh and twelfth centuries – we can find very few 
recorded instances involving homicides. Wormald listed a total of nine in his handlist of all Anglo-
Saxon “lawsuits”, whilst R. C. van Caenegem’s compilation covering the period from 1066 to 1199 
has only seventeen.29 Hyams’s collection of feud case-narratives, being free of restrictive criteria 
for what constitutes a “lawsuit”, can add a few extras to these, but no more than a handful.30 Yet 
even these meagre results are rather flattering to the evidence, much of which is extremely terse, 
touching on the point of homicide only tangentially, or problematic in a number of other ways (a 
fair proportion of these cases, for example, come from miracle-stories). Some of this material, of 
course, is useful and relevant but there simply is not enough of it, in my view, to mount a full-
scale inquiry into violence which does not make significant use of normative legal sources. 
The scholarly trends of recent years, however, are strongly against such an approach. The 
preference of early medievalists looking at conflict, to use terminology borrowed from 
anthropology, has been very much for a “processual” approach over a “normative” one. Piotr 
Górecki and Warren Brown explain the distinction as follows:  
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The normative approach takes as a given, that is, assumes an autonomous existence and 
importance of norms, then inquires into their convergence with the behavior they purport 
to regulate. The processual begins by reconstructing the behavior of participants in 
disputes, and then situates the role of norms within that behavior as a dependent 
variable.31 
In the latter situation, they further explain, norms can be seen as generated by behaviour, or at 
least can be inferred from it; they are, in effect, subsumed within the study of processes and – in 
practical terms – largely sidelined.32 As Górecki and Brown point out, the processual approach has 
been dominant since at least the early 1980s, with “an intuitive distrust” of normative approaches 
being shared by both anthropologists and medievalists specialising in conflict.33 The result has 
been a sharp focus on discovering what actually happened in the course of disputes, violent and 
otherwise, with interpretations of behavioural norms being based on the findings of such studies. 
Additionally, the usefulness of written laws from the early Middle Ages has been questioned by 
Wormald, who argued the following: 
Lex scripta, as the various contexts of its issue seem to hint, was not so much practical as 
ideological in its inspiration. ...  Germanic kings made laws, first and foremost, partly in 
order to emulate the literary legal culture of the Roman and Judaeo-Christian civilisation 
to which they were heirs, and partly in order to reinforce the links that bound a king or 
dynasty to their people.34 
Laws, then, tend to be viewed with scepticism by modern scholars as untrustworthy guides to the 
realities of disputing, more useful for what they tell us about kings’ ideological pretensions than 
their practical engagement in the maintenance of social order.35 
There can be no doubt that much of the research that forms part of this trend has been extremely 
productive, not least in its repeated highlighting of the fact that, in practice, norms were not 
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followed rigidly. In allowing for a subtler picture in which participants in disputes manipulated 
norms for their own ends, this work has made a valuable contribution. However, there is a 
problem with this approach, at least for medievalists, in that it tends to privilege certain types of 
conflict that appear most frequently in our sources. Stephen White explains the situation very 
clearly:  
Excluding or at least marginalising not only “political” conflicts that did not have readily  
identifiable “legal” dimensions, but also certain documented disputes that did, explicit or 
implicit models of medieval dispute-processing were largely based on a restricted class of 
“cases” in which a prior relationship between two upper-class parties of relatively equal 
status (usually a religious community and a group of nobles) was disrupted by a dispute 
over property rights.36 
These, of course, are the conflicts that monastic houses had a clear interest in recording. 
Obviously these cases could involve violence but they frequently did not, and even when they did 
it was always incidental to the primary issue of property. They do not, and simply cannot, reveal 
to us the conduct or settlement of feuds waged to avenge killings or other wrongs. A processual 
approach, therefore, would not be without serious drawbacks even if the problems with evidence 
were not so great.  
The problems with normative sources, in any case, are not so great as to render them useless to 
sensitive historical investigation. Wormald’s critique of royal law-codes, though put forward in 
characteristically robust and forthright style, did not show that all early medieval laws were of 
purely ideological significance, with no practical application. Nor was it meant to: Wormald’s 
target was mainly what he termed “primary legislation”, the totemic national codes such as the 
Lex Salica or, in an English context, the laws of Æthelberht and Alfred’s domboc. He believed that 
there was an important ideological context even to codes which had “strictly practical and legal 
objectives”, but he did not deny those objectives.37 Indeed, his treatment of Edmund’s laws 
directed against feud and Æthelstan’s campaign against theft show that he was entirely alert to 
the possibility that kings had practical legislative intentions and, furthermore, might well have had 
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a practical legal impact.38 Certainly some normative texts have real problems with them, but so 
too do the sources which we would need to conduct a processual analysis; it is our task as 
historians to assess them critically and make of them what use we can. A dogmatic opposition to 
normative source material would not, in my view, be a helpful way to proceed, even if it were a 
plausible option. 
A brief examination of historians’ views of the Leges Henrici Primi will highlight some of the issues 
here.  It is a source with many potential problems. The author, writing in the 1110s, was the same 
man who translated much of the corpus of Anglo-Saxon law into Latin in the document known as 
the Quadripartitus, and his clear commitment to the pre-conquest system of law makes it 
reasonable to suspect him of archaising in places. Furthermore, he quite brazenly draws on 
continental texts, such as the Lex Salica, which seem very unlikely to have had an impact on the 
English legal system. To top it all, the earliest extant manuscripts come from the early thirteenth 
century, making tampering in the century following the text’s composition a possibility.39 
Nonetheless, with the exception of the well-known interpolation in some manuscripts of material 
relating to London, there is little reason to believe that the text we have today differs 
substantially from what the author wrote, and it is perfectly possible both to detect foreign 
intrusions and to tread carefully around possible archaisms. Indeed, there are many places in 
which there is no known source for the author’s words and where, therefore, we might 
reasonably think he wrote from personal knowledge of contemporary practice. Given that we 
know he was a lawyer of some sort, possibly even a judge, his personal knowledge should carry 
considerable weight for us. Why, then, ought we not to make as full a use of the Leges Henrici as 
we can? 
John Hudson – though he is certainly not alone in doing so40 – is unusually explicit about his 
rationale for dismissing the Leges Henrici and the other Anglo-Norman legal collections in favour 
of processual evidence: 
Faced with very limited case-materials, writers on the Anglo-Norman period have been 
lured by the mirage of plenty offered by the Leges. However, these are archaicizing texts, 
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and I prefer to use them only when they are congruous with other contemporary 
material, or with the general pattern of legal development revealed by the more plentiful 
later sources. Setting aside the Leges, we are left mainly with anecdotal material from 
ecclesiastical narrative sources. They have obvious disadvantages, including an 
ecclesiastical bias, and a preference for the unusual. They resemble newspaper stories 
rather than law reports. However, since it is unlikely that any great shift in the nature of 
offences occurred, conclusions can be tested against the much more plentiful sources 
emerging from c. 1200. Moreover, reliance on anecdotal evidence can have some positive 
advantages. It discourages concentration on the royal administration of justice or the 
genealogy of certain common law actions, compelling instead an interest in the settling of 
individual disputes, the relationship of offence and offenders to society.41 
I would not dissent from Hudson’s assessment of both the drawbacks and potential advantages of 
the anecdotal evidence he prefers, and the archaising tendencies of the Leges Henrici are clearly a 
genuine problem, but I would question whether the problem is so great that the best solution is 
to resort to sources from the thirteenth century. To state that it is unlikely that any great shift in 
the nature of offences occurred is surely prejudging an issue that we ought to be using the 
evidence to resolve. Fundamentally, why should law in the Anglo-Norman period be interpreted 
in the light of its thirteenth-century future rather than its Anglo-Saxon past? In practice, Hudson’s 
approach yielded an account of violence and theft in Anglo-Norman England that was just as 
sensitive to what came before as what would follow, but it is a brief survey that makes the very 
most of the case-narrative evidence he prefers. The preference itself I do not object to – there is 
nothing wrong with a processual approach where the material is used carefully – but the 
suggestion that we should go to such lengths to avoid having to use contemporary normative 
source material (whose only identified weakness was potential for anachronism) seems 
unreasonable. 
My preference is for a much simpler approach. I aim to use all available material, but to do so 
critically and whilst maintaining as great an awareness of the limitations of the evidence as can be 
mustered. I see no reason why we cannot draw perfectly valid conclusions from looking carefully, 
cautiously and sceptically at normative sources. We should not think that laws were applied to 
the letter, indeed we might want to think of them in some circumstances as mere starting points 
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for negotiation, but no-one would suggest they were works of fantasy; they must, surely, often 
have reflected the genuinely practical intentions of lawmakers with regard to the problems of 
social order that they perceived. Anglo-Saxon laws, at any rate, seem most freqently to have been 
the product not just of a single mind but to have been, at least in part, influenced by the major 
assemblies at which they were promulgated. Can we really think that the laws discussed and 
approved by such assemblies of the powerful were, as a rule, utterly unrelated to the realities of 
their society? Obviously we cannot. The written texts that such meetings left to us must, then, 
have value to us as evidence and it seems especially important, for a period in which sources are 
so scarce, that we use them to the limits of their potential. The studies of the last thirty or forty 
years may have revealed more about the problems of using normative sources for studying the 
realities of early medieval conflict but they have not, nor could they ever have, rendered it 
valueless. What they have done is raise some crucial issues about their interpretation. Our 
response to this should not, however, be to shun them but to return to them and attempt to 
apply the insights that decades of processual dominance have produced. 
c) The Plan 
This study is divided into two chronologically defined parts, each consisting of three chapters, 
with the Norman conquest of England in 1066 forming the dividing line. This is not, I want to 
emphasise, because of any assumption that this marks a moment of particular significance for my 
subject but for two specific reasons. Firstly, there is the fact that the existing historiography does 
respect that dividing line in some very significant ways. Anglo-Saxonists such as Wormald and 
James Campbell have made important arguments for the stability and strength of the pre-
conquest kingdom relative to its much more “feudal” and decentralised successor. 42  The 
argument pursued here challenges these Anglo-Saxonist interpretations directly on a number of 
points, something that is controversial and requires detailed discussion, so it seemed most 
practical not to try to do this at the same time as looking at post-conquest material where the 
issues were different. Secondly, and relatedly, it seems to me that the best way to assess the 
validity of interpreting the Norman conquest as a caesura in English history cannot be to ignore it 
and to conduct an analysis on the assumption that it had no impact. Far better, I think, to create a 
reliable picture of the pre-conquest period and then to assess what did change with the advent of 
Norman rule. This does not, of course, mean that I intend to present a static picture of “pre-
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conquest England” to be compared with another equally static account of “post-conquest 
England” – doing this would indeed unduly privilege the conquest as a cataclysmic event. Rather, 
the aim is to provide dynamic accounts of the patterns of development in both periods. The test, 
then, for whether the Norman invasion does represent a major turning point with regard to the 
regulation of violence is not whether Norman kings made any significant changes, but whether 
those changes represent a departure from the patterns of change visible under their Anglo-Saxon 
predecessors. 
Throughout the thesis then, the main concern is with assessing processes of change and, in 
particular, evaluating the role that protective power played in it. In each of the two parts we have 
chapters (the second and fifth) analysing in detail the specific legal changes that affected the 
treatment of violence followed by chapters that take these specific findings and look at wider 
interpretative questions (the debate around legal privileges in chapter three, the influence of 
ideological trends in chapter six). However, in both parts these analyses are founded on detailed 
discussions of the extent and nature of the changes in the relevant periods; these chapters (the 
first and fourth) open each part and serve to anchor the broader investigations that follow. Quite 
simply, in order to explain a development we need first to have a clear idea of what it entailed 
and, as far as possible, when it occurred. We cannot, for example, analyse post-conquest 
developments until we have a reasonable picture both of when serious violence becomes 
unambiguously criminal, the main focus of chapter four, and what situation was inherited in 1066, 
which the first part as a whole should provide. For the Anglo-Saxon period the task is even more 
difficult. We have to establish not only the character of the system of feud that obtained in the 
time of King Alfred, but also to assess the historiographically-charged question of whether 
violence came to be thought of as crime in the tenth and eleventh centuries. The accuracy, indeed 
the applicability, of the analysis that follows in the rest of the thesis depends to a great extent on 
getting the answer to this question right. It is to this vital task that we now turn. 
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Chapter One  
Feud, Crime and Homicide 
Introduction 
This chapter has two main functions. It aims first of all to create a picture of the basic system of 
feud by which violence and, in particular, homicide were addressed in the late ninth and early 
tenth centuries. This involves looking at the methods that the laws envisage would be used to 
settle the simplest cases of homicide, as distinct from more complex affairs that had been 
aggravated by some special circumstance, like the breach of a royal protection or prohibition. 
These cases are referred to here, borrowing a later term,  as “simple homicide”.1 The result of 
limiting ourselves to cases of simple homicide, of course, is that we only get a partial impression 
of how feud worked, based on the most generic of cases. From this perspective what we see is 
only the centre, the very core, of the system of feud, around which a veritable constellation of 
exceptional circumstances with different rules  was gathered. This, however, is all we need for 
current purposes, this examination of the core of feud being in large part an essential foundation 
for the next chapter’s analysis of all these potential aggravating factors. It is also all that is 
necessary for this chapter’s second task: to assess whether there was any fundamental change to 
these central aspects of feud in the Anglo-Saxon period. The question here, it is important to 
note, is not whether there was any change at all in the way that violence was viewed in this 
period – as the following chapter will show, there was a great deal – but whether there was any 
shift that applied in general terms, affecting not just specific types of homicide but homicides in 
general. In other words, it assesses the idea that Anglo-Saxon kings might have outlawed feud – 
or placed major restrictions on it – by modifying, adding to, or replacing entirely the old system of 
composition settlements.  Was there, as some historians have suggested, a royal crime of 
homicide before 1066? 
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The view taken here is that there was not, and this is crucial for the analysis that follows in the 
rest of the thesis. After all, if there was a royal prohibition of homicide in this period – as Patrick 
Wormald and Naomi Hurnard have suggested2 – it becomes very difficult to argue for the 
significance of protective power with regard to violence. What would be the significance of a royal 
protection  if even violence against the unprotected was subject to severe penalties from royal 
justice? We might have to imagine a situation like that pertaining in the later Middle Ages where 
protections were valued for the legal privileges associated with them, not as deterrents to violent 
attack.3 If a royal prohibition of homicide did appear in the Anglo-Saxon period, the idea that after 
that point protective power had an important role to play in regulating violence would simply not 
be worth pursuing. The issue, then, is of the highest importance, and will require detailed analysis 
of the cases put forward by both Wormald and Hurnard. However, before we can do this we need 
a solid idea of the point from which we are starting. 
The Core of the System of Feud 
It is, then, to the core features of the Anglo-Saxon system of feud that we turn first. What follows 
is relatively uncontroversial. Even those who argue for the introduction of a royal crime of 
homicide in the Anglo-Saxon period would recognise the system outlined as the one that 
prevailed in at least the first half of the tenth century – it is the starting point for all discussions of 
feud and its increasing regulation in the Old English kingdom. A key part of this chapter’s purpose 
is to show that this core system still applied in 1066, but for now the controversial elements of 
this will be put aside in favour of a discussion that illuminates the system itself. Two features in 
particular will be highlighted: the way that the system allows for the possibility of violent feuding 
and the degree to which the system was dominated by protective power. 
a) Wergild and Composition Procedure 
Feud, as understood here, does not necessarily involve revenge, only the plausible threat of 
revenge. Indeed, at the very centre of any analysis of feud must come the concept of wergild: the 
money payable to the kin of a slain man for the taking of his life. Sir Frank Stenton’s description of 
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the wergild and the vital importance it affords to the kin as protectors offers a good introduction 
to the concept: 
Of *the kin’s+ importance as a protection to individuals there can, of course, be no doubt. 
Among the English, as among all Germanic peoples, it was a fundamental convention that 
the killing of a free man brought his kin into immediate action in order to avenge his 
death, or to enforce the payment of his wergild. It is also clear that the slayer’s kin were 
expected to join with him in paying the wergild or bearing the feud that was its 
alternative. Many passages in the Old English laws are concerned with the application, 
which generally meant the limitation, of this principle.4 
Wergilds are visible in the laws from the very beginning. They first appear, albeit under another 
name, in the late sixth-century laws of King Æthelberht of Kent, where we find the following basic 
statement of law: “Gif man mannan ofslæhð, medume leodgeld C scillinga gebete” which Lisi 
Oliver translates “If someone kills someone, let him pay an ordinary person-price, 100 shillings.”5 
In the same code we also find the terms leodgeld and wergild used to describe compensations 
payable for killing a royal smith or herald (seemingly included because it pertained to the king), 
lying with a freeman’s wife, and damaging the “genital organ” (a triple wergild), as well as what 
evidently are wergilds (without being specifically called anything) for killing various ranks of læts 
ranging from forty to eighty shillings.6 Clearly the wergild was commonplace enough a concept for 
it to be applied to offences other than killings that were thought to be suitably grievous. The later 
Kentish code of Hloþhere and Eadric notes a higher wergild of 300 shillings for a noble-born, 
eorlcund, man.7 Kentish law thus has a scheme of wergilds covering three classes, nobles, freemen 
and the more obscure læts, a term which occurs only in Æthelberht’s code and is interpreted as 
meaning freedmen by Oliver.8 
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In the West Saxon legal tradition with which we are primarily concerned here there is a similar 
pattern. Ine’s code also outlines a scheme with three classes of society but it does so only 
incidentally in a discussion of another subject, in this case the level of manbot to be paid to the 
slain man’s lord: 
When a wergild of 200 shillings has to be paid, a compensation of 30 shillings shall be paid 
to the man’s lord; when a wergild of 600 shillings has to be paid, the compensation shall 
be 80 shillings; when a wergild of 1200 shillings has to be paid the compensation shall be 
120 shillings.9 
Though the class for which 600 shillings is paid seems to have disappeared fairly swiftly – it 
appears in the laws of Alfred but not thereafter10 – this scheme is the one that persists 
throughout all later legislation and becomes so commonplace that Cnut could address his 1020 
letter to England to Earl Thorkel, all his archbishops, bishops and earls and all his subjects 
“twelfhynde and twyhynde, ecclesiastics and laymen.”11 Other passages in Ine’s laws, detailing 
how payment of the wergild may be made in kind (with weapons, armour and slaves), the share 
of the wergild due to the king in the case of a slain foreigner and the compensation to be paid for 
killing a pregnant woman, make it clear that the primary purpose of the wergild was 
compensating the kindred for killings.12 We also, however, find payment of wergild as a means by 
which a captured thief might redeem his own life, a usage that recurs and becomes more 
commonplace in later laws.13 
Wergilds, then, already had a long history by the tenth century. It is, however, only in the 940s 
that we get our first description of the procedure for their payment or even such vital detail as 
who is liable to pay or receive them. This comes in two closely related texts: King Edmund’s 
second law-code (II Edmund) and the text known as Wergeld. 14  The two, though never 
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contradicting one another, do offer some different details so they will be used in conjunction 
here. First, states II Edmund, the slayer should give a pledge to his advocate (forespeca), and then 
the advocate to the kinsmen of the deceased, that he will pay the wergild. After this the kinsmen 
of the slain should give the advocate a pledge that the slayer may approach in security (mid griðe) 
to pledge the wergild.15 After this the two texts agree that the slayer must find wergild-surety 
(wærborh) and Wergeld adds that for a 1200 shilling wergild this means twelve men, eight from 
the paternal kin and four from the maternal.16 Next, the two texts agree, the king’s mund 
(protection) is to be established, which Wergeld explains involves all the kin of each side giving a 
common pledge on a single weapon that this mund will stand.17 Finally they both state that 
payments shall then be made at intervals of twenty-one days, first the healsfang, then the 
manbot, then the fihtwite (though this is absent from II Edmund), and then the first instalment of 
the wergild proper (the frumgyld). At this point II Edmund ends but Wergeld continues: “and  so 
on, until full payment is made within the time-limit that wise men (witan) have ordained”.18 
Wergeld also explains that the healsfang for a 1200 shilling wergild is 120 shillings and that it is for 
the children, brothers and father of the slain man only; adds that after full payment is made they 
may depart in love if they want full friendship; and states that a ceorl’s wergild should be dealt 
with in accordance with the example of the twelve-hundredmen.19 
The picture that emerges from these sources is very clearly one of feud, the possibility of further 
violence being implicit in every step. The slayer needs to send a representative to the opposing 
kin to ensure that he can approach safely to pledge the wergild – clearly approaching without 
such a precaution would have been risky indeed. Then, even after he has given his pledge to pay 
the wergild, the king’s mund is to be levied. The implication is quite clear – if any violence occurs 
after this point the king’s mund is breached and the culprit has thus committed mundbryce and 
must face the consequences. According to II Edmund, this means the forfeiture of his  life and 
property to the king. This may well represent a rather ambitious attempt at royal intervention in 
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the feuding process – it is analysed in this respect in the following chapter – but more importantly 
for current purposes it definitely does serve to emphasise the risk of a renewal of violence during 
(or perhaps even after) the composition proceedings. We have a rather dangerous-looking picture 
of the settlement of feud through wergild, one involving many precautions and a serious risk of 
violence, and one which involves extended kin groups on both sides in the settlement whilst 
simultaneously offering a privileged place to the slain man’s immediate family. 
Finally, one question remains: was the wergild, conceptually speaking, a protection? At face value 
it seems entirely reasonable to suppose that it was, the kindred as a whole protecting its 
individual members. It was, after all, the kindred that both received the payment and enforced it 
through the threat of violence, and it was a man’s kindred that defined his rank and hence the 
value of his wergild. Guy Halsall, however, does suggest an alternative explanation based on a law 
from Visigothic Spain which affords the elderly a wergild lower than that of adults in their prime; 
this, he argues, “reinforces the point that the laws’ concern was usually to penalize damage to a 
family rather than to protect the individual”.20 Though Halsall’s concern was more with the 
distinction between the family and the individual than with that dividing protection from 
compensation for loss, his point remains strong. If the wergild was defined by the value of the 
person killed rather than the status of the kindred that protected him, the wergild looks rather 
more like compensation for damage than compensation for breach of protection. In England, 
however, there is no equivalent of this Visigothic law, nor – as Halsall notes – was there in 
Merovingian Gaul, so this may well be a regional peculiarity.  
The closest Anglo-Saxon law comes to differentiating between  the values of different members of 
the same kindred is in measures that allow men to gain the right to higher wergilds by their own 
efforts, either in the accumulation of wealth and favour or by ascending the ranks of the church.21 
However, at least in the case of the priest – who as a “mass-thegn” deserved, we are told,  the 
wergild of a “world-thegn”22 – there is evidence that this privilege did not extend so far as to allow 
situations in which priests’ ceorlish kindreds were able to claim thegnly wergilds. The Leges 
Henrici Primi state that if a priest’s status entitles him to a higher wergild this does not apply if he 
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is slain, the priest’s slaying being compensated according to the wergild he was born with, that of 
his paternal kindred.23 Though there is no evidence bearing on this question for secular wergild 
promotions, this exception does seem to prove the rule that wergild was defined more by the 
rank of the kindred than by personal status.  
The wergild system does, then, look rather protective, and there is good evidence that this is how 
at least some contemporaries saw it. This is quite explicit in laws authored by Wulfstan II, 
archbishop of York, which require the king to act as “kinsman and protector” (for mæg 7 for 
mundboran) for any foreigner or man in holy orders “unless he has some other” (buton he elles 
oðerne hæbbe).24 This role as a substitute for the kindred, it is explicitly stated, involved either the 
extraction of compensation or the taking of vengeance.25 Here, in effect,  we have a definition of 
the role of the kindred: a man’s relatives were his primary protectors and, in the event of his 
death, they therefore had the duty either to extract compensation or to exact vengeance. The 
balance of the evidence, then, suggests that wergild can indeed be regarded as a compensation 
payment for a breach of the kindred’s protection over its members. 
b) Manbot 
From the evidence of II Edmund and Wergeld, then, it seems that the payment of wergild was 
crucial to the resolution of cases of homicide, and that the threat of violence hung over the 
procedure for making such a settlement. The potential for conflict between the opposing kindreds 
seems the central feature of a case of simple homicide. However, to concentrate on this alone 
would produce an unfairly limited picture of the basic system of feud. Other parties were involved 
and, importantly, had a financial interest in a settlement. II Edmund and Wergeld make this clear 
in their schedules for the payments to be made. As was noted above, after the first instalment of 
the wergild – the healsfang – is paid, the next obligation is to pay the manbot to the slain man’s 
lord. It seems there may have been some mutation in the way that this was calculated. The laws 
of Ine, dating from the late seventh century, give a scheme based on the wergild of the slain man, 
with manbots of 30, 80 and 120 shillings for men with 200, 600 and 1200 shilling wergilds.26 
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Though they crop up frequently enough in the laws – Cnut, for example, lists manbot as the final 
compensation to be paid in the event of a killing in a church27 – their financial value is not 
discussed again before the Norman period. Then we find a slightly more confused picture. The 
Leis Willelme gives the manbot of a freeman as 10 shillings, which equates to 30 Mercian shillings 
and thus directly reflects Ine’s provisions.28 The Leges Henrici Primi also draw on Ine, repeating 
the 30 and 120 shilling manbots for ceorls and thegns and converting them into mancuses for 
contemporary readers.29 However, other passages in the Leges Henrici appear to contradict this, 
stating in relation to compensation to spiritual kin that the payments “shall increase in 
accordance with the wergild, just as the manbot does in relation to the lord.”30 This is supported 
by a later passage that explains as follows: 
As the law stood manbot used to be received, depending on the status of the person 
slain, according to the amount of his wergild, rather than according to the amount 
payable for ouerseunesse (i.e. insubordination, disobedience) towards the lord or 
according to the lord’s status.31 
Though these passages are unambiguous in their present forms there is a possibility that they 
have been corrupted.32 They are, however, supported by the Leges Edwardi Confessoris  which 
offer a scheme based on the status of the slain for the Danelaw and for the “law of the English” 
one in which the king and archbishop can expect 3 marks, bishops, earls and the king’s steward 20 
shillings and the rest of the barony the standard 10 shillings.33 It seems, therefore, logical to 
suggest that at some point between the drafting of Ine’s laws and of these post-conquest texts 
there was a shift to a system in which it was the rank of the lord that determined the amount of 
compensation he deserved. Though it is tempting to locate the shift at the time of the conquest 
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there is no real basis for this. The Leges Henrici’s reference to how the law stood could simply 
refer to Ine’s regulations as quoted earlier – it may be that the shift to compensation based on 
the lord’s status was an Anglo-Saxon one. 
As with wergild, the way in which manbot was calculated can help us understand how it was 
conceived. Compensation based upon the value of the slain man makes it fairly clear that this was 
intended to recompense the lord for his loss, whilst compensation based on the lord’s status 
indicates that the compensation was not so much for the man lost but for the offence caused to 
the lord by daring to harm a man under his protection. Our evidence is, therefore, rather 
interesting. What it suggests is that in the seventh century manbot was more about compensation 
for the loss of a valuable man than remedying the insult to a lord’s honour implicit in the 
homicidal breach of his protection. In the twelfth century, on the other hand, there was an 
understanding of manbot that can only be based on protective power. A shift certainly occurred 
at some point and, though the evidence is very slight, I would suggest that sometime around the 
tenth century is not an unreasonable guess as to when. This is founded on the general emphasis 
on protective power in the laws of this period (on which the following chapter shall say a great 
deal) and on a few specific hints in the laws. We find in II Cnut, for example, a law demanding that 
those who bind or beat holy men pay compensation to either the king or the man’s lord 
specifically for breach of protection, just as we find references to the king acting as mundbora for 
a priest or stranger “unless he has some other”.34 This does seem to indicate, albeit rather weakly, 
that lords were understood as legal protectors of their men in this period, and this seems a good 
context in which to place a shift to an understanding of manbot in terms of protective power. 
c) Fihtwite 
The other payment associated with the settlement of a feud is the fihtwite – literally the fine for 
fighting. This is absent from Edmund’s scheme but it seems reasonable to believe this is 
accidental given its presence in Wergeld and the fact that fines for fighting are evident in the 
codes of both Ine and Alfred.35 In Wergeld the fihtwite is to be paid twenty-one days after the 
manbot, clearly signifying its importance, whilst II Edmund puts it on a par with the manbot as a 
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fine which must henceforth be paid in full and not forgiven.36 Unlike manbot, however, the 
identity of the recipient of fihtwite is not a clear-cut issue. Ine’s regulations on this are a good 
starting point. The code begins its approach to the subject by stating that any fighting in the king’s 
house results in total forfeiture of property and the offender’s life being at the king’s mercy. Next 
it states that fighting in a mynster requires compensation (bot) of 120 shillings and follows this by 
ruling that fighting in the house of a ealdorman or other distinguished witan should result in the 
payment of bot of 60 shillings and a fine (wite) of 60 shillings. In the house of a gebur, it 
continues, a wite of 120 shillings should be paid with what seems to be a further 6 shillings to the 
gebur. Even if the fight takes place in the open (on middum felda) the 120 shilling wite must still 
be paid.37 These provisions, it emerges, are more concerned with the destination of the standard 
120 shilling wite, due to the king for fights occurring even in the middle of fields, than the offence 
to a householder caused by fighting within his premises. Essentially Ine is allowing monasteries to 
claim the entirety of the fihtwite and the ealdormen and other high status nobles half of it. 
However, his experiment in merging house protection with the general penalty for fighting is not 
entirely successful; to the lowly gebur Ine was unwilling to give up any part of his wite, but nor 
does he think that the gebur should go uncompensated for the breach of his protection over his 
home, allowing him an additional six shillings for the affront.38 The result is that fighting in a 
gebur’s house is more costly than in a mynster. The scheme, ultimately, is something of an oddity 
and it is unsurprising that it does not feature in any later laws, but even at this seemingly nascent 
stage the wite that would eventually become the fihtwite, though it seems to pertain to the king 
in most cases, would in certain situations be shared with other high-status individuals or 
institutions. 
There are indications as early as the laws of Æthelstan that this situation had advanced and that 
certain lords were able to receive payment of wite as a matter of course. II Æthelstan stipulates 
that it is possible to come to a financial agreement with your accuser to avoid an ordeal but adds 
that this is not possible for the wite “unless he to whom it is due is willing to consent”.39 The clear 
implication is that this person was not always the king. Indeed, even earlier in the same code 
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there is a regulation forbidding the defence of fleeing thieves on the penalty of payment of the 
thief’s wergild “either to the king or to him to whom it is legally (mid ryhte) due”.40 It certainly was 
not that unusual for the recipient of fines, and even the more substantial forfeitures of wergild, to 
be someone other than the king. That fihtwite was even then one of these fines is relatively clear 
from II Edmund’s order that all fihtwites and manbots be paid in full: if all fihtwites came to him 
anyway, why would he need to command this?41 Indeed, there is a host of references in codes 
from Æthelstan’s time onwards to a class of lords who had the right to receive the wite and 
wergild payments of their men – lords who were wites wyrðe (literally, “fine-worthy”).42 Some of 
these references, indeed, do not mention the king at all, it being assumed that such fines would in 
the normal course of events go to a lord.43  
This, as will be discussed in more detail in chapter three, seems to be the root from which the 
later privilege of “sake and soke” (often simply referred to as “soke”) evolved. From post-
conquest sources it seems quite clear that in most normal circumstances the fihtwite would go to 
the lord who held soke over the slayer, the only exception being when the killer was caught on 
the spot, in which case it went to the lord with soke over the location.44 “Sake and soke” itself is a 
rather late concept. It occurs first in two Yorkshire charters of the late 950s, which appear to be 
genuine, but it does not recur in any charters or writs until the reign of Cnut.45 From his reign 
onwards, however, it becomes extremely common and by the conquest it is clearly a very widely 
held privilege indeed.46 By the end of the Anglo-Saxon period, then, after this proliferation of 
grants of sake and soke under Edward and Cnut, it seems more likely than not that the recipient 
of the fihtwite would be a lord other than the king.  The existence of lords who were considered 
wites wyrðe suggests that this was common in the tenth century as well, before the introduction 
of sake and soke.  
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The fihtwite looks, then, as if it originated as a royal fine before falling into the hands of lords. It is, 
as such, the closest that we have yet come to the idea of a royal punishment for homicide but, 
rather than being something introduced by the powerful West Saxon monarchy in the tenth 
century, it seems that it had been substantially alienated perhaps long before then. The golden 
age for the royal prosecution of homicide in Anglo-Saxon England thus looks more likely to be the 
pre-Viking period from which we get the laws of Ine and of the Kentish kings. Interestingly, the 
closest Kentish equivalent of the West Saxon fihtwite is 50 shillings, the amount payable to the 
king for killing a freeman, which is the same sum as the king’s mundbyrd – the fine payable for 
breach of his mund,  his protection.47 This is roughly the equivalent of the West Saxon fihtwite 
both in terms of function and in terms of size relative to wergilds – each sum is approximately half 
a ceorl’s wergild in the relevant legal tradition. Furthermore, H. M. Chadwick argued in 
considerable detail that the sum of 120 shillings was initially the value of the West Saxon king’s 
mund, and that the West Saxon fihtwite therefore “had its origin in a compensation for violation 
of the king’s mund”.48  
That this figure of 120 shillings remained the value of the fihtwite after Ine’s reign (688-726) is 
something we can only assume as, despites its numerous appearances in later texts, the fine’s 
value is never again specifically stated. The most we can say is that the 120 shilling sum remained 
current for some offences and seems to have been the maximum value for a wite – it is referred 
to in laws written by Archbishop Wulfstan for both Æthelred and Cnut as the cyninges wite, the 
“king’s fine”.49 It is possible, then, that the lack of specificity in references to fihtwite was the 
result of an awareness of differing local customs of the wide variety of lordships that were its 
prime beneficiaries. Indeed, there is room for doubt as to whether the 120 shilling “king’s fine” 
was really what the majority of wites wyrðe lords and, later, holders of sake and soke did in fact 
receive. Both Ine’s laws and the Leges Henrici Primi do make it clear that the fihtwite applied to 
fighting more generally, not just to killings, but the impenetrable vagueness about the level of the 
fine after the seventh century does make it rather difficult to interpret.50 Should we really, on this 
basis, believe that lords were exacting 120 shilling fines from men who had inflicted no more than 
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bruising on their opponents (worth only a single shilling in compensation)?51 Possibly not. Indeed, 
Maitland believed that the fihtwite applied only to cases of homicide.52 This would be supportable 
on the Anglo-Saxon evidence alone but as the Leges Henrici state the opposite quite explicitly, it is 
a hard position to maintain. The post-conquest evidence may represent a degree of novelty, of 
course – the unusually high level of confusion in the Leges Henrici’s discussion might suggest this, 
as could the fact that post-conquest sources introduce a new term, blodwite, into the equation53 – 
but even so it is hard to dismiss it entirely. What we do know is that fihtwite definitely applied to 
homicide, that it was to begin with associated with the sum of 120 shillings, and that it eventually 
came to be applied to even very minor acts of violence. The details of its operation in the tenth 
century must, it seems, remain obscure. 
d) The Practicality of the Feud System 
If these three core elements of the system of feud indicate anything, it is that feuding was an 
expensive business. Killing a ceorl in a situation with no additional aggravating circumstances 
would result in a wergild of 200 shillings, a manbot of 30 shillings (following Ine’s scheme) and 
(again, following Ine) a fihtwite of 120 shillings – a grand total of 350 shillings. Converting this into 
real terms is neither simple nor foolproof but it is worth attempting. 350 West Saxon shillings 
amount to 1750 pence, or a little over 145 Norman shillings.54 The Leges Henrici Primi equates 
forty sheep with sight and horns and no physical imperfections with 20 Norman shillings, and a 
horse likewise.55 By this reckoning a ceorls life would cost the slayer’s kin over 280 sheep or seven 
horses. If we use the tariff given in the Iudicia Civitatis Lundoniae we can arrive at alternative 
figures of 350 sheep, 140 pigs, 70 cows or about 47 oxen.56 Such exercises can, of course, only 
give a very rough idea of the sort of wealth that a kindred might have had to produce to end a 
feud through full payment. Clearly it was substantial and would have required the resources of an 
                                                          
 
51
 Hn 94:1 puts compensation at 5 pence (one West Saxon shilling) per blow, up to a maximum of three 
blows. 
52
 Maitland (1897), p. 88n. 
53
 For attempts to unravel the mess see Gesetze, ii, s.v. “blutig fechten” (pp. 318-20); Downer (1972), pp. 
435-37.  
54
 See Seebohm (1911), p. 12. 
55
 Hn 76:7e-76:7f. 
56
 VI As 6.2. 
Chapter One – Feud, Crime and Homicide 
31 
 
extended kin group but it is not entirely unbelievable that richer ceorlish kindreds might have 
managed full payment without being reduced to total poverty, especially if we consider the 
possibility that land, weaponry and other precious objects might have been included – Ine’s laws 
even suggest slaves.57 
We must suspect, however, that in reality there was much more room for negotiation in such 
composition agreements than the laws suggest, and that a plethora of factors including the 
relative strengths and wealth of the feuding parties would in fact determine the amount to be 
paid, the law serving in many cases as a guide or a starting point for negotiations. As has been 
noted, the very fact that Edmund had to order that fihtwite and manbot be paid in full is a sign 
that they were considered flexible, by some at least, and there is no reason to believe that the 
even more “private” transaction of the wergild was any less so.58 Indeed, the references in II 
Edmund and Wergeld to the role of witan – usually translated in this context as “wise” or 
“leading” men – in setting the time limits for the final payments of wergild and, more generally, 
“settling” feuds, suggest that local notables (most likely including churchmen) played an 
important role in peacemaking.59 It is reasonable to suspect that they had a more pragmatic 
attitude to the task than lawmakers did and would have worked towards solutions that were both 
financially and politically realistic rather than slavishly following the written laws – something of 
which there is no record even in cases that were settled in court.60 
Indeed, there is even evidence in the laws that judges were expected to exercise some discretion 
when it came to such sums – Edmund’s insistence on full payment is rather unusual. There is, in 
fact, a notable trend in the more religiously inclined laws,  those of Edgar and of Archbishop 
Wulfstan, towards the recognition that some flexibility with regard to punishments was probably 
a good thing. Indeed, it was regarded as so important an issue that, combined with a command 
that all men rich or poor have access to justice, it was given pride of place at the opening of 
Edgar’s secular code. He stipulated that there be such remission (forgifnes) of compensations “as 
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it may be justifiable (gebeorglic) before God and tolerable (aberendlic) before the world”.61 This 
phrase is borrowed by Wulfstan and used in both VI Æthelred and II Cnut as part of a more 
general push for merciful punishments. In VI Æthelred he orders that “every deed shall be 
carefully distinguished and judgement meted out in proportion to the offence”, whilst in II Cnut 
he states that even for grievous offences the punishments should be similarly becoming 
(gebeorhlic) and tolerable (aberendlic).62  
Indeed, Wulfstan’s codes contain many references to compensation being “tolerable” and in 
accordance with the nature of the offence, something which has often made his laws appear 
weak to modern commentators: to quote Richardson and Sayles, “Legislation was never so 
loquacious, so vague or so futile”.63 Part of this is undoubtedly Wulfstan’s legislative style, which 
did not differ very markedly from his homiletic style, but it seems probable that it also reflects a 
concern to promote the moderation of penalties and compensations to levels that were realistic 
and acceptable to all parties. That this emerged first in Edgar’s laws, in what may well have been 
the next secular code after II Edmund, may be significant. Perhaps this trend grew out of a 
reaction against the sort of “zero-tolerance” policy visible in Edmund’s insistence on full 
payments, and maybe also in Æthelstan’s brutal punishments for thieves.64 Given that Edmund’s 
code implies that there had previously been some room for compromise with regard to fihtwite 
and manbot and that Edgar’s code orders that this should be the case, it is justifiable to conclude 
that if Edmund did have any impact on the way these compensations were negotiated it was 
rather short-lived. 
Finally, there is the issue as to the arena in which feuds were settled. II Edmund and Wergeld are 
vague on this point but there is certainly not much to indicate that the business of composition 
was meant to take place in court. The only possible sign of this is the opening reference to witan – 
the wise – settling feuds,65 but the argument that this necessarily implied that it was to take place 
in court is tenuous in the extreme. Rather, we find that the slayer has to use an advocate or 
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forespeca to contact the opposing kin before he can approach in safety, which tells against the 
idea that this was usually expected to be transacted within the  security of a gemot.66 A similar 
sort of situation can be found in II Edward which states that if any man withholds from another 
man his rights he shall pay 30 shillings on the first and second occasions, and 120 shillings on the 
third, to the king.67 Taken at face value this could be read to mean that a refusal to pay wergild 
when it was demanded in court by the kindred of a slain man would result in a series of fines to 
the king. From such a viewpoint wergild becomes less an element of feud and more an item of 
royally enforced compensation. However, such an interpretation is very difficult to square with 
the evidence of II Edmund. If this was the case it seems remarkable that Edmund did not include 
such a key piece of anti-feud legislation in what is without doubt an anti-feud code, and even 
more remarkable that there is no indication of such procedure in either its or Wergeld’s account 
of composition procedure. Fortunately an explanation is to be found in I Edward where exactly 
the same scheme of fines is applied to withholding someone else’s rights specifically in either 
“bookland” or “folkland”.68 In this light the ruling in II Edward looks more like an abbreviated 
restatement of a law forcing holders of land to answer pleas regarding its title. Similarly, there is a 
rule in the laws of Ine that nobody should resort to wracu before demanding justice of 
someone.69 As wracu usually means vengeance, this could be interpreted as applying to taking 
vengeance without first demanding wergild from the killer. However, in this instance, as 
Whitelock argues, it is perfectly clear that once again what is referred to is not precipitate 
vengeance but distraint of property, as the penalty for doing so involves paying back double what 
has been taken.70  
Nevertheless, despite the lack of evidence, it would be unwise to discount the possibility that 
feud-related matters could be pursued in court. How else could ecclesiastical institutions have 
participated? They must have needed to claim manbots for their dependants often enough, and 
towards the end of the period a great many possessed soke and sake and would thus have 
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needed to claim fihtwite too. There is nothing to suggest that Anglo-Saxon monasteries had 
secular “advocates” like their Frankish counterparts so the only real option left for the 
enforcement of payments is the system of “public” courts. The payment of wergild, however, is 
another issue. Maybe this could be extracted without the threat of violence from the kindred 
simply by making a demand for it in court, but if it could be it is surprising that this is not referred 
to in II Edmund. At most it can have represented an option for the aggrieved kin to be placed 
alongside feud and the threat of violence that is so strikingly present in Edmund’s composition 
regulations. If this was the case, then the choice of whether to feud or to press the case in court 
must have depended on a number of factors, not least an assessment of the relative strengths of 
the parties involved.71 It could be, however, that if the opposing kin brazenly refused to pay in 
court the only viable option involved the aggrieved kindred threatening violence. There is nothing 
in the laws that suggests any agent of the crown would be prepared to do this for them. Indeed, 
Michael Clanchy has argued that even in the thirteenth century royal justices had great difficulty 
in imposing their judgements on unwilling litigants, meaning that in practice matters often had to 
be settled by private agreement.72 Though it is not impossible, there seems little reason to 
assume that royal justice was any more capable in our earlier period. 
Records of real-life events, unfortunately, cannot give us much help here. We have only one good 
example of a feud for this period: the multi-generational struggle between the families of Uhtred, 
earl of Bamburgh, and Thurbrand the Hold described in the tract De Obsessione Dunelmi. The 
basic story is that Uhtred entered into an alliance with a certain Styr Ulfsson, a wealthy Yorkshire 
Dane, marrying his daughter on the condition that he kill Thurbrand, lord of the region known as 
Holderness (Yorkshire, East Riding) and Styr’s greatest enemy. However, with the connivance of 
King Cnut, Thurbrand pre-empted this by killing Uhtred, ambushing him and his retinue as they 
entered the king’s hall in the spring of 1016. Uhtred’s son Ealdred then took vengeance by killing 
Thurbrand, but we have no details as to how, where or when he did so. The next act involved 
Thurbrand’s son Carl killing Ealdred. After some time spent in trying and failing to kill each other, 
the two decided to make peace; they swore brotherhood and apparently set off together on 
pilgrimage to Rome. This was in 1038. There was, however, some sort of delay and Carl took 
Ealdred back to his hall to entertain him; he then clearly had a change of heart and killed the 
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unsuspecting Ealdred in some nearby woods. The final act in the feud, so far as we know, was 
many years later. In the winter of 1073/74 Earl Waltheof, Ealdred’s grandson, sent a large band of 
men to catch the sons and grandsons of Carl feasting together at their hall, they succeeded in 
taking them unawares and conducted a great massacre, sparing only a certain Cnut, apparently 
“because of his innate integrity”, and returning home with much booty.73  
There is a lot that is of interest here but in terms of wider feuding practices this story does not 
offer much. 74 These men were of the highest possible rank and seem not to have had any fear of 
legal penalties affecting their actions. There is treacherous killing aplenty, as well as killing in the 
royal presence, and a massacre in a hall; most of which, as shall be seen in the next chapter, were 
by this point unequivocally offences that should have been seriously punished by the king. There 
is no sign that this occurred at all, which must surely be a result of the fact that both families were 
extremely wealthy and politically powerful, and perhaps also a reflection of the English 
monarchy’s relative weakness in Northumbria. This exceptional status makes it impossible to 
generalise with any confidence from what occurred here. The peace-making efforts of Ealdred 
and Carl –including sworn brotherhood and a pilgrimage to Rome – may well be indicative of the 
sorts of strategies that less influential kindreds might have adopted, but the utter absence of any 
agents of the crown (indeed, of any external restraint) in all this seems very unlikely to be typical. 
Likewise, the national political dimension signalled by the role of King Cnut, and drawn out in 
William Kapelle’s study, makes this a highly unusual case.75 We cannot take the independence 
shown by these families – the seeming irrelevance of the core structures of wergild, manbot and 
fihtwite as well as the utter disregard in which royal laws seem to have been held – to be in any 
way representative of wider conditions.  
e) Interpretation 
It seems, then, that our best evidence for the core of the system of feud is indeed to be found in 
normative sources. We find a core of three payments that were, it seems, meant to be present in 
the settlement of every case of homicide: wergild going to the victim’s kindred, manbot going to 
the victim’s lord and fihtwite going, in all likelihood, to the killer’s lord. Protection seems to have 
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played a large part in this. The protective characteristics of wergild seem clear, and the signs are 
that manbot was conceived in a purely protective fashion for at least some of the late Anglo-
Saxon period. Even fihtwite may have grown from protective roots. The picture, however, is not a 
simple one. There are indications that manbot and maybe also for wergild, initially designed 
simply to give compensation for harm, were being reinterpreted as protections in the tenth and 
eleventh centuries. This, interestingly, fits with Wendy Davies’s observation that protective 
power, at least in the form of what she termed “protected space”, is very difficult to locate before 
around 900, both in England and more widely in the British Isles.76 In the case of fihtwite, 
however, prohibitive power is at the fore, with any protective element that had existed seemingly 
long forgotten by the tenth century. If indeed fihtwite had initially been based on a royal 
protection covering the entire free population, we have an early example of a generalised 
protection from violence losing its protective character and becoming a general prohibition.  
We should, however, be wary of overestimating the significance of the conceptual differences 
visible in the structure of specific penalties. Did it make a great deal of difference to the way a 
lord or his men thought about manbot to know that it was calculated on the basis of the lord’s 
status rather than his men’s? Quite probably most never even contemplated it; regardless of the 
precise method of calculation the manbot still functioned as a protection and was, presumably, 
still thought of as giving legal force to the protection offered by lords to their men. The difference 
between the two methods of calculation in terms of how they would have been thought of is 
extremely subtle, possibly even illusory: at most a rather vague sense that in cases of breached 
protection there was a shameful affront to honour and a duty to avenge that was not so 
prominent in a mere entitlement to compensation for loss. Protection is a far more personal and 
emotive concept than the precise reckoning of damage suffered visible in the Visigothic law that 
reduced the wergilds of the elderly.77 Whether in practice the structure of a compensation 
payment in such a document can really tell us how a lord would feel about the loss of his man, or 
for that matter a son about the slaying of his father, is highly doubtful. What we get in these texts 
is an insight into the way that lawmakers thought about power when, we might suppose, they 
were in contemplative moods – a long way from the high passions that would accompany real 
violence. This is interesting and useful in itself, it gives us a picture of how some of the most 
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capable and worldly men of their time understood the way power worked in their societies, but to 
take these rather small distinctions so seriously as to imagine that they affected the experience of 
families who had lost loved ones could be a mistake.  
A comparison of the law on homicide with that on non-lethal violence illustrates this well. On the 
surface they appear quite different. Putting aside the fihtwite, whose workings in this regard are 
obscure, killing someone in Anglo-Saxon England results, as we have seen, in a wergild that varied 
depending on the rank of the victim’s kin and a manbot that came to depend on the rank of his 
lord. Protection, it has been argued, played a strong part in this; the killing is an offence against 
both kindred and lord. In the case of non-lethal violence, however, this complexity evaporates. 
Compensation for personal injury depends on nobody’s status, but is just a matter of comparing 
the severity of the injury against a tariff – for Wessex that in Alfred’s great law-code, the domboc. 
Personal injury is unequivocally about compensation for personal loss; there is nothing in the laws 
to suggest that even serious injuries like tearing a man’s tongue from his head, knocking out his 
eye or forcibly castrating him would constitute an offence against his kindred and lord – the 
attacker simply has to compensate the individual for his suffering.78 By the late Anglo-Saxon 
period, then, there is good evidence for seeing the wergild as protective power, and some 
suggestion that the manbot was seen in the same way, but these only applied to homicide; non-
lethal violence was represented entirely differently, as compensation for damage with no regard 
for the status of the victim or his protectors. The contrast is stark, but is it real? I think not. If 
kinsmen and lords were, as Wulfstan’s laws imply, thought of as protectors (mundboran) in cases 
of killings then surely they were thought of similarly in other cases of serious harm. The kinsmen, 
after all, had a large role in the prosecution of any claim for compensation for injury, both in 
providing supporting oaths and in supplying a credible threat of violence to help motivate the 
opponents to pay up.79 They would, in essence, have functioned in exactly the same way as when 
a wergild was at issue, and in return for their efforts they quite probably shared, to an extent, in 
the resultant payment. The victim’s lord seems, from Anglo-Saxon sources, not to have a role, but 
in one passage of the Leges Henrici Primi it is stated that blodwite was payable to the lord of the 
victim in cases of assault involving bloodshed, though it must be admitted that this does seem to 
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contradict other statements on the subject and that the role of blodwite remains obscure.80 It is 
possible, however, that blodwite was meant to represent the protection from serious violence 
that a lord offered to his men. 
It is, then, interesting to note that personal injury tariffs – quite probably one of the most deeply-
rooted and traditional elements in early medieval law – take a rather cool and calculating 
approach to violence, basing compensation on the damage caused, just as the seventh-century 
evidence for manbot does. The comparison with the emphasis on protection that is visible in late 
Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Norman accounts, where compensating the offence to the honour of a 
protector takes a greater role, is certainly instructive. There is, perhaps, an important long-term 
shift in attitudes to violence and power detectable in this. However, this shift should not be 
overestimated. No matter how compensation payments were calculated their presence, 
combined with that of kinsmen and lords willing to enforce them, must have provided some 
degree of protection to individuals which both protector and protectee would have appreciated. 
The reality of wergild, manbot and personal injury payments to those involved clearly would have 
involved protective power rather heavily, as well as some valuation of harm suffered. Even 
fihtwite, seemingly originating in the protection offered by the king to all his free men, may have 
retained some protective connotations.  
There are, then, a few important points to be made here. Firstly, most simply and most 
importantly, it should be emphasised that as far as the laws were concerned, wergild, manbot and 
fihtwite were the three essential elements in dealing with cases of homicide. In any given case 
there may have been other liabilities arising from special circumstances but these three would 
always be present unless there was something particularly justifiable about the killing – if the 
victim was killed in the act of theft, for example. They were, in this sense, the core of the system 
of feud. Secondly, protection figured very strongly in these core powers: however they are 
represented, in practical terms kindreds and lords would have used threats of violence to impose 
penalties on those who harmed people they had a duty to protect. Thirdly, this protective 
function became more, not less, explicit in the laws as time wore on; protection is something that 
is coming to the fore in the late Anglo-Saxon period, not something archaic that is fading away. 
The exception to this is fihtwite, which may have had roots in a royal protection, as Chadwick 
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argued, but was clearly a prohibition by the tenth century, and one increasingly exercised by 
lords. Here, and this is the final point, we see that the king’s role in general is a minor one and 
that it was tending to decrease in favour of local elites. The trend towards understanding lords 
and kindreds as exercising their own protective power, rather than just collecting the 
compensation for loss to which they were entitled, could be seen as fitting in with this. The core 
of the late Anglo-Saxon system of feud, then, involved the exercise of power by the kindred and 
lord of the slain as well as, it seems likely, the lord of the killer. If we believe II Edmund and 
Wergeld this was power in a very real and raw sense, the prospect of an eruption of vengeful 
violence clearly being implied by the elaborate precautions in the composition procedure. The 
king, on the other hand, had no clear role unless he happened also to be a lord or kinsman. This is 
the picture painted by the laws of how homicide cases were to be settled, and at least up until the 
early tenth century most historians would find it fairly uncontroversial. There are, however, 
arguments for a very different picture in which homicide was not a matter for this system of feud 
but an offence – a crime – punished by the crown.  
A Royal Crime of Homicide? 
We now turn to the more controversial side of this chapter, the historiographical arguments in 
favour of the introduction of a royal crime of homicide in late Anglo-Saxon England. There are two 
different arguments that need to be looked at here: that made by Naomi Hurnard in 1949 in her 
two-part article on “The Anglo-Norman Franchises” and the more recent case made by Patrick 
Wormald in both his 1999 book, The Making of English Law, and in an article entitled “Giving God 
and King their Due”.81 As is explained above, if these interpretations are accurate they render the 
system of feud outlined here largely irrelevant, any killing being a matter first and foremost for 
royal forfeiture. The aim here is to refute the arguments of Wormald and Hurnard, maintaining 
instead that the system of wergild, manbot and fihtwite remained at the heart of the system of 
dealing with simple homicide throughout the Anglo-Saxon period. The arguments will be taken in 
turn here, beginning with Wormald’s which is the most recent as well as the more detailed and 
far-reaching of the two. His argument is analysed here in two parts, one looking at his 
interpretation of II Edmund, which Wormald represents as a crucial turning-point, and the other 
looking in detail at the evidence for the existence of the system of feud after Edmund’s reign. 
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a) II Edmund  
The picture painted above of the procedure for settling a homicide case by payment of wergild 
was largely based on the two closely related texts known as Wergeld and II Edmund. These texts 
unambiguously show homicide being settled in the context of feud, with very little royal 
involvement and with a constant danger of further violence erupting. Though this clearly is 
important evidence, it obviously cannot simply be accepted as an accurate description of all 
Anglo-Saxon feuds. Indeed, Wormald goes so far as to argue that this scheme is completely at 
odds with the original intent and overall significance of II Edmund as a code intended as an 
offensive against feud. The first stage of this argument is to detach this final passage on 
composition procedure from the rest of the code. Wormald argues that this final section shows 
signs of being out of place: 
It was hardly logical to return to the topic of feud after a clause thanking his subjects for 
the peace they were upholding, and another on mundbrice and hamsocn. The law making 
person changed [from the first person], outsize initials appear in the manuscripts, and 
there was perhaps a shift of emphasis from the exemption that kins were allowed in the 
early clauses to an account of their rights and duties.82 
There is some force to this argument but it is overstated, particularly in the notion that the code 
moves away from the subject of feud. As was noted above, mundbryce is far from being irrelevant 
to feud, the king’s mund playing a key part in the composition procedure described later in the 
text  and, as shall be seen in the next chapter, hamsocn (the offence of attacking someone in a 
house) is no different. The clause thanking Edmund’s subjects for the peace they are upholding 
specifically refers to theft but it concludes with a statement that because of this he believes they 
will be all the more willing to give their support towards “this”, which can only refer to the current 
project of the closer regulation of feud.83 The point about the change from the first person has 
more weight but there is room for doubt. Though the first person is used frequently there are 
some clauses where it is not, and alongside them the final section does not look quite so 
unusual.84 Cumulatively these points may give us some grounds for suspicion, but they do not 
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demonstrate that the description of wergild payment procedure was not part of Edmund’s laws in 
their original form. 
Shorn of this final passage II Edmund appears a lot less friendly towards feud. Indeed, Wormald, 
in his seminal Making of English Law, went so far as to place it in the Carolingian tradition: 
Charlemagne, in a text which could by then have been accessible to English law-makers, 
saw what Christian “peace and unanimity” implied for vendetta; in principle at least, he 
prohibited feud outright. Edmund now followed suit.85 
Is this really what Edmund did or even what he was aiming to do? The argument that he was 
responding to ideas of Christian “peace and unanimity” is perfectly plausible, but that he actually 
prohibited feud in principle is very difficult to accept. Indeed, this statement does seem rather 
extreme by comparison to the more moderate assessment in one of Wormald’s earlier essays:  
Edmund has reduced the liability of an offender’s associates for the harm he does: 
without such a liability, an injured party’s chance of obtaining redress is seriously 
reduced, as is an offender’s opportunity to provide it.86 
This, though far from “prohibiting feud outright”, is still a heavily anti-feud interpretation. What 
this sentence implies is that feud, if conducted according to Edmund’s strictures, offered the 
injured kin a seriously reduced opportunity to exact vengeance or wergild because the liability of 
the killer’s kindred either to pay or to bear the feud has been attacked. It logically follows that in 
many cases only the killer was liable and, being unable to pay the sums involved on his own, 
would have to flee or be killed. Homicide under such a scheme leads, in effect, to banishment, not 
to feud.  
Wormald then goes on to look at evidence of how violent disputes were conducted in practice 
and draws the following somewhat speculative but far-reaching conclusion: 
So the same sources or types of sources which tell us about Norman feuding offer nothing 
for the late Anglo-Saxon era except punished homicide. This could of course be the result 
of the far richer wealth of post-conquest evidence. But it might also indicate that 
                                                          
 
85
 Wormald (1999a), p. 311. 
86
 Wormald (1999e), pp. 337-8. 
Chapter One – Feud, Crime and Homicide 
42 
 
Edmund’s strictures on feud took effect; even that the Old English “state” had begun to 
claim Weber’s “monopoly of legitimate violence”. If so, it was a monopoly that kings had 
no hesitation in exploiting vigorously. There is, to say no more, reason to think that the 
English scene was quite unlike that in Professor White’s Touraine: until, that, is conquest 
superimposed the French scene upon it.87 
This passage makes a number of extremely important suggestions. Firstly, that simple homicide 
was demonstrably punished by the crown in late Anglo-Saxon England; secondly, that this might 
be the result of the regulations of II Edmund; thirdly, that there was a “state” in Anglo-Saxon 
England that could conceivably claim Weber’s “monopoly of legitimate violence”; and finally, 
though closely related to the first point, that feud was so non-existent in England that it was 
actually reintroduced after the Norman conquest. These will all be examined in this chapter but 
for now the pertinent issue is II Edmund – can this text really support the claims being made for 
it? 
II Edmund is traditionally divided into a prologue and seven clauses of unequal size. The final 
clause on wergild, which Wormald argues was a later addition, has already been analysed whilst 
the fifth and sixth clauses, which respectively thank his subjects for upholding the peace and set 
the penalty for mundbryce and hamsocn as forfeiture of life and property, have also been touched 
upon. The prologue begins as a fairly formulaic address informing all Edmund’s people, high and 
low, that he has been considering with his witan how best to promote Christianity. It goes on to 
stress the importance of peace and concord and states that he and his witan are greatly 
distressed by “the unjust and manifold fights between us”, identifying this as the reason for the 
laws that follow. The second clause concerns those who flee to churches or to the king’s burh and 
states that anyone attacking such a person will forfeit his property and become, essentially, an 
outlaw; the third clause is an injunction that fihtwite and manbot should be paid in full and not 
forgiven; and the fourth prohibits anyone who has spilt the blood of a man from having the 
protection (soc) of the king’s household until he has begun penance, compensation of the kin and 
submitted to justice (rihte).88  
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It is the first clause, however, together with its three sub-clauses, that forms the basis of 
Wormald’s argument. It begins: 
If henceforth anyone slay a man, he is himself to bear the feud, unless he can with the aid 
of his friends within twelve months pay compensation at the full wergild, whatever class 
he [the slain man] may belong to.89 
Though this seems to imply that it is solely the killer who is to bear the feud – that is, be liable to 
suffer violent vengeance from the victim’s kin – this is not how the text should be read. Indeed, 
Wormald himself is careful not to employ such a reading.90 The reasons for this are primarily the 
lack of any penalty for deviation from the rule – for killing anyone other than the slayer in revenge 
– and the logical implications of the following clauses. It, and indeed the stipulation of twelve 
months, should rather be read as a statement of ideals serving to introduce more concrete 
measures. Essentially it is saying that vengeance really is best directed at the slayer and wergild 
really ought to be paid within a year.91 
It is the following sub-clauses that bear the weight of Wormald’s analysis. The first reads: 
If, however, the kindred abandons him, and is not willing to pay compensation for him, it 
is then my will that all that kindred is to be exempt from the feud (unfah), except the 
actual slayer (handdæda), if they give him neither food nor protection (mund) 
afterwards.92 
This, then, is the great innovation of Edmund’s code. If a kindred group wishes to disown one of 
its members who has provoked a feud then it can do so, as long as it then shuns him to the extent 
of no longer feeding or protecting him. The next two sub-clauses give penalties for violating this 
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rule. Firstly, should any one of his kinsmen thereafter harbour the handdæda, that kinsman shall 
then bear the feud with the victim’s kin and, because he had previously disowned him (forðam hi 
hine forsocan ær), also forfeit all his property to the king.93 Secondly, should any from the other 
kin take vengeance on anyone other than the true killer (rihthanddæda), that person will become 
the enemy of the king and all his friends and lose all his property.94 Dorothy Whitelock believed 
that the effect of this was to limit vengeance to the actual killer in all circumstances, effectively 
making the rest of the kindred immune to all feud violence, but the context makes it clear that 
this is incorrect: it is only once his kinsmen have disowned the rihthanddæda that they cease to 
be liable for his actions.95 This, indeed, as Wormald quite clearly understood, is the reward that 
was expected to motivate kindreds to abandon their homicidal members in the first place.96 
Less clear is the significance of these statements. The picture Wormald paints is rather difficult to 
support. This is a measure a long way from outlawing feud and in no way establishes royal 
punishment of homicide. What it does establish is an option for a kindred to discard a 
troublesome member and thereby escape the violent or financial consequences of the feud he 
has provoked. This, however, is only an option and not necessarily an attractive one. In order to 
take advantage of this the kin needed to refuse the killer food and protection from that point on. 
From that point the opposing kin, or indeed anyone else, could kill the ejected kinsman and 
expect no reprisals from his erstwhile family. He would, clearly, have to flee the area. Quite 
probably his old kin would assist him to some degree in this, perhaps with money, maybe before 
disowning him, but even so it cannot have done much to restore honour to what must have been 
seen as a cowardly act of abandonment – a refusal to fulfil the obligations of kinship. It is easy to 
imagine that in some circumstances such an act would be socially justifiable, but we must equally 
suspect that in many others it would not – leaving the abandoning kindred dishonoured and the 
slain man’s relatives unsatisfied. Even if it were accepted, following Wormald’s logic, that this 
measure offered an attractive option and was taken up by the majority of kins in such situations, 
then there are still no grounds to posit royal punishment of homicide. Instead, in such a situation, 
the initial killer faces either exile or death at the hands of the injured kin. It is only if a member of 
                                                          
 
93
 II Em 1:2. 
94
 II Em 1:3. 
95
 See E.H.D. i, p. 402n (no. 43, n. 1). 
96
 Wormald (1999e), p. 337. 
Chapter One – Feud, Crime and Homicide 
45 
 
this kin, frustrated by the absence of the original killer, slays someone declared unfah that we find 
royal punishment – but this is not simple homicide it is aggravated by the special circumstances of 
unfah status. 
It is, nonetheless, fair to conclude that if this measure were commonly employed in the form set 
out in II Edmund it would have had serious consequences for feud. As Wormald notes, these 
measures seem to remove the possibility of either revenge or compensation: the killer is likely to 
flee, his kin is no longer liable to pay compensation and the injured kin can do nothing to avenge 
the dead man. However, we perhaps ought to show some scepticism here. The workability of the 
law depends on how realistic the threat of royal intervention was. If a kin did not believe that 
their unfah status would be respected after abandoning an individual member and any breach 
firmly punished by the king, then there are problems. If the threat of royal intervention is not 
credible then the opposing kin have no need to respect the abandonment and there is little to 
restrain them from taking whatever vengeance they feel appropriate, or coming to some sort of 
financial settlement with the kin that remain.  
If such was the situation, there was little to entice the kin to abandon the killer in the first place. 
The tradition in Anglo-Saxon law up to this point looks more realistic in this light. Æthelberht 
states that if the killer departs from the land his kinsmen still have to pay half the wergild.97 Alfred 
is less generous to the kinsmen, but follows a similar logic when discussing those without paternal 
relatives. In such a situation his maternal relatives are to pay their third and his gegyldan another 
third, for the final third he must flee (for ðriddan ðæl he fleo).98 Similarly, if he also lacks maternal 
kin his gegyldan must pay half but for the rest he must flee.99 Some of this older tradition, in fact, 
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seems to be reflected in poetry where the theme of exile as a result of feud is a strong one. We 
might think, in particular, of the exile of Beowulf’s father Ecgðeo at Hroðgar’s court, which we are 
told he was forced into by his kindred because he had killed Heaþolaf, a Wulfing, and they wished 
to avert a feud.100 The indications of a feud context for exile in the Husband’s Message are also 
strong.101 Had flight by the actual killer not offered some amelioration in the situation of those left 
behind, it is difficult to understand its being regarded as anything other than cowardice, which is 
clearly not the case. The important point here is that though Edmund’s measures do stand in a 
tradition allowing killers to flee and their kindreds to then pay less than the full wergild in 
compensation, they are more extreme than anything that had come before as, in effect, they 
relieved the kin of all responsibility. 
b) Feud after Edmund 
If we now understand the content and pedigree of Edmund’s legislation, what remains is to assess 
its effect. To do this both subsequent laws and the actual cases of which we have some record will 
be examined. First, the legislation. The possibility that the idea of allowing a killer to flee and be 
entirely disowned by his kin turned out to be both an impractical and unpopular innovation is 
perhaps indicated by the fact that it is not found in any other Anglo-Saxon law-code. In particular 
its absence from Cnut’s codes, which draw very widely from the corpus of laws that preceded 
them, is puzzling if we are to believe that it had far-reaching effects.102 Even its appearance in the 
Leges Henrici Primi is rather unusual as rather than simply stating his measures as law, as is done 
in most of the work, the author introduces it “Scriptum est in legibus regis Eadmundi”.103 It could 
be that his doing this is a sign that he did not regard it as “living” law, something which might also 
explain his immediate resorting to Lex Salica for a slightly contradictory law allowing kinsmen to 
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disown their kindreds.104 In any case, even without such doubts, the simple repetition of an Anglo-
Saxon measure in the Leges Henrici can certainly not be held to demonstrate contemporary 
relevance. It must also be remembered that Edmund’s reign was a brief one (939-46) and that this 
code seems to have been a secular response (though not a counterpart) to the ecclesiastical 
I Edmund, which because it mentions Archbishop Oda cannot have been made earlier than Easter 
942. II Edmund must, then, have been produced at the very earliest towards the end of 942; at 
the very outside he can have had only three and half years in which to enforce this potentially 
unpopular law before his stabbing on 26 May 946. Indeed, this could just as easily have been only 
six months or a year.105 If his successor, Eadred, lacked the will to enforce Edmund’s measures it is 
easy to imagine that they might have fallen into disuse. We do, at any rate, have some grounds to 
suspect that this legislation may not have had any great impact on reality.106  
If there is no evidence to support the continued application of Edmund’s laws, the same cannot 
be said for the continued existence of feud. Instead there are many indications that feud and kin 
responsibility remained standard. The most notable of these occurs in VIII Æthelred and I Cnut, 
which state that any man in holy orders who is charged with feud (fæhþe) and accused of having 
killed or instigated a killing can clear himself (by oath) with the help of his kin, who must 
otherwise bear the feud with him or pay compensation.107 Those without kin can clear themselves 
with the help of fellow churchmen or must face the ordeal of the consecrated host (corsnæde),108 
whilst monks cannot either receive or pay feud compensations (fæhðbote) having left their kin-
law (mægðlage) when they accepted rule-law (regollage).109 If Archbishop Wulfstan, the author of 
both these codes and a staunch defender of ecclesiastical privilege, can countenance feud for the 
secular clergy it surely cannot have been effectively prohibited by Edmund’s laws over seventy 
years beforehand. Indeed, in a discussion of tithings in II Cnut, he specifically highlights the value 
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of a wergild, ordering that every man over twelve years of age must be in one if he wants to be 
“lade wyrðe” (to have the right to make an exculpatory oath) or “weres wyrðe, gyf hine hwa 
afylle” (to have the right to wergild if anyone kills him).110 It is a key part of Wormald’s argument 
that your wergild, from the tenth century, increasingly appears in laws as the  sum you would 
forfeit to the king for a variety of offences, and in this light the possession of a high one looks 
more like a burden than a privilege. 111  Here, however, we see the other side of the story, a clear 
statement that the wergild remained valuable for its original purpose – compensation to a man’s 
kindred in the event of his being killed. 
Even more convincing is the evidence of the Cambridge Thegns’ Guild, whose regulations are 
preserved on a detached leaf of a gospel book that once, in all probability, belonged to the Abbey 
of Ely. They were entered there after a grant that can be dated between 970 and 999, making it 
clear that they date from either the eleventh century or the end of the tenth. The guild, like the 
others about which we have information, existed to provide for the funerary expenses of its 
members but, uniquely among the surviving records, it also served to help its members in feud:112 
And if anyone kill a guild-brother, nothing other than £8 is to be accepted as 
compensation. If the slayer scorns to pay the compensation, all the guildship is to avenge 
the guild-brother and all bear the feud. If then one avenges him, all are to bear the feud 
alike. And if any guild-brother slays a man and does it as an avenger by necessity and to 
remedy the insult to him, and the slain man’s wergild is 1200 *shillings], each guild 
brother is to supply half a mark to his aid; if the man is a ceorl, 2 ores; if he is servile [or 
Welsh?] (wylisc), 1 ore. If, however, the guild-brother kill anyone foolishly and wantonly, 
he is himself to be responsible for what he has done.113 
This, shows the responsibility of even a seemingly "private" guild for feud, and clearly 
demonstrates the importance of feud in post-Edmundian England. The responsibility of the wider 
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kin (or in this case of guild-members) for the actions of individuals, the legitimacy of revenge 
killings, and the alternative of compensation via wergild, are constants in English laws. At no point 
is there any legislation providing for prosecution of simple, unaggravated homicide by the crown.  
This is hardly a revolutionary discovery – indeed, for a long time it was the standard interpretation 
– but in the light of recent scholarship it has needed reasserting. Wormald’s picture of late Anglo-
Saxon England as a society to which feud had to be reintroduced by the Normans does, however, 
require one final step before it can be safely set aside. The key to his argument is not so much 
that the laws suggest feud was eradicated but rather that the “evidence of how things were”114 
shows this to have been the case: 
It is not because kings made rules for the control of feud, the holding of courts and the 
punishment of “crimes”, which might even encompass “false” pleading, that I believe 
these things to have happened. It is because I find them happening, in ground-level 
conflicts.115 
If indeed Wormald had found ground-level conflicts that could demonstrate royal punishment of 
simple homicide as “crime” his arguing for such a situation in spite of the evidence of the codes 
would not be unreasonable. However, the evidence he does put forward is very weak indeed. Of 
the nine cases of homicide that he has assembled for the entire Anglo-Saxon period only two have 
any hope of being regarded as “simple”: five involve the killing of people whom we might expect 
to be under royal protection (two royal reeves, a king’s thegn, an earl and an abbot), one involved 
slaying in defence of a thief,  and one was a case of infanticide – in which the crime was proved by 
means of a beard miraculously falling off when its erstwhile owner unwittingly swore a false oath 
– and which involved no royal punishment at all, only a penitential grant of land.116 
Wormald’s case thus rests entirely on two, very poorly documented, cases. The first occurs in the 
Anglo-Saxon boundary-clause of a bilingual charter from 998 in favour of Ealdorman Leofwine, 
which mentions that three hides of land had been forfeited by a certain Wistan to King Æthelred 
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for “unrihtum monslihte”.117 We know nothing more about this case than that the man-slaying 
that took place was considered unriht. We do not know what it was that made this killing unriht 
and we cannot be sure that there were no aggravating factors involved. It is possible, indeed, that 
the reference to this as unriht killing is in itself an indication that there was something especially 
heinous about it. We cannot be certain, either, that this forfeiture did not relate to a penalty we 
already know about, perhaps the fihtwite. The second case, also from the late tenth century, 
offers slightly more detail. It comes from a list of sureties for estates that had been acquired for 
Peterborough Abbey by Abbot Ealdwulf in the late tenth century. The relevant passage is as 
follows: “These are the sureties that Osgot found for Abbot Ealdwulf for the land at Castor that he 
paid over to him for the outlawry that he incurred through slaying Styrcyr”. 118 Here there is 
certainly something rather odd going on. This is not, in the first instance, a royal forfeiture at all 
but one to an abbot who seems to have the right both to take the property of outlaws and, a later 
passage in the same document explicitly states, to pronounce outlawry himself.119 This, in its own 
right, is potentially important evidence for the possession of significant judicial powers by 
monastic houses, but quite apart from this the same considerations apply here as did to Wistan’s 
case. Osgot may have killed Styrcyr but how he did so is unclear; it could have been, as Wormald 
assumes, a case of simple homicide or this could be a tersely functional allusion to a much more 
complex situation. Possibly Abbot Ealdwulf was involved because Styrcyr was under his protection 
in some way, in sanctuary perhaps, or maybe he also had the right to forfeitures for an offence 
such as hamsocn (which was at first punished by outlawry under King Edmund and may still have 
been so at this point).120 These sources, in short,  are far too terse and ambiguous to demonstrate 
the existence of a royal crime of homicide. 
There is, then, a very good chance that both incidents can be explained without having to posit a 
royal crime of homicide, punished by land forfeiture, which somehow managed to exist without 
ever being explicitly mentioned in any of the law-codes. The word unriht may actively tell against 
Wormald’s interpretation in Wistan’s case, and the involvement of Abbot Eadulf certainly does in 
Osgot’s, but even if these references were absent these would still be still very flimsy grounds on 
                                                          
 
117
 S. 892; Napier and Stevenson (1895), no. 8; Wormald (1999d), no. 61. 
118
 S. 1448a; Robertson (1956), no. 40; Wormald (1999d), no. 50. 
119
 S. 1448a; Robertson (1956), no. 40; Wormald (1999d), no. 51.  
120
 II Em 6. 
Chapter One – Feud, Crime and Homicide 
51 
 
which to base such a far-reaching theory. In such terse records that do little more than associate a 
homicide with a land transaction, offering no description of the events surrounding the killing at 
all, it does not seem at all unlikely that the sort of aggravating circumstance that is the key to this 
issue would fail to be recorded. It is, then, the ideas of vengeance and compensation for 
homicide, not of punishment by the crown, that come through most strongly in the evidence for 
what came after Edmund’s reign. Edmund had not outlawed feud, he had offered the kindred a 
means to escape from it and there are no indications in later law that even this proved to be a 
successful measure. As Wormald later wrote, rather undermining his earlier argument, “Edmund’s 
second code is generally conspicuous for its lack of effect”.121 With regard to his measures 
allowing kindreds to opt out of feud by abandoning their members, at least, this seems a fair 
judgement. Kin-responsibility may not exactly resound throughout later legal texts, but why 
should it? It was traditional, a value or assumption shared by society, not an innovation that 
needed to be set out in detail, and it surfaces often enough for us to be assured of its continuing 
presence through to the latest extant Anglo-Saxon laws. Wormald’s article makes some very good 
points regarding royal prosecution of theft, and is valuable in its highlighting of how even very 
prominent individuals had to go through the system of courts. Indeed, if we look at offences 
relating to property and those which can be interpreted as treason, Wormald’s picture of a 
powerful royal ideology of crime and punishment is a convincing one.122 However, where he 
attempts to promote the idea of the Anglo-Saxon “state” yet further, by assigning to it a 
monopoly of jurisdiction over homicide, he goes beyond what the evidence can support. 
c) Hurnard’s Case 
Hurnard’s case for the existence of a royal crime of homicide is considerably less detailed than 
Wormald’s, appearing only in one extended footnote in a larger article about immunities.123 It can 
thus be dealt with more swiftly. To the best of my knowledge it has never been analysed in detail 
by other historians; though Wormald knew the article well, describing it as “masterly”, he at no 
point mentions Hurnard’s contribution on this issue and his own argument on the subject does 
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not reuse any of Hurnard’s points.124 Her case relies almost entirely on her interpretation of one 
passage in the Leges Henrici Primi, within which is the phrase “homicidium wera soluatur uel 
werelada negetur”, which is translated by Downer “homicide shall be compensated for by the 
amount of the wergild or it shall be denied by an oath of exculpation equal in value to the 
wergild”.125 Hurnard’s argument is that this referred not to the victim’s wergild being paid to his 
kinsmen but to the culprit’s wergild being paid to the king. Obviously, the passage alone neither 
says nor implies this, so her argument relied entirely on context. The phrase is part of a list of ten 
offences where all the others involve the offender forfeiting his own wergild to the king. 
Furthermore, it is in a section that is followed by the statement “the matters decided above are 
those which are assigned to the justice or mercy of the king and to his treasury.”126 Logically, then, 
Hurnard argued, the Leges Henrici Primi author must be telling us that homicidium had become a 
royal crime where the offender was punished by forfeiting his wergild. 
This, to my mind, is to place a great deal of reliance on the structural integrity of the Leges Henrici 
Primi, a notoriously complex and convoluted document. Furthermore, if we look at the passage in 
full in the original Latin more problems emerge: 
Hec emendantur wera si ad emendationem ueniat: qui in ecclesia fecerit homicidium; 
persolutio uel robarie; qui furem plegiatum amiserit; qui ei obuiauerit et gratis sine 
uociferatione dimiserit; qui ei consentiet in aliquo; homicidium wera soluatur uel 
werelada negetur; si uxoratus homo fornicetur; qui uiduam duxerit ante unum annum; 
qui in hostico uel familia regis pacem fregerit, si ad emendandum uenire poterit; si 
prepositus pro firme adiutorio witam exigat.127 
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If we look at the structure of this passage, the italicised text is unique among the other items in 
the list in that grammatically it forms a complete sentence, not beginning with a “qui” or “si” like 
the other passages. Whereas all the other entries require the introductory passage, stating that 
they are to be compensated by wergild if compensation is allowable, in order to make sense, the 
passage on homicide states it all again, albeit concisely. What does this mean? Possibly the author 
is trying to indicate that there is something unusual about this particular entry, that unlike the 
others the wergild was intended for the victim’s family and not the king. Possibly it is a sign that 
this was a well known phrase, a pithy way of stating the rules for denying or compensating 
homicide, that has been inserted into the passage because it is indeed, as the sentence opens by 
explaining, an instance in which wergild is the appropriate compensation. It looks, at any rate, out 
of place and we might well suspect that this is because the passage was not present in the first 
draft, perhaps added later as an afterthought. Thus, though the relationship of this passage to the 
statement that all the above are assigned to the justice or mercy of the king (which occurs six 
pages later in the printed edition) is logically correct, the possibility that this does not represent 
the author’s meaning seems high. Whatever else this passage is, it is not conclusive evidence of 
the existence of a royal crime of homicide. Indeed, if we were relying on this evidence alone we 
would be left in considerable doubt as to what the author’s view on the subject was. 
Fortunately, though, the author of the Leges Henrici was perfectly willing to make his 
understanding of homicide plain on other occasions. The clearest example of this is from the 
opening of chapter 69: 
Concerning the slaying of an Englishman. If any Englishman is slain without fault on his 
part, compensation shall be paid to his relatives according to the amount of his wergild 
and the custom of the district relating to wergild. Wite and manbot shall be paid to the 
appropriate lords as justice requires, in accordance with the amount of the deceased’s 
wergeld.128 
This, to my mind, is clear enough. The Leges Henrici supports precisely the approach to homicide 
that is to be found in the pre-conquest legislation: the old system of wergild, manbot and fihtwite. 
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I can see no reason to prefer Hurnard’s extremely uncertain interpretation of the passage 
analysed above to this uncomplicated and wholly explicit statement. Once this is established, 
Hurnard’s supporting evidence collapses very swiftly. It consists of the Domesday entry for 
Kintbury in Berkshire, which states that Walter FitzOthere held half a hide exempt from all 
customs “excepta forisfactura regis sic est latrocinium, homicidium, heinfara et fracta pacis”.129 
This does appear to imply that homicidium was a royal forfeiture but it is a single, isolated case 
and could simply be an error, perhaps a mistaken rendering of fihtwite or, as Hurnard herself 
suggests, a case of “homicidium being confused with murdrum, the fine payable by the district”.130 
This seems to me to be significantly more likely than Hurnard’s suggestion that there was a royal 
crime of homicide which left no record whatsoever in the legal texts of the day except for this one 
Domesday entry and one ambiguous statement in the Leges Henrici. There is, in short, no more 
reason to follow Hurnard’s reasoning than Wormald’s in positing the existence of such a crime. 
The reason we are not explicitly told of it is the simple one: it did not exist. 
Conclusions 
As this analysis has shown, the system of feud is evident in the Anglo-Saxon law-codes with no 
sign that it had, in principle, been proscribed at any point before the conquest. Indeed, the 
evidence of Anglo-Norman legal texts would suggest that this was still the case for some years 
after 1066. The evidence that we have for violent feuds with tit-for-tat vengeance killings 
occurring in practice is, admittedly, slight – the one good pre-conquest example is that of Uhtred, 
Thurbrand and their descendants, and in featuring such powerful men and in occurring in 
Northumbria it may well be far from typical.131 However, the absence of examples of long-term, 
violent feuds in Old English sources is, to some extent, unsurprising. These sources tell us about 
what interested their writers and contemporary readers, and this almost always meant 
churchmen and most often it meant monks. Our accounts of disputes in Anglo-Saxon England are 
thus inevitably skewed towards land disputes involving the monastic houses that recorded them – 
even the feud of Uhtred and Thurbrand is only known to us because of the writer’s interest in 
certain lands alienated from the bishopric of Durham. Indeed, we probably only know about it 
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because the writer happened to find it an interesting diversion; he could easily have accomplished 
his main task without including most of the violent details. Other than this, we do find records of 
aristocratic violence in narrative sources such as the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle  but these tend to be 
very brief – we would have no idea about the feud of Uhtred and Thurbrand if we relied on them 
alone – and their interest is invariably in the highest levels of the nobility. There is no particular 
reason that we would expect to find details of lower-level feud violence in the documentation 
that survives to us from the period before 1066.  
It should be emphasised, however, that even such a poor haul of evidence of violent feuding in 
practice easily outweighs the evidence that simple homicide tended to be dealt with in any other 
way than through the core system of feud consisting of fihtwite, manbot and wergild. As we have 
seen, the case for its being punished by the crown as “crime” is tenuous at best. But this is the 
sort of black or white approach to the issue that we really need to get away from. There are more 
than just two options here – with prevalent violent bloodfeuds on one side and comprehensive 
royal jurisdiction over violence on the other. What we need is a much more subtle picture of the 
grey area in between. There is no convincing evidence for an outright prohibition of homicide, let 
alone violence in general, by English kings, but this does not mean that these kings did not try, 
and succeed, in limiting outbreaks of feud violence by other means. This chapter has found that 
the basic system of feud outlined here continued up to 1066, and probably beyond, with the 
threat of violence from slain men’s kindreds and lords remaining, at least in theory. The West 
Saxon monarchy never attempted to destroy this system, but – crucially – that does not mean it 
was inactive. Rather, the following chapter argues, tenth- and eleventh-century English kings 
gradually carved themselves a major role in the system of feud and worked within that system to 
make the use of violence an increasingly difficult, dangerous and expensive option.  
 56 
 
Chapter Two  
Protection, Prohibition and the 
Regulation of Violence 
Introduction 
The previous chapter  has shown that the core of the system of feud, essentially the three 
payments for simple homicide, wergild, manbot and fihtwite, persisted throughout the Anglo-
Saxon period. It argued that there is no convincing case for a royal crime of homicide before the 
conquest, something which would have removed most of the relevance from these payments. 
These are important points but they are only the foundation of a full understanding of how 
violence was regulated in Anglo-Saxon England. In wergild, manbot and fihtwite we have only the 
core of the Anglo-Saxon system of feud, not the full picture. In knowing that they remained the 
central legal means of settling cases of simple homicide, we know that we have to afford 
significant emphasis to the context of feud in our understanding of violence in Anglo-Saxon 
society. We cannot envisage a context consisting purely of prohibition by central authority and we 
certainly cannot, as Wormald did, talk about the Anglo-Saxon “state” having a “monopoly of 
legitimate violence”.1 This gets us only so far, however. We know about the core of the system of 
feud, which remained fairly constant throughout the period, and we know one way that Anglo-
Saxon kings did not try to change it; but what we do not know about are the more peripheral 
elements of the system of feud  and what exactly it was that kings did try to do. This is the 
purpose of this chapter. It is an investigation into the ways that Anglo-Saxon kings did manage to 
extend their jurisdiction over violence to a point where it would have been relatively difficult to 
seriously assault anyone, let alone kill them, without offending royal justice.  
Though kings did not, as was shown, have a very great involvement in the settlement of cases of 
simple homicide, it does not follow that they were not greatly involved in the regulation of 
violence. Many homicides would not have been simple, they would have incurred additional 
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penalties because of some particular feature or combination of features. The killing could, for 
instance, have been committed in a particular way that was prohibited by the crown, or it might 
have taken place in a protected space, or the victim might have been under specific royal 
protection – there was a multitude of ways in which violence could incur penalties beyond the 
core payments of wergild, manbot and fihtwite. The theory put forward by this chapter is that it 
was with these extra rules working alongside the system of wergilds that kings gained a major – 
possibly even dominant – role in the regulation of violence. More specifically, it argues that it was 
through the innovative use of protective power, not through prohibition, that this role was 
created. The chapter aims to do this by creating a reasonably complete picture of the extra rules 
governing violence, looking not only at protections but also at prohibitive powers and even some 
measures which could be characterised as hybrids of both protection and prohibition. In providing 
this comprehensive account of royal jurisdiction over violence, it will also identify the areas in 
which there were innovations and give assessments of their success. It will, I hope, give a broader 
picture of the development  of the Anglo-Saxon system of feud, not only of the increase in royal 
powers but also of their relationship to other key players such as the church and the nobility. The 
aim is to provide not only an account of the growth of royal power but also a sober assessment of 
its limitations. This chapter attempts to do this in three sections. Firstly, it looks at what seems 
quite clearly to be a royal prohibitive power, that of morð, or murder. Secondly, it looks at what I 
term “complex protections”, hybrid measures, with both protective and prohibitive elements, 
intended to prevent violence breaking out between parties with a pre-existing relationship of 
some sort. Most often this means preventing violence between hostile parties in a feud. Finally, 
and most extensively, it looks at protections and the way that they were expanded across this 
period.  
Prohibitive Power: Understanding Morð 
The clearest prohibition on killing in Anglo-Saxon legislation is that against murder or morð, but 
this is difficult to define. Apart from its occurrence in Æthelstan’s Grately code and the fragment 
known as Be Blaserum (which Wormald associates with that code on linguistic grounds)2, it 
appears only in laws of King Æthelred and King Cnut whose authorship has been attributed to 
Archbishop Wulfstan. In all but two instances, both in Cnut’s laws, the term occurs as part of 
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compounds, thus we hear of morð-deeds, morð-slayings and morð-works.3 All of the Wulfstanian 
instances of morð compounds occur in lists of unrighteous deeds to be avoided or evil people to 
be shunned, usually alongside such figures as witches, perjurers and magicians. The relevance of 
these associations to the contemporary legal meaning of morð has, however, been dismissed by 
Bruce O’Brien on the grounds that such lists are simply Anglo-Saxon renderings of biblical 
models.4 Because of this, and because they do not mention any legal penalties, these passages 
can be safely ignored. What remains are the two usages linked with Æthelstan’s reign and the two 
uncompounded instances of morð in Cnut’s laws. Like the later Wulfstanian examples, 
II Æthelstan treats morð alongside witchcraft and sorcery but it does at least offer a penalty: that 
of death if the charge is undeniable.5 Be Blaserum deals with murderers and arsonists and 
prescribes the threefold ordeal for those charged.6 Neither can offer significant enlightenment as 
to the meaning of the term. The uses in Cnut’s code are slightly more helpful. In II Cnut 64 æbere 
morð, flagrant or undeniable murder, is listed alongside a number of other serious offences as 
being botleas – that is, uncompensatable.  
The other passage, II Cnut 56, needs to be examined in detail. Robertson’s edition and translation 
is fairly representative of the traditional reading: 
Open morð. 
Gif open morð weorðe ðæt man amyrred sy, agyue man magum [ðone banan]. 
Murder which is discovered. 
If anyone dies by violence and it becomes evident that it is a case of murder, the 
murderer shall be given up to the kinsmen [of the slain man].7 
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The murderer, presumably, was not intended to live long after this meeting with the relatives of 
his victim, which makes it all the more puzzling that the following clause, dealing with accusations 
and exculpatory oaths, appears to assume the killer is still alive.8 Stefan Jurasinski has recently 
attempted to reintroduce some sense into our understanding of this law. He shows that the idea 
that the killer is to be handed over to the king is in fact an Anglo-Norman error. If we strip away 
the twelfth-century emendation  ðone banan (“the killer”), and follow the Latin of the Instituta 
Cnuti rather than that of the Quadripartitus and the Consiliatio Cnuti, we come up with a text in 
which it is not the killer but the body of the victim that is given to the kin.9 He goes on to interpret 
this law with reference to some continental parallels and argues that it was precisely the killer’s 
failure to return the body that made this homicide morð: 
The term “morð” as it is used in II Cnut 56 most likely bears a meaning consistent with its 
cognates in Frankish and Scandinavian legal literature: not simply “secret or stealthy 
killing”, a definition that is too vague, but “killing followed by concealment of the victim’s 
corpse” or “a failure to provide the kin with the victim’s corpse.”10 
According to Jurasinski, then, the homicide was morð because the killer failed to fulfil his 
obligation to return the body, or even hid it, and it became open morð because someone found 
this body. It was presumably this someone who then had to return the body to the kin and the 
following clause describes the process of accusation and exculpatory oath that would likely 
follow. 
But how solid is Jurasinski’s definition of morð? As he himself notes, this essentially secretive 
crime hardly seems compatible with the term æbere morð used in II Cnut 64 and on this basis 
alone it seems likely that morð requires further definition.11 Other than this, however, it seems 
likely that Jurasinski’s interpretation is broadly correct, though it could perhaps be refined a little. 
Jurasinski in effect offers two explanations: morð is either the breach of a prohibition on hiding 
the bodies of slain men or it is a failure to perform a duty to return such bodies to their families. 
Both of these, to my mind, seem a little too precise. A requirement to hide the body would rule 
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out situations where the killer simply left it where it fell and told no-one of its location. On the 
other hand, the requirement that the killer physically return the body is rather elusive. Nowhere 
is any evidence of such a requirement cited. There is a passage from the Leges Henrici Primi, 
according to which a lord can demand a body, but the circumstances envisaged are odd: he needs 
to give security and offer to do full justice for the slain man and, most importantly, failure to 
return the body requires only extra compensation; it is not botleas, as it would have been if it 
were regarded as morð.12  
What we do have evidence for is a requirement that the killer publicly give notice both of his 
responsibility for the killing and of the location of the body. Jurasinski quotes the well-known 
passage from the thirteenth-century Icelandic compilation Grágás that details this ritual, known 
as víglýsing,13 but this roughly equivalent passage in the Leges Henrici Primi escaped his attention: 
If anyone kills a person in the course of a feud or in self-defence, he shall appropriate 
nothing at all for himself from the dead man’s possessions, neither his horse nor his 
helmet nor his sword nor indeed any property; but he shall lay out the body itself in the 
manner customary for the dead, his head turned towards the west, the feet towards the 
east, resting on his shield, if he has one, and he shall drive his spear into the ground and 
arrange his arms about it and put a halter on the horse. He shall make this known at the 
nearest village and to the first person he meets, and also to the lord that has soke, so that 
it may be possible for a case to be established or denied as against the slain man’s 
relatives or associates.14 
Given that no source for this passage has been discovered, and that the reference to the lord of 
the soke is probably indicative of an English origin, it may well be that this passage represents 
genuine custom. It looks as if, rather than actually returning the body, English killers were 
expected to lay it out honourably and make both its whereabouts and their own responsibility 
public. If, then, we are to define morð as the failure of a killer to carry out a legal obligation 
regarding his deed, this seems the best candidate for such an obligation. It has the benefit of 
being entirely consistent with II Cnut 56: any corpse that is discovered by a third party will, almost 
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by definition, constitute a case of open morð if morð is a killing to which the killer will not publicly 
own up. It thus seems that if we shift away from Jurasinski’s focus on the centrality of the fate of 
the corpse, and towards a slightly broader definition focused on the concealment of the deed 
itself and responsibility for it, we are coming closer to the truth. This not only makes sense of the 
English evidence but also accords perfectly with what is known of the Scandinavian tradition. 
Attempts to define morð using literary evidence are less than convincing. In a Scandinavian 
context Klaus von See discovered that morð meant very different things in skaldic verse and legal 
texts – the usage in the former being much looser – and there is every reason to think that a 
similar situation may have obtained in England.15 Bruce O’Brien, in his survey of the meaning of 
morð in Old English literature, found that it had two special meanings: a killing for which there 
could be no compensation, by which he seems to envisage primarily kin-slaying, and treachery to 
one’s lord, the evidence for which is primarily of actual lord-slaying.16 Legally speaking these two 
cases are very different. Kin-slayers, mægslagan, are mentioned only once in pre-conquest law, 
alongside morðslagan in a passage in Cnut’s letter to the English of 1020.17 As evidence of legal 
practicalities this is extremely weak. It is more of a homiletic admonition than a law, part of a list 
of unrighteousnesses to be expelled in the purification of the kingdom. No penalties are specified. 
Indeed, the general silence of the sources suggests that the killing of immediate kinsmen 
presented an insoluble dilemma for the kindred in question that the law made little effort to 
address. In cases where the slayer and the slain were not related on both sides, the Leges Henrici 
Primi states that some compensation can be given to the relatives of the slain with whom the 
slayer had no blood-ties but, probably sensibly, leaves the details to be worked out by “wise 
men”.18 The killing of lords, however, was a different matter entirely. Alfred states that though it 
is permissible to fight alongside one’s kin, to do so against one’s lord is not allowed.19 Indeed, he 
is quite clear (as are both Æthelstan and Cnut) that anyone who even plots to kill his lord is to 
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forfeit both life and property.20 Clearly this sort of treachery against lords was something which 
kings were closely involved in stamping out. The contrast with kin-slaying is sharp. Both are 
despicable acts but only the slaying of lords is legislated against. From the way they are treated in 
the laws there is nothing to indicate either was encompassed by the term morð. Indeed, both 
appear alongside morð in these texts, represented as distinct offences.21 It seems most likely that 
what O’Brien found in his literary analysis of morð and morðor was a term that in poetic usage 
described any despicable homicide, of which kin- and lord-slaying were the most potent 
examples. 
So what can be concluded from this examination of morð? We know that it was prohibited, albeit 
in rather formulaic and biblically influenced terms, in Æthelstan’s Grately code with the penalty of 
death if the charge was undeniable, and that around the same time Be Blaserum prescribed, in 
more convincingly secular terms, the threefold ordeal for dealing with accusations. It thus seems 
most likely that morð was a “crime” punished by the crown by the 930s at the latest. Though we 
have to work back from later evidence and draw to some extent on foreign parallels, we can come 
up with a reasonably convincing argument for some ways in which morð could be committed. As 
Jurasinski suggests, hiding the body of the victim seems to have been one method but, on 
balance, this seems likely in most circumstances to have been subsumed within the slayer’s failure 
to perform the ritual declaration of responsibility, as outlined in the Leges Henrici Primi. In 
essence, we come to a definition of morð as “secret killing”. This does leave the question of 
exactly how one committed the æbere morð described in II Cnut 64. Conventional definitions of 
morð, such as Wormald’s “underhand killing” suggest that the answer may well lie in killing by 
trickery and betrayal, which could potentially be done flagrantly.22 There is no real evidence to 
back this up but in the absence of any better explanation it retains some plausibility. 
There can be no doubt that morð was a prohibitive power – there is no protected group, the 
offence being based on the way that the killing is committed rather than the identity of the victim 
– but  the extent of its importance for royal jurisdiction over violence is questionable. The very 
obscurity of morð is probably the most important point here. There is nothing to indicate that it 
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was a legislative priority of any king and there are no signs (before the conquest) of the concept 
being extended to encompass a broader range of killings. Though it does not emerge in legal texts 
until the tenth century, there is no particular reason we should think that it was a novelty under 
Æthelstan. It seems just as probable, perhaps more so given that the whole concept of 
dishonourable killing is so closely bound up with feud, that morð was a much older idea. If royal 
jurisdiction over violence did advance in this period, the signs are that it did not do so through 
morð. Indeed, it is possible that the offence was never of any great significance. We do not, at any 
rate, have any clear evidence of cases of morð occurring in practice. Perhaps the closest is the 
Anglo-Saxon Chronicle’s account of Earl Sweyn’s treacherous killing of Earl Beorn, for which he 
was declared a niðing and effectively exiled, but there are other factors at play here such as the 
fact that Beorn was both Sweyn’s kinsman and an earl – it is by no means clear that this was 
either considered morð or that the treachery was an important factor in how it was treated.23 
Indeed, it is notable that morð, unlike many important royal rights, does not appear at all in 
Domesday Book.24 There is a distinct possibility, therefore, that morð was a very serious but very 
rare and  thus rather obscure offence, whose significance in the grand scheme of royal jurisdiction 
over violence was minimal.  
Complex Protections: Delegitimising Vengeance. 
Morð, then, may well not have been of any great significance for royal jurisdiction, nor kin-slaying, 
but the other offence touched on above – lord-slaying – is a different matter. Alfred’s measures 
quite clearly indicate that those who plot against their lord’s life would forfeit both life and 
property to that lord, but Æthelstan and Cnut are much vaguer about the destination of the 
property, which may indicate that the destination of forfeitures for lord-betrayal had shifted to 
the crown.25 Here, then, we may well be seeing an expansion of royal jurisdiction over violence, 
but it is important to note that unlike morð this is not all about prohibition. We do have a 
protected group – lords – but we also have a clearly limited group at whom that protection is 
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aimed – those lords’ men. This is what I term a “complex protection” and there are several 
examples of these in Anglo-Saxon law. 
A complex protection, then, is one that uses a specific protection but a protection whose effects 
are limited to a specific group. Unlike a normal protection, in which the protected group receives 
complete protection such that attack from any quarter is considered a breach, complex 
protections are rather more sophisticated. Not only does the protected group have to be defined 
but so too does the group that is constrained by that protection, and there needs to be a clear 
understanding of what type of act constitutes a breach of that protection. The protection of lords 
from their men is a good example of how this works. The lord is protected and his men are 
constrained by that protection, but the protection quite clearly extends beyond violence and into 
any form of plotting against the lord’s life. This, logically, works very well. Treacherous men 
cannot get around the prohibition on lord-slaying by bringing in an outsider to do the deed itself. 
We have not only the protected and constrained parties but also a clear definition of the type of 
act that constitutes a breach. Though the element of protection is undoubtedly the strongest 
here, it requires much more than just protection to function properly. Complex protections, then, 
are probably best regarded as being to some extent hybrids with more prohibitive types of power. 
Their common factor is that they are used to prevent violence between groups with an 
established relationship, and usually this means that they are specifically aimed at preventing 
what was regarded as illegitimate vengeance. Indeed, the example of lord-slaying is exceptional in 
that this is not its main purpose. Thus, though they do offer protection, their main purpose seems 
to be preventing, in specific situations, the independent assertion of protective power by kindreds 
and other non-royal parties. By making violence illegitimate in such situations these measures 
would have removed the one lever by which compensation payments might be extracted. 
Perhaps the clearest example of such a complex protection is Edmund’s decree allowing the 
kindred to abandon a member, which has already been looked at in some detail. The key concept 
here is that of being unfah, or exempt from feud, a status that pertained to the kindred after they 
had disowned their homicidally inclined kinsman. Once this unfah status was attained by a 
kindred, II Edmund states, any vengeance taken upon them by the slain man’s kin was punishable 
by outlawry.26 What is particularly significant about this is that it is so precise a measure. It is not 
that nobody may harm the unfah kindred, it is only the kin of the slain man who are prohibited 
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from doing so. Attacks unrelated to the potential feud (i.e. by people unconnected with the 
original slaying) were presumably to be dealt with in the normal manner – through wergild, 
manbot and fihtwite. This clearly has the main features of a complex protection, a protected and 
a constrained group, and for it to work it would need the prohibited deeds (homicide 
undoubtedly, but maybe also other types of violence) to be clearly understood. This, however, is 
not quite so watertight as the measure against lord-slaying. It is easy to imagine that there could 
be substantial grey areas which could be manipulated by those eager for vengeance. Is a non-
lethal scuffle a breach of this complex protection? Were friends of the slain man who were not 
strictly kinsmen constrained by the unfah status? Were friends of the slayer who were not blood 
relations protected by it? The precision which characterised the lord-slaying measure is absent 
here.  So can we be sure that this was a workable measure at all? Significant doubts were raised 
about this in the previous chapter: the dishonourable nature of abandoning one’s kin, Edmund’s 
untimely demise and, above all, the absence of any later repetition of the measure or of any 
evidence for its implementation, all these combine to make the case for the efficacy of unfah 
status rather problematic.27 Such a complex and controversial measure with such room for 
evasion would surely have needed both great royal will and extensive aristocratic backing for it to 
be enforced – it relied, after all, on “the hostility of all the king’s friends” as a penalty – and it is 
unclear that this was available. If it was, we would expect to find some evidence of it in later laws, 
but this is absent. In short, it is impossible to state with any certainty that unfah status gained by 
formally abandoning homicidal kinsmen ever had any extensive practical application. 
There is, however, evidence for something akin to Edmund’s unfah status in regulations that 
prohibit feuding on behalf of people who have been slain in accordance with the law. This first 
appears in the laws of Ine in which it is stated that he who captures a thief is to give him up to the 
king and receive 10 shillings for his trouble, whilst the kin of the thief (who seems to have faced 
execution) had to swear “aðas unfæðha” – oaths of “un-feud” – towards his captor.28 Later codes 
remove the need for an oath. In II Æthelstan those who avenge thieves are placed on the same 
level as witches, suffering death if they cannot deny the charge with the extra provision that 
those who attempt to take revenge but fail, wounding nobody, have to pay a 120 shilling wite.29 A 
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later and slightly contradictory clause of the same code even uses the same formulation as II 
Edmund in stipulating outlawry for those who try to avenge a thief: “ðonne beo he fah wið ðone 
cyng 7 wið ealle his freond”.30 Similar regulations on thieves can be found in VI Æthelstan and also 
in III Edmund, which uses a Latin version of this same outlawry formula.31 This formulaic 
borrowing suggests that Edmund drew on the analogy of those who avenged thieves to deal with 
inappropriate revenge in feud.  
The two cases are in a sense parallel. In both there is a kin-group that, a member having been 
slain, might understandably desire to pursue a feud which the king wished to prohibit. In the case 
of thieves it seems that Æthelstan was particularly concerned by the prospect of large, powerful 
and aggressive kindreds allowing their members to steal with impunity – men who might 
otherwise have slain them being put off by the certainty of incurring the wrath of such a kindred. 
Even the threatened “hostility of the king and all his friends” was not, it seems, enough for such 
groups. A number of Æthelstan’s codes contain provisions for the internal exile of these kindreds. 
They were to leave their home districts and be prepared to go wherever the king told them, to be 
slain as thieves should they dare to return.32 The Exeter code makes it clear that this was both an 
extraordinary measure and a last resort: 
And he who harbours them, or any of their men, or sends anyone to them, is to forfeit his 
life and all that he owns. That is then because the oaths and the pledges and the sureties 
which were given there are all disregarded and broken, and we know no other things to 
trust to, except it be this.33 
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modern scholars have interpreted the passage but it does make more sense, especially of the absence of 
penalties (cf. Robertson, p. 198; Gesetze, ii, p. 168). 
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If Æthelstan did have some success in his drive against theft – as it seems, from the thanks for this 
offered in II Edmund, that he eventually did34 – it was evidently at the cost of much commitment 
and energy from the king himself, and equally clearly would have required the help and 
cooperation of powerful noblemen. In this light Edmund’s thanks and plea for further aid look a 
long way from being a simple nicety. 
However, Edmund’s laws on unfah status and Æthelstan’s complex protection of the slayers of 
thieves, though in some senses parallel, were intended for radically different contexts. The sort of 
grey areas discussed above for Edmund apply just as much to Æthelstan’s anti-theft measures – 
we may imagine creative evasion of the laws – but there is a key difference in the status of the 
man being avenged. A thief, if the laws are any reflection of social attitudes whatsoever, was held 
to deserve death and cannot have been thought worthy of vengeance by many people outside his 
immediate family and friends; whereas the man being avenged in II Edmund has the potential to 
be an upstanding citizen, an innocent party for whom we might expect a much wider section of 
society to show some concern.35 In the one situation it seems likely that prevailing social attitudes 
might have mitigated against vengeance, in the other they may well have worked for it. We 
should surely expect this divergence in attitudes – variable, of course, with the particular 
circumstances of each instance – to be reflected in the willingness of local men to ride against the 
avengers. As this is what underpins the law in either case it does seem likely that Æthelstan’s 
legislation would prove more workable than Edmund’s. In short, it is quite possible that, with 
stern examples made of a few troublesome kindreds, the laws threatening outlawry against those 
who avenged thieves were able to draw on hundreds of years of anti-theft sentiment and become 
reasonably effective. That even this more feasible anti-theft legislation looks to have required a 
massive investment of Æthelstan’s political will is yet another indication that Edmund’s attempt 
to do the same for feud – for which we have no reason to believe there was an effort of similar 
proportions – was probably a failure. 
Our final example of a complex protection has also been touched upon in the previous chapter: 
the use of the king’s mund as part of the composition procedure outlined in both II Edmund and 
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Wergeld.  After surety has been found for the wergild but before any payments are made II 
Edmund states that “the king’s mund is to be established”.36 Wergeld offers more detail: 
When that is done, the king’s mund is to be established, that is that all from either kin 
give a common pledge on a single weapon to the arbitrator (semende) that the king’s 
mund will stand.37 
This is clearly intended as a measure to ensure the security of both parties once they have firmly 
committed (through the production of sureties) to the process of compensation. Any violence 
between the parties thereafter would constitute mundbryce which an earlier clause of II Edmund 
identifies as an offence that incurs total forfeiture of property and the placing of the offender’s 
life in the king’s hands.38 We have the same pattern of a complex protection found in the previous 
instances, except that the constrained and protected groups are technically the same. In reality, 
however, it seems most likely that the mund was intended to protect the slayer and his kindred 
and constrain the kinsmen of the slain. As with unfah status, it seems that those with no 
connection to the feud were not affected by the declaration of the king’s mund in this context and 
would not expect any offences they committed to be treated with any unusual severity.  
With this measure, as with the others, there may have been grey areas that could have been 
exploited, but because the levying of the mund is something that both kins have to agree on this 
seems less likely to have been an issue. If the feeling within a kindred was so vengeful that it was 
unwilling or unable to prevent a member trying to circumvent this complex protection, then it 
seems rather unlikely such a kindred would have agreed to accept compensation in the first place. 
Furthermore, unlike the unfah measures that open II Edmund, there is at least one solid indication 
that this measure was used in practice. This comes from the Domesday section covering the lands 
between the Ribble and the Mersey where it is twice stated that land was held quit of all customs 
except for six, one of which was “a fight after an oath has been made” (pugnam post 
sacramentum factum remanentem).39 This, to my mind, can only be a reference to the “common 
pledge on a single weapon” which established the king’s mund, otherwise it is difficult to explain 
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why the king would be involved at all, the offence being simply perjury. Now, there is an issue as 
to whether this was a traditional element of composition procedure or a novel addition of 
Edmund’s. Certainly it would fit with the context of II Edmund if this was in fact another royal 
intrusion into feud but, as has been noted, there are some reasons to think that this final section 
might have been an addition.40 Clearly we cannot say for sure, but there is at least a possibility 
that this was an innovation of Edmund’s that did have a lasting impact.  
Complex protections, then, seem generally to have been reasonably effective. The protection of 
lords, the prohibition of vengeance for thieves, and the levying of the king’s mund in the 
composition of feud can all be traced beyond their first appearances in ways that inspire a degree 
of faith in their efficacy – unlike Edmund’s experiment with unfah status in feud. On the other side 
of the coin, however, it is clear that imposing such a complex protection was not something to be 
undertaken lightly. The determined effort required by Æthelstan to enforce his will against even 
so generally despised a character as the thief shows, I think, just how hard it was to interfere with 
the kindred’s protective power. These measures were, in essence, attacks on the universality of 
the protection that kindreds, and logically also lords and guilds, were able to offer. They should 
thus be seen as highly provocative and likely to encounter resistance. We can see that Æthelstan 
succeeded by dogged perseverance and the willingness to throw the full weight of royal power at 
the problem of theft; we can imagine that the practice of mund-levying in composition 
settlements, being voluntary, would have encountered less resistance; and we may suspect that 
measures against lord-betrayal would have had the whole-hearted support of the Anglo-Saxon 
elite; but we should not be surprised that there is no sign of success for a scheme that allowed a 
unilateral act of one kin to deny another its right to either vengeance and compensation. Though 
thegns, with considerable royal prompting, may have been willing to risk their lives riding against 
thieves’ kindreds, it would not be surprising if they were much less willing to do so in support of 
kindreds who had shirked their traditional responsibilities in feud. Complex protections can thus 
be seen to some extent as extensions of royal protection, but far more crucial is that they 
constituted deliberate attempts to limit and weaken non-royal protective power. It is this facet 
that provoked contemporary opposition but, insofar as they were successfully implemented, it is 
this that gives them their long-term significance. They were measures that struck at the heart of 
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the system of feud and their various fates show us just how difficult an endeavour this was for 
Anglo-Saxon kings 
Protections and Royal Jurisdiction 
Normal protections, as opposed to the complex protections discussed above, are relatively simple 
affairs. A protected group is defined by some means and anyone harming one of its members is 
liable to the protector for breach of protection. There must, of course, be an understanding about 
what sorts of acts would constitute breaches, but the importance of this issue is not so great here 
as it is with complex protections because there is not the same scope for creative evasion of the 
law. Except for the very limited restrictions imposed by the sorts of complex protection detailed 
above, a normal protection is absolute: you are either protected or you are not and this fact 
applies to all possible assailants. The question of what acts breach a protection is of some 
importance here, but it is not primary. There are, broadly speaking, three categories: protections 
that apply only to homicide (such as the wergild, manbot and, later, the murder fine), those that 
cover all violence and those that go beyond violence and cover misdeeds of virtually any type. The 
distinction between the first two categories, as was discussed in the previous chapter, may be 
illusory. The wergild and personal injury compensations should probably be taken together as 
representing a general protection from the kindred, whilst there are indications that manbot may 
have had a non-lethal equivalent in the blodwite, and – as shall be seen in later chapters – the 
murder fine can be interpreted as just one aspect of a more general protection of William I’s non-
English followers.41 When discussing royal protections, as we are here, it is usual that any act of 
violence of any seriousness will qualify, from a punch to a decapitation. Though, as we shall see, it 
can be significant from a jurisdictional perspective if even non-violent offences are included, it is 
fair to say that generally the definition of what offences breach a protection does not emerge as a 
major priority. Indeed,  the issue is not usually addressed at all. 
Instead, the most significant source of variety in protection is the way that the protected group is 
defined. In some cases this is personal – a single individual may be granted the king’s special 
protection as he goes about his business – but in others it might be spatial, covering all those 
within a certain area. Protections are also granted en masse to particular groups – widows, for 
example – and more rarely they are limited by time, perhaps providing additional protection on 
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feast days. Given that King Æthelred extended his mund to warships, it seems that protections 
could in principle be applied to virtually anything, but usually we should be thinking in terms of 
categories of person, space and time.42 Indeed, combinations of these factors could be used to 
define protections with considerable subtlety. Perhaps because of this scope for variety, there 
were numerous royal protections in late Anglo-Saxon England. The main thrust of this chapter’s 
argument is that it was with these protections that English kings successfully extended their 
jurisdiction over violence. To demonstrate this we need to look closely at how various protections 
evolved and identify points at which it seems innovation occurred. The aim is not only to show 
that protections were the core of royal jurisdiction over violence but also to examine the 
processes by which this came about. This does require considerable detail, so the analysis of 
protections here is divided up by category as far as is possible. First we will look at the largest 
category, that of spatial protections, then we will move onto personal protections, before 
examining the offence of forsteal, an important and unusual protection that does not sit well 
alongside either category. Temporal and group protections, which are a lot simpler, are treated 
briefly in the conclusion. 
1. SPATIAL PROTECTIONS 
Spatial protections constitute the largest and possibly the most significant category of protections 
in late Anglo-Saxon law. In certain places, committing a violent deed such as a killing would lead 
not only to the usual payments of fihtwite, manbot and wergild, but also incur an additional 
penalty for a breach of protection. Such protection applied to buildings, including royal and noble 
halls, churches and even the houses of humble ceorls, and might in some cases extend beyond 
the building itself, although it was building that was the focus of the protection, the degree of 
protection usually being dependent on the status of the building’s owner. A closely linked type of 
spatial protection is the “presence” of the king or of other high-ranking individuals. Here the focus 
of the protection is not a building but the immediate environment of the individual in question. 
The similarities between all these types of spatial protection are so great, both in terms of original 
concept and the usages we can detect for them, that it makes sense for them to be treated as a 
group here. There are two main contexts for such protections that are suggested by the laws. The 
protected zones can appear as being intended simply as places of peaceful conduct in which any 
violent act, indeed any misbehaviour at all, was conceived as a breach of protection requiring 
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compensation. In such passages, the purpose of the protection seems to have been simply to 
ensure good order within the protected areas, probably as a mark of respect to the protector. 
Alternatively, spatial protections can be treated specifically as places of refuge to which people in 
fear of violence might flee. The two contexts do not seem to reflect different concepts. Rather, 
the use of such zones as sanctuaries looks likely to be based on their being places of non-violence. 
Nevertheless, this sanctuarial use did spawn additional rules, such as the time-limits, that are 
limited to that context. The two shall, therefore, be treated separately here. 
Whatever the context, these spatial protections constituted a check on killing. Slaying someone 
whilst in any such protected zone would result in some level of additional penalty. One of the 
interesting aspects of spatial protections, however, is that not only did the level of the additional 
penalty vary but so too did the protector to whom it was payable. The king was undoubtedly a 
great protector but there is ample evidence of payments being due to a host of other parties from 
abbots to ealdormen, and from churches to ceorls. Significantly, though, there is some evidence 
of a royal takeover of these protections. An examination of spatial protection can, therefore, not 
only tell us a great deal about how royal jurisdiction over violence expanded but also place that 
expanding jurisdiction in a wider context within which many other protectors were operating. We 
thus get a picture not only of royal power but also an insight into how the distribution of 
protective power within Anglo-Saxon society changed over our period. 
a) Zones of Peaceful Conduct in the Earlier Law-Codes 
It is first to the more general understanding of spatial protection that we turn: protection that 
ensures the peaceful conduct which was a mark of respect to the protector in question. This is 
perhaps the root of the protection surrounding houses, halls and churches, as it occurs earlier 
than the sanctuarial usage. The seventh-century Kentish laws of Hloþhere and Eadric are one of 
the places where these ideas are most explicit: 
If a person in another’s house calls a person a perjurer or accosts him shamefully with 
mocking words, let him pay a shilling to him who owns the house, and 6 shillings to whom 
he spoke that utterance, and let him pay 12 shillings to the king. If a person takes a cup 
from another where men are drinking without [the man from whom the cup was taken 
being at] fault, according to the established right let him give a shilling to him who owns 
that house, and 6 shillings to him from whom the cup was taken, and 12 shillings to the 
king. If a person should draw a weapon where men are drinking and no harm is done 
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there, a shilling to him who owns the house, and 12 shillings to the king. If that house 
becomes bloodied, let him pay the man his mundbyrd and 50 shillings to the king.43 
The principles at work here are interesting. So far as the owner of the house is concerned any 
bloodshed within his home is a breach of his mund, in recompense for which he requires his full 
mundbyrd. From Æthelberht’s law-code we know that a ceorl’s mundbyrd was 6 shillings and that 
killing in a nobleman’s house required a 12 shilling fine, which was undoubtedly his mundbyrd.44 
What the passage from Hloþhere and Eadric’s code adds to this is that cup-stealing, verbal abuse 
and weapon-brandishing were regarded as infractions for which the householder was entitled to 
compensation, albeit the lesser one of a single shilling. The focus on these lesser offences makes 
it clear that the ultimate purpose of the protection was to ensure that the householder and his 
guests could feast together without fear of violence erupting as a result of such provocations. The 
concern is for peaceful conduct at a gathering. The same can be said for the West Saxon 
discussion of house-protection in the context of the destination of fihtwite, which was examined 
in the last chapter.45 Here again we find a concern not just with fighting and killing but with what 
happens when men quarrel whilst drinking.46 
These early house-protection laws, then, seem more concerned with the issue of ensuring 
peaceful conduct. Sanctuarial uses – that is, the idea that people in fear of violent attack might 
avail themselves of such protections – do not appear explicitly. The closest we come are 
ambiguous statements like Æthelberht’s that anyone killing in the king’s dwelling is to pay 50 
shillings,47 which could refer to sanctuary but equally well might not. Sanctuary in churches is not 
a large subject. We hear from Æthelberht that church peace (ciricfrið) is to be compensated 
twofold and from Wihtred that the church’s mundbyrd is 50 shillings, the same as the king’s – 
essentially two different ways of making breaches of church peace more expensive for the 
perpetrator – but there is nothing specifically on churches being used as sanctuaries by fugitives.48 
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This does occur in Ine’s laws, according to which those who fled to churches were not to suffer 
the death penalty or the lash. However, this clause mentions no penalty for attacking someone in 
sanctuary, we only have the fine for the fighting in a mynster, which is discussed alongside 
penalties for men quarrelling whilst drinking together. It is certainly the idea of ensuring peaceful 
conduct that emerges most strongly from these early laws. This, however, should not be 
overplayed, as there is strong evidence for the use of the body of St Cuthbert as a refuge in this 
period. The saint himself, we are told, warned his brethren not to bury him on Lindisfarne 
because, his fame as a holy man being widespread, they would be constantly harassed by all sorts 
of malefactors seeking refuge.49 And indeed, we know from the Northumbrian annals contained 
within the Historia Regum that in 750 Offa, son of the late King Aldfrith of Northumbria, took 
refuge there only to be dragged half-starved from the monastery on the orders of King 
Eadberht.50 
To an extent, Alfred’s laws continue the same pattern: any fighting in the house of a ceorl requires 
6 shillings in compensation, in the house of a sixhynde man 18 shillings and in that of a twelfhynde 
man 36 shillings. Drawing a weapon but not fighting is also an offence but only requires half the 
compensation.51 Alfred, however, does not specifically demand anything at all for the king in such 
circumstances – no longer, it seems, could kings claim compensation for people drawing weapons 
at gatherings with no connection to the crown. What Alfred does provide is a quite bewildering 
array of compensations required for such breaches. They can, however, just about be reconciled. 
We can assume I think, following the model of the laws of Hloþhere and Eadric, that the figures 
above represent the mundbyrds of the three classes of freeman defined by their wergilds of 200, 
600 and 1200 shillings. To these Alfred adds a list of higher status mundbyrds that gives figures of 
£5 (240 shillings) for the king, £3 (144 shillings) for the archbishop and £2 (96 shillings) for 
ealdormen and bishops.52 Additionally, there is a scheme setting payments for fighting or drawing 
weapons in the presence of the archbishop at 150 shillings, and that of ealdormen and bishops at 
100 shillings.53 These compensations are so close to the sums for these figures’ mundbyrds that it 
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is reasonable to think that they may be approximations.54 Certainly, there can be no doubt that 
the aim of peaceful conduct remains prominent here and that Alfred’s code clearly stands in line 
with the seventh-century tradition in this regard. However,  other elements of Alfred’s legislation, 
as shall be seen, have a more sanctuarial flavour, being concerned with the protection of those 
within certain spaces from attackers outside rather than regulating the behaviour of those 
legitimately within. In fact, Alfred’s code seems to reflect a turning point, as from Alfred onwards 
the sanctuarial use of the protected space within houses, halls and churches becomes the 
dominant one. Indeed, between Alfred’s code and Archbishop Wulfstan’s legislation for Æthelred 
and Cnut, we have a period of about a century in which protected space seems to be seen only in 
terms of sanctuarial use. It is to this understanding of spatial protection that we now turn. 
b) Sanctuary and Protected Space from Alfred to Æthelred 
That certain spaces – homes, halls, churches and esteemed presence – could function as places of 
refuge for those in fear of violence first becomes clearly evident in Alfred’s laws. It is also here 
that the close parallel between the protection expected within the home and that pertaining to 
churches is made plain. First, Alfred’s  regulations concerning house-peace: 
Moreover we command: that the man who knows his opponent (gefan) to be dwelling at 
home is not to fight before he asks justice for himself. If he has sufficient power to 
surround his opponent and besiege him there in his house, he is to keep him seven days 
inside and not fight against him, if he will remain inside; and then after seven days, if he 
will surrender and give up his weapons, he is to keep him unharmed for thirty days, and 
send notice to his kinsmen and his friends.55  
The substance of this, a period of seven days in safety within his own home followed, having 
surrendered, by thirty days unharmed in the custody of his adversaries, is identical to the 
provisions given in an earlier passage on sanctuary in churches: 
Also we determine this sanctuary (frið) for every church which a bishop has consecrated: 
if a man exposed to vendetta (fahmon) reaches it running or riding, no one is to drag him 
out for seven days, if he can live in spite of hunger, unless he himself fights [his way] out. 
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If then anyone does so, he is liable to *pay for breach of+ the king’s protection (cyninges 
mundbyrde) and the church’s sanctuary (þære cirican friðes) – more, if he seizes more 
from there … If he himself will hand out his weapons to his foes, they are to keep him for 
thirty days, and send notice about him to his kinsmen.56 
The two passages are alike in all but the crucial aspect of penalties.57 For a violation of the 
sanctuary of a church the offender was to pay not only the king’s mundbyrd – set, as we have 
seen, at £5 – but also an unspecified amount for church-peace, whereas for that of the home 
there is no penalty specified. Indeed, the nearest Alfred’s laws come to stating a penalty for 
attacking someone in their own house is in a combination of the scheme of penalties for fighting 
in someone’s house and another related scheme covering the offence of breaking into an 
enclosure surrounding somebody’s house.58 However, even if these penalties were combined, 
which we cannot be sure was the case, the total fine incurred by the act of killing someone in 
their own home would amount to only 5½ percent of their wergild. Such a tiny addition to the 
total liability for a killing cannot have constituted much of a deterrent. 
The context envisaged by these passages is beyond doubt. Those who were expected to be taking 
refuge in their homes or in churches were evidently those in fear of violence from their enemies 
in a feud situation. The time periods mentioned, seven days within the building followed by thirty 
days in the custody of the besiegers, were clearly designed to provide a temporary check on 
violence in which some sort of deal could be reached between the kindreds concerned – hence 
the stipulation that kinsmen be notified. The threat of renewed violence at the expiry of these 
periods remained. What we are dealing with here is unquestionably law aimed at preventing feud 
violence. There is, however, another passage on sanctuary earlier in Alfred’s code where the 
context of feud is less clear: 
If anyone for any guilt (scylde) flees to any one of the monastic houses to which the king’s 
food rent belongs, or some privileged community which is worthy of this honour, he is to 
have respite of three days to protect himself, unless he wishes to be reconciled. If during 
that respite he is molested with slaying or binding or wounding, each of those [who did it] 
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is to make amends according to legal custom, both with wergild and fine (ge mid were ge 
mid wite), and to pay the community 120 shillings as compensation for the breach of 
sanctuary (ciricfriðes to bote) and he himself is to have forfeited his own [claim against 
the culprit].59 
It is difficult to know exactly what to make of this as it flatly contradicts the statements made on 
the same subject very shortly thereafter. Possibly the context envisaged here is one not of feud 
violence but of something more akin to crime, theft perhaps, with the shorter time limit and 
lower penalty for breach reflecting the lesser degree of protection that a thief deserved. Another 
possibility, however, is that this never did make sense and simply reflects two different sources of 
sanctuary tradition. This passage may be just an echoing of Ine’s 120 shilling payment for fighting 
within a monastery, while it is perhaps plausible that the association of ecclesiastical sanctuary 
with the king’s mundbyrd in chapter 5 could reflect earlier Kentish law.60  
Æthelstan’s legislation presents an altogether much clearer picture of the sanctuarial purpose of 
spatial protections. IV Æthelstan, the harshest of all Anglo-Saxon anti-theft codes, is preserved 
only in the Latin of the Quadripartitus except for a brief fragment in the original Anglo-Saxon. This 
is from the Latin text: 
And if there is a thief who has committed theft since the council was held at Thunderfield, 
and is still engaged in thieving, he shall in no way be judged worthy of life, neither by 
claiming the right of protection [per socnam] nor by making monetary payment [per 
pecuniam+ if the charge is truly substantiated against him … And if he seeks the king, or 
the archbishop, or a holy church of God, he shall have respite for nine days; but let him 
seek [whomsoever or] whatsoever he may, unless he cannot be captured he shall not be 
allowed to live longer if the truth becomes known about him.61 
The omitted section of the text details how this applies to people of whatever sex or rank, 
whether caught in the act or otherwise: so long as their guilt is securely established they are to 
die unless they manage to escape. The following clause adds that those who seek a bishop, abbot, 
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thegn or ealdorman are to have three days’ respite but again emphasises that they are to live no 
longer. This is confirmed in its essentials by the somewhat terser Anglo-Saxon version which 
states the same nine and three day periods (though it puts bishops in the nine-day category) and 
concludes “but let him seek what sanctuary (socne) he may, his life shall be spared only as many 
days as we have declared above”.62  
These remarkable provisions illustrate a number of points very clearly. In their discussion of the 
fate of thieves who reach some form of sanctuary they make perfectly plain that the sort of 
temporally limited protection that fitted well with the context of feud made little sense when 
dealing with theft, which it is quite clearly appropriate to term “crime” in this context. While for 
feud the limited period of safety provided would constitute a window for negotiation, in cases 
where royal law demanded the exaction of a non-negotiable penalty this purpose was absent. If 
Æthelstan’s laws had practical effect, sanctuary for criminals in the early tenth century was more 
of a death row than a safe haven. Indeed, this law would have made the taking of sanctuary either 
in churches or with prominent individuals a very poor strategy indeed for any criminal fleeing 
from royal justice.63 The overwhelming impression is that Æthelstan’s aim in this code was to 
prevent thieves abusing an institution that was meant for feud and feud alone. Logically, in fact, 
the presence of time-limits ought to have been enough to make this clear. When dealing with a 
fugitive from royal punishment there cannot have been any need for such a provision. Either, as 
Ine prescribed, the fugitive would gain some level of reduction in his punishment simply by virtue 
of his reaching the sanctuary or, following Æthelstan, he would not. 64 In legal terms, at least, no 
amount of time spent in sanctuary could change the outcome. Temporally limited sanctuary 
makes sense only in violent disputes in which a non-violent financial solution may be reached by 
negotiation. 
Finally, the Anglo-Saxon fragment of IV Æthelstan is also significant in that it alone states that 
anyone harming the fugitive in the protected period would have to pay the mundbyrd of the 
protector.65 There is no hint here of any royal financial interest in sanctuary breaches except, of 
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course, when it was the king’s protection that was breached. It, however, is not explicit on the 
point of churches so it may be that Alfred’s imposition of the king’s mundbyrd on top of the 
payment to the church still stood. Æthelstan’s successor, Edmund, certainly seems to have been 
thinking along these sorts of lines: 
If anyone flees to a church or to my burh, and he is attacked or molested there, those 
who do so shall incur the penalty which has already been stated (ðe hit her beforan 
cweð).66 
The penalty in question, modern editors agree, is that discussed earlier in the code for attacking 
those who have abandoned a kinsman and thus been rendered unfah; that is, to forfeit all 
property and suffer the hostility of the king and all his friends.67 What we have here, then, is a 
significant advance in the royal interest in sanctuary, both in the king’s own burh and in churches. 
Rather than being one among many in need of compensation for an act of violence in these 
protected places, the total forfeiture of the culprit made the king the sole recipient of his worldly 
possessions. Here, there is no hint at any entitlement of the church to financial compensation – 
the direct opposite of the situation according to Æthelstan. What this looks like is an attempt at a 
royal takeover of ecclesiastical sanctuary. Its aims, however, do not look to have been purely 
acquisitive. Rather, the context of Edmund’s code suggests that this was an attempt to make 
ecclesiastical sanctuary a more powerful check on feud violence, to provide a more secure refuge 
for feuders and thus encourage composition agreements. 
Edmund, however, did not stop there. Not only did he legislate to strengthen the protection 
available in his own presence and in churches, but also in the home. It is in II Edmund that we first 
encounter the term hamsocn. From Edmund we learn only that hamsocn would result in the total 
forfeiture of both life and property for whoever committed it.68 For an explanation of what the 
term means we have to wait for post-conquest glosses. The Leges Henrici Primi offers the most 
detail: 
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Hamsocn which in Latin means attack on a house (quod domus inuasionem Latine sonat) 
occurs in several ways as a result of both external and internal circumstances (extrinsecis 
et intrinsecis accidentis). Hamsocn occurs if anyone assaults another in his own house or 
the house of someone else with a band of men (haraido) or pursues him so that he hits 
the door of the house with arrows or stones or produces a perceptible blow from any 
source. Hamsocn or hamfare is committed if anyone goes with premeditation to a house 
where he knows his enemy to be and attacks him there, whether he does this by day or 
by night.69 
Some of this detail is rather confusing – the reference to “extrinsecis et intrinsecis accidentis” is 
particularly baffling70 – but the general meaning of “attacking someone in a house” is clear. 
Indeed, there is consensus among all the post-conquest glosses that the meaning of the term is 
something akin to domus invasione.71  This fits very well with the term itself. Ham simply means 
“home” or “house” but socn – though its root meaning is “a seeking” or “a search” – is often used 
specifically to refer to the protection that someone in fear might seek. Thus socn is used in the 
Old English fragment of IV Æthelstan to denote the protection offered by thegns, ealdormen, 
abbots, bishops, churches and the king: any man who slays a thief under such protection had to 
pay the mundbyrd or swear that he was unaware that the thief had socn (þæt he þa socne nyste); 
but after the protected time allotted to a thief was up he could seek whatever socn  he liked (7 
sece swylce socne swylce he sece) without any hope of mercy.72 Likewise, Wulfstan refers to the 
type of sanctuary that a fugitive might seek as friðsocn.73 Hamsocn clearly stands in the same 
tradition, literally meaning “house-protection” with the connotation that this is the sort of 
protection that might be actively sought, not just enjoyed passively. 
The concept, however, had clearly been extended somewhat by the twelfth century – the next 
clauses of the Leges Henrici state that hamsocn applies to mills, sheepfolds and any building with 
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“two roofs” – so it is necessary to tread warily when trying to understand what it meant in 
Edmund’s day. A sensible approach, to my mind, is to take the most general meaning that comes 
through in the Leges Henrici – an attack by external parties on someone within a house – and 
search for earlier parallels. The only passage that fits the bill is the Alfredian discussion of house 
protection analysed earlier, which states that anyone residing at home is to have seven days of 
sanctuary before surrendering to his enemies, whereupon he is to be held unharmed for a further 
thirty days and notice sent to his kinsmen.74 As was noted above, no penalty is given for those 
who ignored these prohibitions. I would suggest that the best interpretation for the introduction 
of the offence of hamsocn for attacks on people within houses is that, just as with churches, 
Edmund was using royal power to make the sanctuary previously available more secure. Indeed, 
in this case it seems the change was a truly drastic one as the penalty of total forfeiture replaced a 
situation where there was no royal penalty whatsoever. 
The importance of this is that in II Edmund we see not only a royal takeover of sanctuary in 
churches but also one of sanctuary within houses. It appears, from the Leges Henrici at any rate, 
that the house in question does not have to be the victim’s own house. It is, of course, possible 
that the reverse was true in the time of Edmund, but there is no particular reason to believe this 
was the case. Nowhere is there any indication that the concept of hamsocn was ever so limited. 
Logically, therefore, this measure also may well have been something of a takeover of the 
protection available in the houses of prominent men. By adding the royal penalty of total 
forfeiture, Edmund may well have been reinforcing the protection available within all houses, 
from those of ceorls to those of ealdormen, but it was not all he was doing. If, following Edmund’s 
changes, any attack on anyone in any house constituted hamsocn and resulted in the culprit’s 
total forfeiture to the king and to the king alone, then the king had essentially usurped the 
position of householders as protectors of their own homes. It was the king, not the householders, 
who received the penalty for attacks taking place in their own houses. The effect, in theory, was 
dual: attacks in houses were more heavily punished and houses thus more secure for their 
occupants, but the principle that the householder should receive compensation – in the form of 
his mundbyrd – for such infringements of his protection is removed. This is in direct opposition to 
the message of IV Æthelstan where, despite the clear concerns about such protections being 
abused by thieves, the principle that breaches incur the payment of the protector’s mundbyrd is 
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upheld. According to this interpretation, then, Edmund’s introduction of the offence of hamsocn 
into English law was part of a programme that used royal power to give greater security to those 
places where feuders could traditionally seek sanctuary. By adding to this security, Edmund was 
not only trying to make feud violence more difficult to commit legitimately – and thus encourage 
peaceful settlements – but also extending the reach of royal justice at the expense of 
householders. It was, therefore, a piece of aggressively royalist legislation that was aimed directly 
at the restriction of feud.75  
Tenth-century law contains one more major development regarding hamsocn. IV Æthelred – one 
of the four surviving pieces of that king’s legislation now thought not to be authored by 
Archbishop Wulfstan – states that anyone committing that offence within London would have to 
pay £5 to the king. Additionally, the Londoners (who seem to have been the authors of this 
section of the code) asked the king to allow that the city be entitled to an additional 30 shillings.76 
Hamsocn, then, is no longer botleas. Rather than the culprit forfeiting both his life and all his 
property to the king leaving other claimants with nothing, he now has a number of people to 
compensate including both the householder and seemingly also the city of London. The key result 
is that prominent individuals, under this system, are still entitled to their mundbyrds for attacks 
on those who have taken sanctuary in their houses. The king has a large claim on the culprit’s 
goods, but theoretically this is not to the detriment of other protectors’ claims. This, then, 
represents a step back from the full force of Edmund’s legislation, the reason for which seems 
likely to be that his insistence on forfeiture was harmful to the interests of the very same 
powerful men whose cooperation was necessary for the enforcement of the law. Even with this 
accounted for, however, the introduction of hamsocn remains significant. The £5 fine was double 
the 120 shilling fihtwite, so it provided a genuine deterrent, but crucially (from the perspective of 
royal jurisdiction) it was also the fine for breach of the king’s protection – his mundbyrd – which 
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meant that the payment pertained to the king alone and could not be claimed by any lord who 
was wites or weres wyrðe.77 
In the West Saxon legislative tradition, then, the tenth century saw a definite shift away from an 
emphasis on spatial protections as measures designed to ensure peaceful conduct within certain 
zones to a concern with such protections functioning as secure refuges. This shift, I would argue, 
is indicative of a new tendency to apply royal protections to the violence of feud. In Æthelstan’s 
sanctuary regulations (covering not only churches but noblemen too) we see quite starkly just 
how feud-centred spatial protection was meant to be in the eyes of tenth-century West Saxon 
kings: for thieves all the protection they could hope for was a few days’ respite before inevitable 
execution. Time-limits, after all, make sense only in a feud context and they can be found not only 
in Æthelstan’s laws but in Alfred’s too, as well as in the sanctuary regulations of a number of 
Northumbrian churches. 78  Protections were not intended to allow “criminals” to avoid 
punishment, but were meant to prevent feud violence and facilitate a negotiated settlement. This 
is how they emerge in the tenth-century sources and it is clearly a step beyond the older trend of 
spatial protections being used almost exclusively to ensure peaceful conduct. I would not want to 
deny that the spatial protections outlined in the earlier codes could also fulfil a sanctuarial role; 
what I think is significant is the way that in tenth-century legislation they are being used actively 
for this purpose. English kings had begun to manipulate spatial protections so as to restrict and 
regulate the violence of feud. 
That it was King Edmund who was most ambitious in the manipulation of spatial protection for 
this purpose should, by now, come as no surprise. In mounting a complete royal takeover of both 
church- and house-protection, he was making truly fundamental changes. We should not be too 
surprised, either, to learn that later kings did retreat from the full force of Edmund’s introduction 
of hamsocn. In spite of this, though, it seems that Edmund made a real impact on these points. 
Killing in church was from this point onwards regarded as botleas, with a full forfeiture of both life 
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and property to the king the prescribed punishment.79 Hamsocn, though it did not retain the  
same severe penalty, came to be regarded as a crucial element of royal jurisdiction, with Cnut 
listing it as one of a handful of offences reserved to the crown under both English and Danish 
law.80 These were serious advances in the scope of royal jurisdiction. Churches and householders 
to some extent seem to have lost out as the crown encroached on protections that had previously 
been held by them, but in a sense they also gained something in that royal enforcement of these 
increased penalties provided a greater deterrent to violence on their premises. Churches and 
houses had long been traditional refuges from violence, but in this later period, perhaps 
beginning with Alfred’s own rather contradictory measures on church-protection, we find English 
kings carving themselves a role as guarantors of these refuges. In taking over and reinforcing 
these old spatial protections kings were not challenging feud directly, what they were doing – 
initially at least – was taking measures to ensure that everyone played by the rules. When 
Archbishop Wulfstan took on the task of drafting England’s laws, however, the emphasis changed 
somewhat, and in sources relating specifically to the Danelaw the picture is different once again. 
It is to these later sources that we now turn. 
c) Spatial Protection under Wulfstan and in the Danelaw 
It is with the advent of Wulfstan, Archbishop of York, to the position of chief law-maker in Anglo-
Saxon England, and with the emergence of some information on Danelaw customs under King 
Æthelred just beforehand, that the term grið emerges fully into the vocabulary of Anglo-Saxon 
law. Meaning both “peace” and “protection”, grið would eventually come to displace mund as the 
conventional  term for royal protection. It seems probable that it was imported from the 
Danelaw, and it was in Wulfstan’s codes that it first assumed this meaning in southern English law 
– perhaps in some way reflecting his archiepiscopal connection with the north.81 Wulfstan’s 
legislation is a particularly rich vein to mine in search of spatial protections. He clearly regarded 
protection, specifically church protection, as something of a priority as it is often given top-billing 
in his codes. Indeed, one compilation, now known as Grið, is devoted to the subject. As Wulfstan’s 
works, his codes for Cnut in particular, do in large part constitute a recapitulation of previous law, 
it is not surprising that on some measures he adds little. On hamsocn, for example, we hear only 
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of its existence as one of the pleas reserved to the king in both the south and in the Danelaw and 
it is confirmed that it was now considered amendable through the payment of £5.82 The only 
information we have for aristocratic protections are somewhat modified restatements of Alfred’s 
scheme of mundbyrds and the regulations in IV Æthelstan on temporally limited sanctuary.83 His 
secular code for Cnut does contain a few useful nuggets of information: we learn there was a 
spatial peace (grið) covering the army, a breach of which would result in either loss of life or 
wergild, and we find out that all those going to and from a gemot were to enjoy protection (again, 
grið), unless they were notorious thieves.84 These details are interesting, and they probably do 
represent further broadening of royal protective power, but there is not much more that needs to 
be said about them here than this. 
Our information on the Danelaw is similar in this respect, albeit for a different reason: we simply 
do not have that much information. Most of what we do know comes from King Æthelred’s 
“Wantage Code” (also known as III Æthelred), where we hear of a series of spatial protections 
covering various legal assemblies, from one presided over by the king all the way down to 
assemblies at which, it has been suggested, men would meet and form legally binding agreements 
sealed through ceremonial drinking.85 Particularly for the higher echelons of this scheme it is not 
at all clear that the grið in question is limited to the meeting, or if it is something that the 
assembly is entitled to grant to someone personally. What is clear is that the fines for breaches of 
such protections were vast by comparison to the West Saxon tradition, the highest, the grið given 
by the ealdorman or the king’s reeve in the court of the Five Boroughs, amounting to a staggering 
£96. There are suggestions that these were so large that they had to be paid collectively, primarily 
because they are expressed in units called “hundreds” worth £8 each and some Domesday entries 
suggest that they were paid by individual hundreds (that is subdivisions of shires).86 This 
possibility is interesting in that the collective penalty may, in some sense, anticipate the later 
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murder fine, but of the wider development of spatial protections before the conquest this 
scheme, standing outside the West Saxon legal tradition, can tell us very little.87  
The Danelaw and Wulfstan, however, do have some truly significant things to add to our picture 
of the development of spatial protection. As we have noted, Wulfstan dramatically alters the 
vocabulary of church protection by adopting the term grið, a Scandinavianism previously only 
seen in Æthelred’s Wantage code.88 Thus church-protection becomes ciricgrið whilst, in an almost 
verbatim borrowing from Wantage, the king’s protection becomes his handgrið.89 Wulfstan 
devotes much space to discussion of these two ideas and the picture that emerges is an 
interesting one. Firstly, he was quite insistent on the point that ciricgrið within walls (binnan 
wagum) and the king’s handgrið were equally inviolate and that a breach of either would result in 
the culprit losing both land and life.90 Breaching ciricgrið by committing homicide within church 
walls was a botleas offence and the offender was to be pursued mercilessly by all “friends of God” 
unless he found so inviolable a sanctuary (swa deope friðsocne) that the king chose to grant him 
the opportunity to pay compensation.91 If, by this or by some other means, he managed to prevail 
upon the mercy of the king, he then had to buy his own forfeited life back through payment of his 
own wergild to the crown before going on to pay for the breach of ciricgrið with the king’s full 
mundbryce of £5, followed by the usual payments of wergild and manbot.92 Full payment in such a 
case would have required truly immense resources. It seems rather unlikely that after the 
payment of the culprit’s own wergild there could ever, except in the most exceptional 
circumstances, have been enough left to satisfy the church’s claim to the mundbryce, let alone the 
family and lord of the dead man. Indeed, even if the culprit was rich enough to satisfy all, he still 
needed to persuade the king not to execute him and seize all his assets for himself. What we have 
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here, then, is a detailed description of the extent of the royal takeover of church protection: 
death and forfeiture for the culprit with the spoils going entirely to the king except in extremely 
special circumstances. 
This, however, is not all that comes through in Wulfstan’s laws on ciricgrið. On careful 
examination it becomes clear that this royal monopoly is riddled with caveats. Ciricgrið must be 
breached by homicide and it must be breached within church walls. So what happened if ciricgrið 
was breached outside church walls or by an offence short of homicide? Wulfstan answers the 
latter question directly: 
4. And if the sanctuary (ciricgrið) is violated without anyone being slain, compensation is 
eagerly to be paid in proportion to the deed, whether it arises from fighting (feohtlac), or 
from robbery (reaflac), or from unlawful sexual intercourse (unriht hæmed), or whatever 
it arises from (si þurh þæt þæt hit sy). 
4:1. And always first the church is to be compensated for the violation of sanctuary 
(griðbryce), in proportion to the deed and in proportion to the status of the church. 
5. All churches are not entitled to the same status in a temporal sense, although they 
have the same consecration in regard to religion. 
5:1. Violation of sanctuary of a chief minster (heafodmynstres griðbryce), in case of a 
crime that admits compensation, is to be atoned for at the rate of the [breach of the] 
king’s protection (cyninges munde), namely with £5 in English law; and that of a rather 
smaller minster (medamran mynstres) with 120 shillings, that is, at the rate of the king’s 
fine (cyninges wite); and that of one still smaller, where nevertheless there is a burial-
place, with 60 shillings; and that of a field-church with 30 shillings.93 
The answer, then, is that a payment needs to be made to the church reflecting both the church’s 
rank and the nature of the offence. If we take the stipulation about the compensation being paid 
in proportion to the deed seriously then we should regard the sums given for each rank as 
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maximum penalties, which could be reduced by judicial discretion for less serious offences. The 
king is notably absent here. The message seems to be that though he had effectively annexed 
lethal breaches, ciricgrið could be breached in other ways and the compensation for those 
breaches pertained solely to the church. What we have, then, is an approach to spatial protection 
that has returned to ideas about respectful conduct within a protected area. Kings had effectively 
taken over the main sanctuarial aspect of church protection – the prohibition on killing – but the 
church could still assert its protective rights in the context of ensuring peaceful behaviour. 
The explanation for one of Wulfstan’s caveats is thus perfectly clear, but what can be made of his 
unremitting insistence on the phrase within church walls (binnan ciricwagum)?94 This appears 
with such consistency throughout his legal writings that it is impossible to regard it as a mere 
stylistic flourish, yet he never explains it.95 Its implication, however, must surely be that it was 
possible to breach ciricgrið through homicide both inside and outside church walls, with only the 
former being deemed unforgivable. There is evidence to support this interpretation in Wulfstan’s 
unofficial compilation on protection known as Grið. Firstly, it is stated that in “South English” law 
if anyone fought within a minster but outside the church (on mynstre butan cyrcean), they were 
to make full compensation to the minster according to its rank.96 Secondly, we are told that in 
“North English” law killing binnan cyricwagum rendered the killer liable in his life (he bið 
feorhscyldig) whilst wounding in the same area would be paid for by a hand (se bið handscyldig).97 
Killing binnan cyricderum, however, would cost only 120 shillings whilst, it seems, a non-lethal 
attack in the same area would come to only 30 shillings.98 Clearly there was some meaningful 
distinction between binnan cyricwagum and binnan cyricderum. Conceivably, binnan cyricderum 
could be a reference to the churchyard—the “doors” in question being the cemetery gates—or it 
could, as Liebermann suggests, mean Vorhalle (“entrance hall”, “porch”). 99 Neither explanation is 
particularly satisfactory, but regardless of the finer points both these passages do show the 
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existence of an area outside the main church building covered by ciricgrið.100 Though Wulfstan’s 
main legislative efforts do not say so explicitly, they are careful to imply that all offences, killings 
included, in these outer zones require compensation to be paid to the church but not to the king. 
One possible way of interpreting this is to posit that an orderly scheme of compensations for 
breach of churches’ protections was at some point disrupted by a decision that homicide within 
any church, regardless of its rank, was a royal, and uniformly heinous, offence. This would suggest 
that this scheme existed long  before Wulfstan tells us of it and that, in it, we are seeing the  
effects of the royal takeover of ecclesiastical sanctuary. There is probably a degree of truth in this 
but it cannot be the whole picture. In many ways Wulfstan’s scheme completely fails to accord 
with earlier evidence. Most obviously, this is the first point at which we get any mention of 
churches having distinct ranks, but the insistence that homicide was the only offence to bring 
about royal involvement is also new. In Alfred’s laws, for example, it is the act of dragging 
someone out of the church that triggers payment of the king’s mundbyrd and the payment for the 
church’s frið, whilst in II Edmund an assault is sufficient to call down the king’s wrath.101 In this 
respect it seems that Wulfstan is signalling a major restriction on royal interference in 
ecclesiastical protected space. He also, as has been noted, introduces completely new vocabulary 
to the West Saxon legal corpus. Whereas previously we have heard of the church’s frið (peace) 
and the king’s mund (protection) we now hear of both parties’ grið, a term which essentially 
combines the meanings of both frið and mund. This linguistic alteration, making explicit the 
protective qualities of the peace of the church, does not look insignificant when placed alongside 
Wulfstan’s other innovations. Rather, it seems as though he was deliberately manipulating 
protective language and ideas to assert ecclesiastical privileges and to limit royal involvement as 
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much as possible. A better interpretation, then, is that Wulfstan’s orderly scheme was something 
that he largely created anew, hemming in as much as possible the royal power that had intruded 
over the preceding century but, ultimately, having to respect its existence. 
Wulfstan’s uniform scheme of ciricgrið, then, seems likely to be something that he was trying to 
impose on a much messier reality, but it is certainly possible that he was drawing to some degree 
on existing customs. What seems beyond doubt is that in talking about spatial protection in this 
way Wulfstan was attempting to secure ecclesiastical privilege and to limit the rights of the king 
to only the most serious breaches. His concern is different to that of previous tenth-century 
lawmakers in that he does not treat ciricgrið as something primarily intended for the context of 
feud, or indeed for fugitives at all. (It is worthy of note, in fact, that when he does talk about 
protection for those seeking refuge he uses different terminology: friðsocn rather than 
ciricgrið.)102 In that his version of spatial protection is clearly aimed at punishing all forms of 
misconduct within the protected area Wulfstan is more akin to seventh- than tenth-century 
lawmakers, but his emphasis on defining the boundaries of ecclesiastical and royal spatial 
protection is something completely new. Here, for the first time, we are seeing protection being 
discussed primarily for its value to its holder as a legal privilege conveying something very like 
jurisdiction. This, perhaps, is a context we should be aware of for later Anglo-Saxon texts. Spatial 
protection that could be interpreted in terms broad enough to cover both fighting and fornication 
was a significant legal privilege, granting the holder rights to fines for any imaginable offence. This 
is protected space of precisely the sort that Wendy Davies identified in Wales and posited as a 
tenth-century trend around the British Isles.103 
There are, furthermore, some non-Wulfstanian sources that serve to confirm this interpretation 
of spatial protection. The foremost of these is the law fragment known as Pax, which consists of a 
single sentence that defines the extent of the king’s grið from his burhgeate in all directions as 
“three miles and three furlongs and three acres breadth and nine feet and nine ‘shaftments’ and 
nine barleycorns”.104 What this describes can only be a large circular zone of protected space 
surrounding the king’s burh, offences within which would result in an additional penalty for 
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griðbryce. That this only survives in a fragment is unfortunate as it makes it difficult to place with 
any certainty, but Wormald linked it to III Æthelred (a code intended for the Danelaw) on grounds 
of its being treated as an extension of that code by the Quadripartitus and for its use of the 
Scandinavianism grið. 105 Though this is far from conclusive – the use of grið is also a characteristic 
of Wulfstan’s work, after all – it is still a reasonable guess given that there is good evidence for the 
existence of similarly sized protective sanctuary zones at Ripon and Beverley in this period. These 
could, possibly, also be examples of the quasi-jurisdictional sort of spatial protection visible in 
Wulfstan’s laws, but the evidence for this is problematic. They certainly were large circles of 
protection, but our sources do not show that this protection conveyed the right to extract fines 
for any and all offences, at least for the Anglo-Saxon period.106 However, though these cases are 
far from certain, Wulfstan’s ciricgrið and the king’s grið in Pax are difficult to read in any other 
way. These were spaces in which, it seems, all offences would constitute breaches of “protection”  
or ”peace” and require compensation as a result.  
d) The Evolution of Spatial Protection in Anglo-Saxon England 
In terms of spatial protection, then, there is a lot going on in the late Anglo-Saxon period. First of 
all we can detect a general trend in the tenth century towards the deliberate manipulation of 
spatial protections as part of the system of feud. Unlike earlier law-codes, in which the focus is 
very clearly on the idea of ensuring the peaceful conduct of people within a space, in the tenth-
century codes the concern is very clearly with protecting those who had taken refuge in such a 
location from people outside it who intended to harm them. When this shift does seem to reverse 
itself under Wulfstan, what we find when we look closely is not a return to the seventh-century 
norms but a new emphasis on the quasi-jurisdictional value of spatial protection. It looks, then, as 
if we have a development in which kings began to manipulate spatial protections in order to 
restrict and regulate feuding and in doing so extended their jurisdiction over violence. This 
process seems, eventually, to have led to a point where it was recognised that possession of 
spatial protections could constitute a very lucrative form of legal privilege. This general trend is 
borne out by points of detail in which it is clear that kings effectively took over the protection of 
both houses and churches. Although the full potential of these measures for exclusive royal 
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jurisdiction, as seen in Edmund’s rather ambitious laws, was not achieved and in both cases royal 
powers seem to have diminished in the second half of the tenth century, what remained in the 
eleventh was still a considerable step forward. The crown had not only created higher penalties 
and new royal protections, it had also recognised their value and sought to keep them firmly in 
royal control.  
Spatial protections were not the sole preserve of the king, however. As we have seen, Æthelstan’s 
laws detail protections pertaining to the presence of bishops, ealdormen and thegns, whilst, as we 
have seen from Wulfstan’s treatment of ciricgrið, churches retained considerable protective 
power of  their own. Even the humblest of freemen, the ceorl, had some protective power over  
his home according to Alfred’s laws. The important point here is not that kings became exclusive 
protectors but that they increased their role within a wider system of protections. The effect of 
this, it seems likely, was that feud became more difficult. The royal takeover of ecclesiastical 
sanctuary, and the increased likelihood of effective enforcement that this entailed, must have 
made churches more secure for those in peril than they had been previously. In terms of royal 
spatial protection, however, the major advance of this period has to be the offence of hamsocn. 
From Alfred’s code it is clear that there had been an established idea that houses were places of 
refuge in feud, but there is no sign of any significant mechanism of enforcement for this idea until 
the first mention of hamsocn in II Edmund. In introducing the new penalty, it seems, the king was 
adding strict royal enforcement to a much older custom of feud. The significance of this, I believe, 
has not been sufficiently recognised previously. Indeed, if we were to assume that the king 
punished all major violent offences in any case, as Wormald and Hurnard did, hamsocn does in 
truth look rather minor. But once we appreciate the very limited involvement of kings in violence 
before Edmund’s reign it becomes apparent what a major step this was. To go from general royal 
jurisdiction over violence to slightly increased jurisdiction over violence in houses is only a very 
small step forward; but to go from very little royal jurisdiction over violence, not much beyond 
that covering the king’s presence and his dependents, to jurisdiction over every house – possibly 
even every building – in the country, is a giant leap. Edmund may not have lived to see the 
measure through from legislation into reality, and it may have been watered down by his 
successors, but even with this taken into consideration the achievement is an impressive one. It is 
even more extraordinary, however, when we consider that this is not all Edmund attempted to do 
with protection. He was an innovator, too, with the king’s personal protection, his mund. It is to 
this that we now turn. 
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2. PERSONAL PROTECTIONS: THE KING’S PEACE 
There is a long tradition in the use of the king’s personal protection – first his mund and later his 
grið – in Anglo-Saxon law. For the most part it is perfectly clear that the king’s protection, like that 
of other high-status figures, applied to his immediate vicinity but could, it seems, also be used to 
cover those the king had a special wish to protect as they went about their business. This sort of 
personally applicable protection is probably implied by Alfred’s listing the mundbyrds of 
archbishops, bishops and ealdormen in addition to the statements about fighting in such figures’ 
presence discussed above.107 In general such statements are unproblematic: it is perfectly clear 
here that the mundbyrd is the payment to be made for breaching that figure’s protection whether 
expressed spatially, in the case of a “presence”, or granted out on a personal basis. Equally little 
trouble arises from Æthelstan’s use of the term or, indeed, from any other occasion when the 
words mundbyrd, mundbryce or griðbryce are used to denote the payment due to someone 
whose protection has been breached.108 However, there are occasions on which the terms 
mundbryce and griðbryce are used differently, to denote an offence rather than the penalty for it, 
and these can be a little more difficult to interpret. The first such occasion is alongside hamsocn in 
II Edmund: 
Further, we have declared concerning mundbryce and hamsocn, that anyone who 
commits it after this is to forfeit all that he owns, and it is to be for the king to decide 
whether he may preserve his life.109 
This, in fact, is the first occurrence of the term mundbryce in the laws, just as it is the first 
appearance of hamsocn. In this context mundbryce clearly describes an offence rather than a 
payment – indeed the logic of the sentence is that a breach of the royal mund is so serious that 
there can no longer be any payment of the mundbyrd. What is odd about it is that it is simply 
mundbryce, not cyninges mundbryce; it is almost as though Edmund was trying to make the 
breach of any mund whatsoever a botleas offence. Though this does seem rather an extreme 
interpretation, this might, in fact, not be far from what Edmund both intended and achieved. 
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To come to grips with mundbryce what we need is a clear idea of the sorts of offence that could 
be covered by it. For this, one very significant passage is II Cnut 12, which again includes 
mundbryce alongside hamsocn: 
These are the rights which the king possesses over all men in Wessex, namely mundbryce 
and hamsocn, forsteal and [the fine for] the harbouring of fugitives (flymena fyrmðe) and 
the fine for neglecting military service (fyrdwite), unless he wishes to honour anyone 
further.110 
The code goes on to state that the king has the same rights in Mercia, whilst in the Danelaw he 
has fihtwite and fyrdwite, griðbryce and hamsocn, again unless he particularly wishes to honour 
someone by granting these powers to them.111 Except for mundbryce and griðbryce – and forsteal, 
which is discussed below – all of these are straightforward enough. But what does mundbryce 
mean in this context? Traditionally the king’s mund would have applied to his presence, his hall 
and to men to whom he had given special protection, but can we really countenance the idea that 
Cnut might wish to grant someone else the right to the compensation payable for offences taking 
place in his own royal hall? This does not seem likely. A clear definition, as for hamsocn, is 
something only offered by the Leges Henrici Primi: 
79:3. A person who breaks the king’s peace which he confers on anyone with his own 
hand shall, if he is seized, suffer the loss of his limbs. 
79:4. If anyone has the king’s peace given by the sheriff or other official (a uicecomite uel 
[alio] ministro) and a breach of it is committed against him, then this is a case of 
gri[ð]breche and compensation of 100 [Norman] shillings [i.e. £5] shall be paid, if 
settlement can be effected by payment of compensation.112 
There were available, then, at least by the early twelfth century, two levels of king’s peace that 
applied personally rather than spatially. The peace given by the king’s own hand is clearly his 
handgrið and the penalty of mutilation is an example of Norman “mercy” in remitting the death 
penalty. The second type of peace, still belonging to the king but granted by his agents, seems 
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likely to be the one under discussion in II Cnut 12. It is, at least, perfectly believable that the king 
might wish to transfer the revenues drawn from infractions of such a detached form of his 
personal protection to those he wished to favour. 
Indeed, this two-tiered king’s peace is to an extent implied by Wulfstan’s treatment of handgrið. If 
we take Wulfstan’s insistent equation of the king’s handgrið with ciricgrið within church walls as a 
starting point, we can make some progress. I Cnut states that both handgrið and ciricgrið were 
botleas unless the king chose to allow compensation.113 If the two were as closely related as 
Wulfstan gives us every reason to think they were, then the same pattern should apply to one as 
to the other. If, therefore, he did choose to pardon a violator of handgrið, logic dictates that the 
culprit would have to redeem his life through payment of his wergild, just as he would in case of 
ciricgrið breached through homicide within walls, before being allowed to compensate through 
payment of the king’s mundbryce. Handgrið, then, from this perspective, appears as a particularly 
grievous breach of the king’s protection that, with some luck and a substantial sum of money, the 
culprit could get to be treated as though it were the lesser offence of mundbryce. Following this 
interpretation, which looks to be the correct one, we again have a story whereby under Wulfstan 
there is a distinct step back from the aggressive royalism of Edmund’s laws. Whereas Edmund 
made any breach of his protection unforgivable, no matter by whom it was established, Wulfstan 
split the king’s protection into two classes. His handgrið, the personally granted peace of the king, 
was to be unemendable whilst the more common peace granted on his behalf by royal agents was 
compensatable by the old £5 royal mundbyrd. Rather than the uniform and compensatable 
protection that existed before Edmund, or the uniform uncompensatable protection he tried to 
introduce, there was by the turn of the millennium a compromise solution.  
But what about Edmund’s role here? We can find a two-tier system with royal officers granting 
out the king’s grið or mund in the Leges Henrici Primi and we can be fairly confident that this is 
visible in Wulfstan’s laws, but can we really trace this development back to Edmund? I think so. 
We find in II Edmund, after all, a total of three distinct references to royal protection. As well as 
the passage including hamsocn quoted above, there is the second clause which states that anyone 
attacking someone who had fled to Edmund’s burh would suffer outlawry, and the reference to 
the levying of the king’s mund as part of a composition settlement.114 What we  have here are 
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three different types of royal protection: the protection of the king’s burh is a straightforward 
spatial protection; the process of levying the royal mund in feud is, as was discussed above, a 
complex protection established voluntarily by those it affected; and the reference to mundbryce 
was specifically to personal protection. Unless we think Edmund was repeating himself, he was 
talking here not about the protection available in his vicinity but the type of mund that would be 
carried wherever its grantee happened to wander with it.  
Admittedly we cannot be entirely sure that Edmund envisaged this personal protection as being 
available not from him alone but more widely from royal agents, but there are strong indications 
that this was the case. A man who allows feuding kindreds to establish his mund by taking an oath 
on a single weapon does not seem likely to have shrunk from allowing his agents from 
establishing it. An even stronger indication of  this is, of course, the absence of the word cyninges 
in the law. This is unlikely to be accidental as all previous laws are scrupulous in defining to whom 
any given mundbyrd belonged, and scribal error seems unlikely because II Cnut likewise makes no 
reference to the king.115 The meaning is surely that Edmund wanted breach of personal protection 
to be botleas even when it was not granted personally by him, and this surely implies that he was 
willing for others to do so on his behalf. The likely candidates for this job are, as the Leges Henrici 
suggest, royal reeves of some sort but it is possible that Edmund also intended to include the 
munds of bishops and ealdormen. Alfred’s laws’ listing of these figures’ mundbyrds does suggest 
that they, and perhaps only they, were  able to offer personal protection that was not limited to 
their presence or halls. It is quite possible that, at least in terms of personal protection, Edmund 
was attempting both to make his own mund more widely available and, in effect, to take over the 
munds of bishops and ealdormen. This could, in short, be quite a close parallel, in terms of 
aggressively royalist law-making, to the case of hamsocn. 
Edmund’s  ambition, it seems, once more exceeded his ability: we have seen that mundbryce was 
no longer botleas under Cnut, and this was almost certainly already the case under Æthelred, but 
in addition to this there are signs in Wulfstan’s work that non-royal personal protections 
remained a reality.116 But even if ultimately the effects of the introduction of mundbryce fell well 
short of Edmund’s intentions, he still deserves much of the credit for creating a situation in which 
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royal personal protection was available not just from the king’s own hand but from a network of 
royal officers covering the whole kingdom. In the end, just as a man could be granted the king’s 
handgrið and go about his business knowing that he had the strongest protection possible, so too 
would a man who obtained the king’s mund from the sheriff be able to wander freely in the 
knowledge that it applied. It would, of course, be extraordinary if sheriffs did not make such men 
pay heavily to enjoy this protection, but that does not detract significantly from the dramatic 
increase in availability of royal personal protection that this represents. In multiplying the sources 
of this protection so that there would, undoubtedly, be at least one for every county, Anglo-Saxon 
kings – Edmund foremost among them – ensured that far more people would obtain royal 
protection and that as a result far more acts of violence would be considered breaches of it. This 
was the expansion of royal protection from being something requiring access to, and a personal 
favour from, the king, to being a bureaucratic procedure available from local officials. Its effect in 
expanding royal jurisdiction over violence should not be underestimated. 
3. FORSTEAL 
Alongside mundbryce and hamsocn in Cnut’s list of offences for which jurisdiction is reserved 
solely to the king (unless he wished to bestow a particular honour on someone) is one other 
crucially important example of protective power: forsteal. 117  As with both hamsocn and 
mundbryce, it is necessary to turn to the Leges Henrici Primi for an attempt at a definition: 
80:2. If an assault is made on anyone on the king’s highway (uia regia), this is the offence 
of forsteal, and compensation amounting to 100 shillings shall be paid to the king… 
80:4. The offence of forsteal occurs if someone attacks his enemy (inimicum) 
unexpectedly or lies in wait for him on the road and assaults him. 
80:4a. But if he waits until he has passed and calls out to him, so that he returns to meet 
him, it is not forsteal if he (the person waiting) acts in self-defence.118 
The core definition of the offence – attacking someone on the “king’s highway” – is thus clear and 
the final clauses are suggestive of a context of feud. Here we have a prohibition on lying in wait 
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for and attacking an enemy – not simply a stranger, although they too were covered by the earlier 
general definition – which, however, allows that once the enemy has been allowed to pass (i.e. his 
path not blocked) he can be challenged and can be fought without royal sanction should he 
choose to accept this challenge rather than continue on his way. Here, then, we have what looks 
like a very significant example of royal protective power, covering everyone travelling on 
whatever constituted a royal road. 
The context of feud is evident enough here and has been asserted cogently by Alan Cooper.119 It 
can very probably also be found in a passage in IV Æthelred that has already been touched upon, 
the best translation of which is that provided by Cooper: 
The man who commits hamsocn inside the town without licence, or makes the worst 
infraction [of the peace] without prior appeal (de placito ungebendeo) or who assaults an 
innocent man on the royal road (in via regia), if he is slain, shall lie in an unhonoured 
grave. If he fights before demanding justice and lives, he will pay £5 for a breach of the 
king’s burghal peace (regis burhbrece).120 
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This is, for all practical purposes, a Latin version of Cnut’s more laconic statement of his rights, the 
first point at which the offences of hamsocn, mundbryce and forsteal are linked together.121 
Indeed, this clause is evidently just as much about the proscription of illicit feud as II Edmund. It is 
only if the offender fights before demanding justice (si pugnet antequam sibi rectum postulet) 
that he is to pay the fine. The context envisaged by the drafters of the law is evidently one in 
which the offender believes himself to have been wronged and is taking vengeance improperly, 
without demanding justice of his victim in advance. We may reasonably assume that if the 
attacker had followed all the requisite procedures and still been unable to obtain justice he may 
eventually have been entitled to fight and kill his enemy regardless of his location. This, as Cooper 
very reasonably posits, might be the explanation for the various caveats included in this law – 
hamsocn “sine licentia”, attacking “aliquem innocentem” on the king’s highway, and the hard-to-
translate “de placito ungebendeo”. They may be allowing for the possibility that the attacker had 
jumped through all the necessary legal hoops and was now taking the legitimate vengeance to 
which he was entitled.122 In suggesting that such hoops did exist by which royal protections could 
eventually be bypassed this is a significant text, though its lack of detail makes it difficult to draw 
any firm conclusions. The language may well suggest that any such acceptable breach would need 
to have been expressly authorised in legal proceedings condemning the man to be attacked. 
Interpreting forsteal, however,  is not that simple. It appears that it had an original meaning 
different to that given by the Leges Henrici. III Edmund uses the term when prohibiting 
interference with the pursuit of thieves:  
And we have declared with regard to the tracking and pursuit of stolen cattle, that 
thorough investigation shall be made at the village, and that no obstacle shall be placed in 
the way thereof or anything to prevent the pursuit and search (et non sit forsteallum 
aliquod illi uel aliqua prohibitio itineris uel questionis).123 
Liebermann suggests that the final part of this phrase, uel aliqua prohibitio itineris uel questionis, 
is the Quadripartitus’s explanatory gloss on forsteallum, and if, as seems likely, this is the case it 
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gives us a fairly clear definition.124 The meaning of forsteal, therefore, seems to have evolved from 
one of obstructing investigations of stolen cattle to that of attacking an enemy on a road, each of 
which draws on the central concept of obstructing free movement. The earlier meaning is still 
visible in some of Wulfstan’s laws composed for Æthelred. Unlike the passage from IV Æthelred 
quoted above, both V and VI Æthelred use the term in the sense of obstruction.125 The apparent 
contradiction here can to some extent be resolved by focusing on the common concern with the 
obstruction of free movement. As Cooper rather ingeniously points out, “the laws of Wihtred and 
of Ine guarantee travellers safety of movement free from being killed as a thief only on the road”, 
enjoining those who are forced to leave the road to announce their presence and honourable 
intentions by either shouting or blowing a horn.126 The only circumstance in which anyone had a 
positive right to travel off the road was in pursuit of thieves or other offenders against whom the 
hue had been raised. Travelling on a road or in pursuit of a thief are thus, in a sense, the only two 
types of legitimate progress in Anglo-Saxon law, and seen in this light the two meanings of 
forsteal do form something of a coherent whole as the offence of “obstructing legitimate 
progress”. This, I think, is the root of the Leges Henrici’s rule that an enemy had to be allowed to 
pass before a challenge could be shouted to him.127 
That forsteal evolved from such a general concern is interesting, but it is not of any more direct 
relevance here than the term’s later, and even more radical, metamorphosis into an offence 
relating to markets.128  What matters is that it had become, quite clearly, a royal protection 
covering roads by the reign of Æthelred, its protective character being evident not only in the way 
the offence worked but in its association both with other protections (hamsocn and mundbryce) 
and with the sum of £5 – the king’s mundbyrd since at least the time of Alfred.129 However, the 
significance we attribute to forsteal is dependent on our view of how widely it applied. What 
exactly qualified as a via regia? A persistent myth, with its origins in the Leges Edwardi 
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Confessoris, is that the king had only four roads – Watling Street, Fosse Way, Iknield Way and 
Ermine Street – and that “other roads from city to cities, from boroughs to boroughs, on which 
people travel to markets or for their own business affairs, are under the law of the county (sub 
lege comitatus sunt).”130 This has been comprehensively dismissed by Cooper, who traces the 
establishment of the myth in literary sources in intricate detail.131 He, quite reasonably, prefers 
the evidence of the Leges Henrici Primi:  
80:3a. That is called a royal highway (via regia) which is always open, which no one can 
close or divert with walls he has erected, which leads into a city or fortress or castle or 
royal town (que ducit in ciuitatem uel burgum uel castrum uel portum regium).  
80:3b Every town has as many main streets (magistras vias) as it has main gates 
appointed for the collection of tolls and dues.132 
This seems like a much more solid basis on which to proceed, with royal roads being seemingly all 
major routes linking military and urban centres. We can, I think, reasonably look at forsteal as a 
protection covering travellers on all main roads.  
In terms of royal jurisdiction, then, it should be plain that forsteal was a crucially important 
addition to the royal arsenal. All violence on major roads – unless both parties consented to it – 
was within the king’s jurisdiction as a result of this late tenth-century measure, and as far as we 
can tell from the evidence this was a novelty. Indeed, the only English precedent for the 
protection of roads by kings comes from Bede’s description of King Edwin as a king who ensured a 
peace throughout Britain such that that “a woman with a newborn child could walk about the 
island from sea to sea and take no harm”.133 There may, then, have been an idea that men and 
women ought to be able to travel in safety, and that this safety was ultimately the responsibility 
of the king, but more than this we cannot say before the appearance of forsteal. All the 
indications are that this protection covering roads was yet another tenth-century innovation, and 
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it is clear that it would have brought a great many more acts of violence within the jurisdiction of 
English kings. 
4. OTHER PROTECTIONS 
It is the contention of this chapter that it was primarily through the protections of ciricgrið, 
hamsocn, mundbryce (later griðbryce) and forsteal  that we can see the expansion of royal 
jurisdiction over violence in the Anglo-Saxon period. There were, however, a number of other 
important royal protections that need to be understood if we are to comprehend the system of 
protections as a whole. Group protections are possibly the most important of these. Certain 
sections of Anglo-Saxon society, most notably the clergy, foreigners and widows, were formally 
under the protection of the king. II Cnut demands that those who bind, beat or deeply insult men 
in holy orders pay the full mundbryce of either the king or the priest’s lord.134 When read 
alongside VIII Æthelred the implication of this is clear: 
And if a man in holy orders or a foreigner is for any reason defrauded of property or of 
life, or is bound or beaten or insulted in any way, the king shall then be for him in the 
place of a kinsman and protector (for mæg 7 for mundboran), unless he has another.135 
It goes on to state that compensation shall be paid to both the victim and the king as is fitting, or 
the king shall avenge the deed.136 Clearly, then, men in orders and strangers or foreigners were 
regarded as under the protection of the king, unless they had some other protector. II Cnut simply 
acknowledges that some clergymen had their own mundboran in the form of a personal lord and 
allows them to be protected with a full mundbryce. Widows too may have received this sort of 
special protection on the basis of their status. We do at least find statements that widows of a 
respectable life are to enjoy “God’s grið and the king’s”.137 Though there are no indications that 
the king’s mundbryce was payable for violence against them, it seems probable that Cnut’s 
statement that anyone doing violence to a widow or maiden must compensate with his wergild is 
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intended to give force to this same grið.138 The Leges Henrici, at any rate, place the same offences 
(violentia uirgini uel uidue facta) next to fighting in the king’s dwelling in a list of pleas which place 
a man at the king’s mercy.139  
Though most protections in Anglo-Saxon law are either personal or spatial, there is also an 
additional category of protected times, within which any offence would meet with additional 
punishment. The majority of the evidence for these comes from the Leges Edwardi Confessoris 
where, among other references to the idea, there are peaces specified for eight days at Easter, 
Pentecost and Christmas, as well as for eight days after the coronation of a king. A breach of any 
of these would, we are told, incur the same penalty as a violation of the peace given by the king’s 
hand.140 Though this evidence is late, and clearly influenced by the continental Truce of God 
movement, there are enough pre-Conquest parallels to give the concept of temporally defined 
protection some credibility. The earliest is Alfred’s statement that during lent or whilst the army 
was away all compensations were to be doubled. 141  II Cnut calls the former of these 
lencgtenbryce, and explains that it can be committed by fighting (fihtlac), intercourse with women 
(wiflac) or robbery (reaflac) “or by any great misdeed” and that it also applied on high festivals.142 
These, undoubtedly, reveal a different approach to that in the Leges Edwardi – doubling a non-
royal compensation is very different to imposing a royal fine – but the principle that at certain 
times the penalties for violent offences should be increased is clearly present. 
We should also, however, be careful not to forget the protective powers exercised by parties 
other than the king. The rights of churches have been discussed in detail above, but it would be 
unwise to forget about the nobility. We have, of course, learnt from IV Æthelstan that every thegn 
was entitled to offer three days’ protection to anyone he so chose, with breaches compensatable 
through payment of the thegn’s mundbyrd, and though this is not something that is confirmed in 
later laws there is no particular reason to think it ceased to apply.143 And we must not, either, 
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forget that lords had considerable protective power in their right to manbot and that throughout 
this period all free kindreds had the right to extract wergilds. We might even want to see the 
Londoners’ request for an additional 30 shillings for each breach of the main royal protections as 
an example of a city’s offering protection. In terms of scale, we should remember that a thegn’s 
wergild of 1200 shillings was £25 in West Saxon money, five times as much as the king could 
expect for offences of mundbryce, hamsocn or forsteal. It seems, furthermore, that groups of 
noblemen could come together in guilds and create their own additional group protections. The 
one example we have of this is the Cambridge Thegns’ Guild, whose regulations, dating from 
either the eleventh century or the end of the tenth, were discussed in the previous chapter.144 
They are significant enough to be worth quoting once more: 
And if anyone kill a guild-brother, nothing other than £8 is to be accepted as 
compensation. If the slayer scorn to pay the compensation, all the guildship is to avenge 
the guild-brother and all bear the feud. If then one avenges him, all are to bear the feud 
alike. And if any guild-brother slays a man and does it as an avenger by necessity and to 
remedy the insult to him, and the slain man’s wergild is 1200 *shillings+, each guild 
brother is to supply half a mark to his aid…145 
It thus seems that a group with no particular link to royal government was able to impose its own 
penalties on men who killed its members.146 This remarkable fact serves as a stark reminder that 
protection in late Anglo-Saxon England was far from being a royal monopoly. It may have been 
the means by which kings expressed their power over violence, but it was also the means by 
which the rest of society did precisely the same thing.  
Conclusions 
This chapter has, I hope, shown fairly clearly how royal jurisdiction over violence evolved in the 
late Anglo-Saxon period. As was seen in the discussion of morð, there is no particular reason to 
think that prohibitive power over violence was an important element in the increase of royal 
jurisdiction. Complex protections – which are to an extent hybrids with prohibitive power – seem 
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rather more influential as a group. Æthelstan’s measures to prevent vengeance against thieves, 
Alfred’s bid to protect lords from the treachery of their men, and the use of the king’s mund to 
ensure peace between parties settling a feud all seem likely to have been effective. Edmund’s 
attempt to allow kindreds to disown members and claim unfah status seems the exception to this, 
however, as all the indications are that it failed. In a sense complex protections are rather limited 
by their specificity: the protections they offer to one group are only valid against an identified 
group of potential enemies and they cannot, as a result, be seen as a major means by which royal 
protection was extended in Anglo-Saxon society. Their significance lies in their character as royal 
measures designed specifically to limit the protective powers of others, notably kindreds. When 
they worked, as Æthelstan’s measures against those who avenged thieves seem to have done, 
they did so by delegitimising the non-royal violence that had been the foundation of non-royal 
protective power. The signs are, however, that such aggressive measures were controversial and 
needed to be targeted very carefully indeed – limited to types of violence that were widely 
viewed as despicable – if they were to get the aristocratic support necessary to be effective. Their 
scope was, therefore, rather limited. It is with simple protections that we see major advances in 
royal jurisdiction over violence. The establishment of royal punishment for all killings (and, in 
sources before Wulfstan wrote, all violence) within churches was a major expansion of the scope 
of the king’s power over violence, and the establishment of the offence of hamsocn – effectively 
extending the king’s protection to all houses – was even more significant. The expansion of the 
availability of the king’s protection on a personal basis so that sheriffs could grant it to those in 
fear was another major development which surely would have brought many more violent 
incidents into the jurisdiction of the crown. Likewise, the introduction of forsteal as a protection 
covering all violence on main roads must have had a similar effect, rendering many more violent 
incidents offences against the king. Taken together these developments, I believe, represent a 
revolutionary expansion of royal jurisdiction over violence. 
These developments do, of course, fall a long way short of the full prohibition of homicide that 
Naomi Hurnard and Patrick Wormald argued for, but we must not allow that to skew our 
assessment of the achievement this represents. This may not have been complete prohibitive 
jurisdiction but it must have been significant. Conducting feud violence without offending the king 
was rendered very difficult indeed by such measures. Any man who felt threatened could, in 
theory at least, feel significantly safer once he was in his home, in church, on a major road, or in a 
court. We should be fairly certain that he would stay close to such protected zones if he felt 
threatened enough and, if he had the resources to secure it, he might well have sought out the 
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local sheriff or some other royal officer and claimed the king’s mund or grið. To kill a man such as 
this without breaching some form of royal protection would probably be just about possible with 
sufficient planning and some good luck, but it would be a risky undertaking. It would, of course, 
be significantly easier if the intended victim was unaware of any threat, but in a feud scenario this 
would surely not have been the case. It is, of course, impossible to do anything but guess at how 
great a proportion of violent incidents would have involved the king with the cumulative  effect of 
his protections taken into account, but it may well have been high. For less serious acts of 
violence it might, perhaps, be expected to be smaller but for killings it does not seem 
unreasonable to me to suggest that at least sizable minority, possibly even a majority, would have 
been caught in the net of royal protections. Indeed, this may well be rather conservative.  
It has, then, been argued here that Anglo-Saxon kings did not establish a royal crime of homicide, 
but this does not necessarily result in a picture of a weak and ineffectual government. Indeed, the 
alternative offered here is hardly a minimalist view of the powers of the English monarchy. In 
recognising that something as deeply engrained as feud cannot simply be done away with by 
legislative fiat, it emphasises the size of the challenge faced by English crown. In showing how 
English kings, particularly Edmund, successfully overcame this challenge through the innovative 
and far-reaching manipulation of protections, the arguments advanced here actually show what 
many scholars call the “Anglo-Saxon state” in a very positive light.147 We should not allow modern 
expectations of what something labelled a “state” ought to do cloud our appreciation of this 
point. What we are seeing in the tenth century is effective government that, recognising how 
central feud was to society, sought to restrict and regulate it rather than to ban it. The protections 
that emerged as important all had some sort of link with older traditions. Houses and churches 
had long been considered off-limits for violence, kings had always been able to offer their 
protection to those in need, and there are signs that a general duty of ensuring safe travel had 
been an expectation of kingship for some time. In establishing protections in the ways that they 
did, English kings were in a sense just reinforcing existing norms with much stricter penalties. In 
building on existing foundations in this way, tenth-century kings demonstrated considerable skill. 
Edmund may have pushed too hard in some respects, but the crucial point is that his successors 
held on to his more important measures by granting some limited concessions regarding their 
severity. This is not a weak and ineffectual monarchy, it is one that subtly probed the boundaries 
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of its power, expanding its jurisdiction over violence and restricting the scope of feud, but 
balancing this against its need to maintain the support of those it governed. This may have led to 
a slower development than that preferred by Wormald and Hurnard, but recognising the limits 
beyond which it was unwise to push must surely be regarded as a sign of good government. If for 
his realm to be considered a state a king needs to possess Weber’s “monopoly of legitimate 
violence”, then clearly Anglo-Saxon England was not a state. It was, however, a kingdom in which 
the crown played an increasingly dominant role in the regulation of violence. This is the important 
fact and we should not let our choice of terminology obscure it. 148 
A key conclusion here, then, is that English kings advanced their jurisdiction over violence 
primarily – indeed, almost exclusively – using protective power. This is important, no doubt, but it 
is secondary in many respects to the conclusions to be drawn about the wider role of protection 
in the regulation of violence. In the last chapter the core of what I termed the “system of feud” 
was examined. Here, we have looked at the more peripheral elements, the protections and other 
powers that could be applied to violent acts in certain specific circumstances. If we put these 
together, then, what we should get is a reasonably well-rounded impression of the system of feud 
as a whole. What I want to emphasise here is that when we do this the picture that emerges is 
overwhelmingly one of protective power. The only examples of prohibitive power are fihtwite and 
morð, but as we have seen in the previous chapter there are good reasons to suspect that even 
fihtwite grew from protective roots, whilst we have seen here how relatively insignificant morð 
seems as an example of royal power over violence. Everything else – literally everything – is best 
interpreted as protective power. The wergild and manbot, as we have seen, were unquestionably 
protective in nature; the complex protections outlined here can, to some extent, be seen as 
hybrids of protective and prohibitive power but the protective side is clearly dominant; whilst the 
key royal powers highlighted here – ciricgrið, mundbryce and griðbryce, hamsocn and forsteal – 
are all clear examples of protection. They are, as has been noted, all intimately linked with the old 
£5 royal mundbyrd, and all but forsteal  (which seems to have evolved out of a prohibition on 
obstruction) have clear protective elements in their terminology. All the other measures covering 
meetings, vulnerable groups in society, and even the £8 penalties imposed by the Cambridge 
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Thegns’ Guild, slot neatly into this same wider system of protections. Indeed, it does not seem 
unreasonable to conclude that the system of feud that regulated violence in Anglo-Saxon England 
was a system primarily – indeed, almost completely – made up of protections.  
The protections that made up this system of feud were diverse, in terms both of who offered 
them and of their strength. Yet despite this diversity the overall picture is clearly one of universal 
protection from violence. Everyone is expected to have a kindred able to exact a wergild or take 
vengeance in the event of a killing. Equally, the expectation is that every man should have a lord 
to collect manbot. For those who did not have this bare minimum of protection it seems that the 
king was expected to step in and act as a protector (mundboran) in its absence. We thus have two 
universal protections emanating from kindreds and lords, with the king acting as a failsafe in 
circumstances when these were missing. Though it clearly was the king’s job to make sure that 
everyone was covered by these core protections, it is important to keep the vast number of actors 
in the system in view: there would have been literally thousands of different kindreds and lords in 
late Anglo-Saxon England to whom wergilds and manbots might pertain. If we add to this core of 
universal protections the multitude of limited protections that applied not to everyone but only in 
specific, defined circumstances – those belonging to churches and noblemen throughout the land, 
and of course the wide variety of specific royal protections – we have a much fuller picture of how 
violence was regulated in English society.  We should, I think, imagine an extensive web of 
protections emanating from thousands of different sources and offering different people in 
different circumstances differing degrees of security. This network of protections gave everyone 
(though probably not outlaws) a degree of protection, but by its very nature it was uneven. The 
differing strengths of protection covering different places and people served not to prevent all 
violence – an impossible goal for any system – but to regulate it and, to some extent, to channel it 
away from the areas that were highly protected and towards those which were less well 
endowed. 
Dealing with violence in late Anglo-Saxon England, then, was a complex matter. Determining the 
proper penalties in any given case depended, to a large extent, on the protections that applied to 
the victim. This situation, I think, is what the Leges Henrici’s author was getting at in the following 
passage, which considers the various factors bearing on compensation or punishment of 
homicide: 
If anyone, either a freeman or a slave, is slain he shall be compensated for lawfully by the 
amount of his wergeld, unless a judgement prescribing amends for the physical injuries is 
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substituted instead; for it will often be the case that a person who slays or wounds 
another will either put his life in jeopardy or suffer the loss of his limbs. Circumstances 
produce different consequences in everything: depending on the place, for example 
whether the offence occurs in a church or the king’s dwelling or during military service or 
in the king’s household or in a town or in any permanent abode of this kind enjoying the 
protection of peace; or depending on the time, for example whether the day is a festival 
day or whether the king is with his personal troop or in the county itself; or depending on 
the person concerned, for example whether he is a servant of the king or a reeve or 
official of some other lord, or in whatever capacity he secures the untroubled calm of 
peace, whether by writ or some other method.149 
Here, in one summing up, we have an acknowledgement that the rule for compensating homicide 
is payment of wergild to the family, but that often in practice the result was a heavier punishment 
because of a breach of a specific protection. The network of protections, furthermore, is 
illustrated clearly and concisely, with a wide variety of royal protections  interspersed with 
references to other protectors  in the form of lords, towns and churches. There is even an attempt 
at categorising these protections as spatial, temporal and personal. Certain things here are clearly 
Norman – the emphasis on mutilation certainly is, and the importance given to temporal 
protection may reflect the importation of continental ideas from the Truce of God movement – 
but with allowances made for this the description fits the Anglo-Saxon system as analysed in this 
chapter very closely indeed. 
We should, then, see the protections that formed royal jurisdiction over violence as part of this 
overarching protective system, not as being in some way set apart from it. Crucially, this means 
that feuding between kindreds over homicides should be interpreted in a similar way to royal 
claims to receive payment for incidents of hamsocn or forsteal. Both, after all, involve protectors 
trying to extract compensation for violent breaches of their protection. To separate these and call 
one “feud” and the other “justice” is surely unwarranted. Why should we privilege a king’s right to 
a £5 payment for a breach of his mund over a thegn’s kindred’s right to a £25 wergild payment for 
a breach of its protection over a kinsman? It may be that in some circumstances the king was able 
to take first place in the queue when the resources of an offender were being divided, but priority 
alone does not necessarily make royal claims qualitatively different. It is because of this that I 
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think it is appropriate to think of violence being regulated by the system of feud in this period, 
even though we do find considerable advances in royal jurisdiction taking place. Perhaps because 
of the confusion surrounding the concept of feud, however, it would be better to think of this 
“system of feud” as a “system of protections”. Though this does sideline the role played by 
prohibitive powers this is, to some extent, fair enough: though fihtwite did have an important role 
it was very much a lone prohibition operating amidst a sea of protections. We may have seen 
kings taking a larger share of this network of protections in this period but all the evidence 
suggests that even in 1066 they were still only a part of the network, fitting in alongside many 
other protectors. Destroying the system altogether by outlawing feud entirely was not on the 
agenda at all. 
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Chapter Three 
The Distribution of Legal Power:  
A Reassessment 
Introduction 
The preceding chapters have presented a picture of late Anglo-Saxon society in which violence 
was regulated, not by the prohibition of all violent deeds by something approximating the role of 
the modern state, but by a system of protections in which society as a whole participated. This 
picture, I believe, is an innovative one – it does not, at any rate, agree with modern historiography 
on a number of points – which has implications for our view of Anglo-Saxon England that reach 
beyond our understanding of the law on violence. In emphasising not the role of the crown but 
that of kindreds, lords, churches and guilds, my picture presents a view of the distribution of legal 
power that does not sit easily with the currently fashionable view of Anglo-Saxon England as a 
prodigiously centralised “state” with power resting firmly in the hands of the king. It is my belief 
that, at least in relation to the legal system, much of this edifice of centralisation is based on a 
misapprehension of the nature and importance of protective power. This chapter is an attempt to 
make this case in detail. It takes the findings of the previous two chapters and applies them not 
just to violence but more widely, looking at the legal system as a whole. It aims to produce a more 
balanced picture of the Anglo-Saxon legal system in which the importance of the roles played, in 
particular, by nobles and churchmen is emphasised. It argues not that the English monarchy was 
weak, but that it presided over a system that involved the upper echelons of society, who were 
well rewarded financially for their troubles. It aims, most of all, to escape from some rather 
pernicious ideas and assumptions about “immunities” – that is, particular configurations of legal 
privileges usually held by an ecclesiastical institution through a royal grant – that have shaped the 
debate on the distribution of legal power in England for many decades.1 
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The conclusions of both the previous chapters, as shall become obvious, are of central importance 
for the reassessment that takes place in this chapter. Much of what follows here builds on the fact 
that there was no royal crime of homicide, as was demonstrated in chapter one,  and the picture 
of a system of protections regulating violence that was put forward in chapter two. I hope to 
show that under the pressure of these two related insights much of the orthodox interpretation 
of the distribution of legal power in Anglo-Saxon England simply collapses, and that something 
much less centralised can be put in its place. This chapter, therefore, functions as something of a 
drawing together of strands running through the entirety of the first half of this thesis. Its aim is 
to provide a carefully balanced picture of the late Anglo-Saxon legal system, something 
fundamental to our understanding of pre-Conquest society as a whole. It does make a difference 
if we envisage this society as one governed by a strong “state” which prohibited crime and 
enforced its will through a centralised justice system over which local elites had little influence, or 
if we see instead a society in which local lords held substantial legal powers and participated 
alongside the crown not only in the regulation of violence but in the wider task of maintaining 
order. These are not minor tinkerings with our understanding of the way Anglo-Saxon England 
worked; though the legal and historiographical issues involved may at times seem obscure, the 
questions being addressed are fundamental. We are concerned, after all, with our understanding 
of the relative strengths of the English monarchy and its subjects. The recent trend has been to 
take an almost unipolar view of law in this period, seeing the king at the head of a powerful, 
centralised system of justice standing over nobles and commoners alike.2 This chapter will argue 
for a very different picture in which parties that could in no way be considered part of the “state” 
are afforded a much greater role. 
Being, in essence, a reassessment of the current consensus on the late Anglo-Saxon legal system, 
this chapter is by its nature a historiographical one. It is necessary to look in some detail at the 
foundations of the orthodox viewpoint. This means that considerable time will be spent looking at 
the long-running and slow-burning historiographical controversy about immunities in Anglo-Saxon 
England – a debate that has been continuing in fits and starts for over a century. It is important, 
however, to avoid automatically accepting the assumptions on which this debate has largely been 
founded, so at the outset I would like to note a pair of rather obvious but vitally important points. 
                                                          
 
2
 This is clearest in the work of Patrick Wormald, particularly Wormald (1999e) and (1999c), but it fits in well 
with the overtly “maximalist” interpretations of Anglo-Saxon England found in James Campbell’s work, for 
example Campbell (1989), (1994), (1995). 
Chapter Three – The Distribution of Legal Power: A Reassessment 
113 
 
Firstly, there is no reason to think that all legal privileges necessarily had any connection to the 
king. The literature on legal privilege concentrates almost exclusively on those rights that kings 
did or did not give away in their charters, but this is a quirk of the literature: a great many legal 
powers were exercised as of right, without any royal grant, and they are no less significant 
because of it. Secondly, there is no particular reason to expect that the types of legal privilege 
that Anglo-Saxon kings granted should look like those that were common in either early medieval 
Francia or in post-conquest England. Much of the past century’s literature on the subject has been 
concerned with how closely eleventh-century England’s institutions conform to the continental 
model of the immunity that came to dominate after the coming of the Normans, with heavy 
emphasis being placed on court-holding rights and the ability to deny access to royal agents – the 
characteristic features of the continental immunity. This, it seems to me, is something of a 
distraction. What matters is the practical significance of the legal privileges that were exercised by 
Anglo-Saxon lords and churchmen; how these privileges compare with those common in later 
medieval England or with those exercised by continental contemporaries should be seen as an 
interesting side issue, not the central point of the debate.3  
This chapter, therefore, takes an approach significantly wider than that of the historiography, and 
this is reflected in the two part structure adopted here. First, the issue of delegated legal 
privileges, or immunities, will be addressed directly, the literature reviewed and critiqued and an 
alternative interpretation offered. Secondly, the much more varied category of non-delegated 
powers will be examined, including any legal powers for which there is no convincing evidence of 
a royal grant. The combination of these two aspects will, it is hoped, produce a well-rounded 
picture. The principle followed here for assessing the importance of the various privileges to be 
discussed will be broadly based on the common-sense arguments put forward by Helen Cam over 
half a century ago. 
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The character of a privilege must depend on the system from which exemption is granted, 
and the Frankish immunity implied a system of comprehensive and centralised control, 
however decadent, for which there is no parallel in England. To speak of “the state” or of 
“a national scheme of justice” in Anglo-Saxon England, even to use the term “political”, 
suggests the existence of categories not yet established there.4 
We need not accept Cam’s assessment of Anglo-Saxon England to see the validity of the principle 
she uses to assess “the character of a privilege”. We must, quite plainly, look at any type of 
privilege in the context of the power structures surrounding it. We need not insist that it takes the 
form of an “exemption” that is “granted”, but to assess the significance of any legal power we 
should draw a comparison with those powers possessed by the king. If any collection of powers in 
“private” (by which I mean “non-royal”) hands can be seen as similar in nature and degree to 
those possessed by the king, then we can conclude that the holder of those powers had a 
privilege – perhaps even an immunity – of considerable importance.  
 Delegated Powers 
a) Immunity Historiography 
The historiography of the immunity in Anglo-Saxon England makes a sensible starting point for 
any consideration of the nature of legal power in non-royal hands, simply because the immunity 
has been the main way in which the subject has been approached by scholars. The consensus on 
the issue has shifted drastically over the last century, from F.W. Maitland’s vision of a great 
proliferation of powerful immunities under Edward the Confessor to the current position that in 
all probability no immunities whatsoever existed in England before 1066.5 Nonetheless, despite 
this shift, the issues on which the debate has hinged have remained constant throughout. There 
are, in effect, three points of controversy. Firstly, the issue of the significance of the rights that 
various institutions did receive by charter: essentially the importance of the jurisdiction that 
certain common legal terms conveyed. Secondly, the issue of court-holding: whether the grantees 
of legal rights, or “immunists”, could enforce them in their own courts or would have to claim 
them in royal courts. Finally, the issue of the exclusion of royal officials: the right or absence of a 
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right to prevent the king’s agents from accessing the land of an immunist. The current consensus 
is a rather minimalist interpretation on all three points: the rights being granted out were 
relatively insignificant; private courts in all probability did not exist; and our one piece of evidence 
for the exclusion of royal agents is very likely to be biased. The picture produced is one of strong 
royal control of a justice system with only the profits of justice from relatively minor offences 
being delegated by the crown. 
Though this chapter is, in large part, intended to challenge this consensus, there are some 
elements of it that are fairly irresistible. It must be acknowledged, for example, that there is no 
strong evidence for the existence of private courts. Though a suspicion does remain that in certain 
cases where a single lord had jurisdictional rights over an entire hundred he would have taken 
over the hundred court as well, there is no evidence to prove this and it must always remain a 
matter of opinion. Similarly, it is impossible to deny that the existence of a significant Anglo-Saxon 
tradition of exclusion clauses (preventing royal agents from entering immunists’ lands) seems 
extremely unlikely. There is only one clear example of such an exclusion in the Domesday entry 
for Oswaldslow, and the reliability of this text was strongly contested by Patrick Wormald.6 
However, accepting these realities does not necessarily mean that the interpretations placed on 
them are equally valid. It is a key aspect of this critique that they are not; that the emphasis put 
on these points is in fact symptomatic of the unwarranted historiographical obsession with the 
continental-style immunity, of which these are defining features. This line of attack, however, will 
have to be put aside for now. Partly this is because focusing on these aspects affords them a 
weight that it is doubtful they deserve, but mainly it is because there is a much more profitable 
and fundamental avenue that demands priority. That is, the conclusion that the jurisdictional 
rights for which we do have solid evidence were minor and insignificant. On this front there are 
factual inaccuracies to be exposed as well as what appear, to my eyes, to be clear errors of 
interpretation. 
The historiographical controversy on this point begins with Maitland’s seminal work, Domesday 
Book and Beyond.7 Among many ideas there put forward about Anglo-Saxon immunities, he 
suggested an interpretation of Cnut’s reservation of certain pleas to the crown: 
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12. These are the rights which the king possesses over all men in Wessex, namely 
mundbryce and hamsocn, forsteal and fyrdwite [the fine for neglect of military service], 
unless he wishes to honour anyone further. ... 
15. And in the Danelaw he possesses fihtwite and fyrdwite, griðbryce and hamsocn, unless 
he wishes to honour anyone further.8 
To Maitland’s mind this looked like a strong king clawing back losses in royal jurisdiction occurring 
under his predecessors. But then, to quote Maitland directly:  
Cnut himself and the Confessor – the latter with reckless liberality – expressly grant to the 
churches just those very reserved pleas of the crown. The result is that the well endowed 
immunist of St Edward’s day has jurisdiction as high as that which any palatine earl of 
after ages enjoyed. No crime, except possibly some direct attack upon the king’s person, 
property or retainers, was too high for him.9  
As far as Maitland was concerned, then, these reserved pleas were the key to high-level 
immunities before the conquest. They could scarcely have conveyed greater privilege. 
This argument was comprehensively dismantled by Naomi Hurnard in her two part article of 1949, 
entitled “The Anglo-Norman Franchises”. Hurnard, clearly as a result of the reverence in which 
Maitland was (and indeed still is) held, spent a great deal of time analysing his rather slippery 
prose from every possible angle so as to rule out the possibility that, interpreted in some special 
way, the great scholar’s words made perfect sense.10 After much analysis she concludes that 
Maitland’s analysis does indeed, as it first appeared, rest on the interpretation of Cnut’s reserved 
pleas.11 These pleas, for the purpose of analysis, she reduces to three – hamsocn, griðbryce and 
forsteal – on the grounds that these are the ones that do tend to appear in charters and in 
Domesday Book. They are, in essence, the West Saxon pleas, with the later more common 
griðbryce standing as a synonym for mundbryce, and fyrdwite neglected on the grounds that, 
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being a fine for failure to give military service, “it was clearly not a major, unemendable [offence], 
and its grant cannot be taken as evidence of haute justice”.12 Her dissection of Maitland aside, 
Hurnard’s argument rests on her own interpretation of these three “reserved pleas”. They were 
not, in her view, reserved by Cnut on the grounds that they were his most important, most 
valuable, rights but rather because, of all the many pleas that did belong to the king, these ones – 
being relatively minor, emendable offences that the king could grant out should he wish – were 
those his lords were most likely to think they could usurp. In Hurnard’s words, “far from being the 
sole pleas of the Crown, they are merely the borderline ones”.13  
Her theory expounded, Hurnard then analyses each of the offences in turn to extract their 
meanings. Griðbryce, then, was “the breach of less exalted peaces, such as the lord’s” or more 
specifically “the humble jurisdiction which the lord has over breach of the peace by medleys and 
brawls”.14 Forsteal “stands … for very minor cases of assault and obstruction”, whilst hamsocn 
was simply “assault on a person in a house”.15 Together, “they denoted aggravated assault and 
only very slightly amplified the modest jurisdiction conveyed by sac and soc”.16 This interpretation 
swiftly became the new historiographical orthodoxy. Wormald, as has been noted, referred to her 
paper as “masterly” and stated that she had “show*n+ conclusively that the pleas apparently 
‘reserved’ by Cnut, yet in fact alienated by his and the Confessor’s writs, were not the major 
pleas, as Maitland had thought, but on the contrary, amendable offences, hence of relatively 
minor importance.”17 Though Hurnard herself argued that great immunities did in fact exist, just 
not on the basis of hamsocn, griðbryce and forsteal, this “fall-back position” was not accepted by 
Wormald.18 His examination of the Bishop of Worcester’s triple hundred of Oswaldslow aimed to 
cast as much doubt as possible on what had hitherto seemed the most solid case of a powerful 
immunity before 1066, and the effect of his work has been the establishment of a consensus that 
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there was no tradition of immunities of any significance pre-conquest England.19 Hurnard’s 
interpretation of hamsocn, griðbryce and forsteal is thus a crucial element of the current 
consensus against the existence of immunities. 
b) The Alternative View 
The keys to unlocking this consensus, then, are the familiar offences of hamsocn, griðbryce (or 
mundbryce) and forsteal. These, of course, were the central elements of the previous chapter, 
where they were subjected to a very different interpretation indeed. Rather than being the 
insignificant offences that Hurnard believed them to be, it was argued that these were crucial 
powers in the expansion of the English monarchy’s jurisdiction over violence. By taking over, 
reinforcing and extending traditional forms of spatial and personal protection, as well as giving 
new teeth to older ideas about the king’s responsibility for the protection of travellers on roads, 
English kings gained an interest in feud, and inter-personal violence more generally, that they had 
previously lacked. Hamsocn, introduced by King Edmund, extended full royal protection to all 
houses, building on pre-existing ideas about freemen protecting their own homes. At the same 
time the royal offence of mundbryce was introduced, signalling a massive expansion in the 
availability of the king’s personal protection, so that it was now something that could be granted 
by sheriffs and other royal officials. Forsteal was in many ways the most far-reaching. Growing, it 
seems, out of ideas of obstruction of legitimate progress, we find it eventually developing into a 
royal protection of those travelling on the king’s highway.  
The result of all this was that from the mid tenth century royal jurisdiction over violent offences 
was extended to houses, to main roads, to the presence of royal officials and to anyone given 
personal protection by such an official. The reason this is so significant, I would argue, is not that 
the powers involved covered particularly “high” or “major” crimes but precisely because of the 
flexibility involved in such protections. You could commit any of these offences through homicide 
but you could equally do so through a much less serious act of violence. To Hurnard, these 
elements made such powers look unimportant – they covered relatively mundane offences – but, 
I would argue, this is precisely why they were so significant. This was an extension of royal justice 
into reasonably everyday events, not just rare and infrequently occurring offences like killing 
through sorcery or morð. Those offences, being botleas, were classed by Hurnard as “major 
crimes”, far more significant than anything for which financial compensation could be made. But 
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their enormity was in all likelihood matched by their rarity and they seem unlikely to have been 
major sources of revenue. For morð, at any rate, we have already seen that the evidence suggests 
it was a long way from being a priority for royal justice. By contrast, the right to a £5 fine for even 
a minor infraction taking place in a house or on a road looks exceptionally lucrative. 
c) Hurnard’s Case 
Hurnard’s argument is based on two major planks. The first is that hamsocn, griðbryce and 
forsteal were insignificant because they did not, in fact, cover cases involving homicide; and the 
second is that there was a series of more serious offences – Hurnard uses the term “major 
crimes”20 – that the crown would never have dreamt of granting out and which, as a group, are 
much more significant than those reserved by Cnut. To take the first plank, as can be seen from 
her definitions of these terms, Hurnard clearly believed that hamsocn, griðbryce and forsteal were 
ways in which mere assault, not homicide, could be aggravated. The principal argument put 
forward in support of this position was that there existed a royal plea of homicide (homicidium) 
which would override any case of, for example, hamsocn that happened to involve a killing. In 
such a case the killer would be solely within the jurisdiction of the king because of his homicidium, 
and it would be absurd to think that he would give up his rights over the culprit because a private 
court had the rights to the lesser crime of hamsocn that he had happened to commit as well.21 
This, of course, rests entirely on the idea that a royal crime of homicide existed, and as was shown 
in chapter one, it seems fairly certain that this was not the case. Hurnard’s argument in favour of 
this royal crime of homicide, which is stated only very briefly within a single footnote, was based 
on extremely tenuous readings of one passage in the Leges Henrici Primi and the Domesday entry 
for Kintbury in Berkshire.22 Not only this, but Patrick Wormald’s attempt to make a similar point 
by different means was found to be equally flawed. With this established, Hurnard’s 
representation of hamsocn, griðbryce and forsteal as minor offences that “denoted aggravated 
assault and only very slightly amplified the modest jurisdiction conveyed by sac and soc” 
collapses.23 There is no reason at all to think that they would not have applied to cases of 
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homicide and, as a result, there is no impediment to their being viewed – as they are here – as 
powers of considerable importance. 
If this point is removed, Hurnard’s whole case is significantly weakened, but the second plank of 
her argument remains. Her suggestion is that there was a whole host of “major crimes” reserved 
to the king which were collectively far more important than those listed by Cnut. She refers to 
these throughout her text, occasionally mentioning a few specifically, as when she lists the 
unemendable crimes mentioned in II Cnut (“murder, treason, arson, attacks on houses, open 
theft, persistent robbery, coining”),24 but the implication is that there are many such crimes and 
that most if not all can be found in the Leges Henrici Primi. On this point, she is correct. Clause 
10:1 of the Leges Henrici lists thirty-six “rights which the king of England has in his land solely and 
over all men, reserved through a proper ordering of peace and security”.25 At first sight it is a 
daunting list but with some categorisation it can be reduced to a more manageable size. Nine can 
be disregarded as being personal affronts to the king (for example, fighting in his house or troop, 
contempt of his commands, stealing his land or money). A further fourteen can be reasonably 
dismissed as regalities, pertaining to the king’s unique position as the monarch (for example, 
danegeld, licensing fortifications, coining, cowardice in battle and neglect of military service, 
forests, baronial reliefs, unjust judgements,  shipwreck). A further five, discounting those already 
eliminated, are almost certainly Norman innovations lacking, at any rate, any solid pre-Conquest 
evidence (murdrum, stretbreche, premeditatus assultus, violentus concubitus, raptus).26 
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Of the eight remaining, two are hamsocn and forsteal, three concern outlaws (utlagaria, 
flemenfyrme and qui excommunicatum vel utlagam habet et tenet), two concern thieves (theft 
punishable by death and robaria) and the last is arson. Of this list we can obviously discount 
hamsocn and forsteal, but also the two mentions of a penalty for harbouring outlaws, on the 
grounds that they are present in the list of powers reserved by Cnut.27 Royal jurisdiction involving 
excommunicates should perhaps be separated from outlawry, however, as II Cnut stipulates 
wergild forfeiture to the king for those harbouring them.28 The only other element of mystery 
here is robaria. This is the Quadripartitus’s rendering of II Cnut’s reaflac (hence, given their 
common authorship, that of the Leges Henrici), which Wormald has suggested “has a quasi-
technical sense: not of theft merely, but of unjustified or falsely defended tenure”.29 According, 
then, to this list Hurnard’s “major crimes” consist of harbouring excommunicates, arson, theft 
punishable by death and something, perhaps, approximating to land theft. To these we can add a 
few more from Cnut’s laws: æbere morð, husbryce, lord-treachery and homicide within church 
walls.30 
Even among this small list of eight potential “major crimes” there is room for various degrees of 
doubt as to the inalienability of some. Most strongly, as shall be seen below, those that involve 
wergild forfeitures (harbouring an excommunicate and reaflac) were certainly considered part of 
sake and soke and must, therefore, be disregarded.31 The royal takeover of sanctuary in churches, 
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as we saw last chapter, was not a complete one.32 Homicide within a church was only one part of 
a wider idea of ciricgrið and, as again shall shortly be seen, there is evidence of even this element 
resting in ecclesiastical hands in some northern English churches. Lord-betrayal may still, as when 
Alfred introduced the measure, have resulted in forfeiture to the lord rather than the king.33 
Finally, the right to forfeitures from thieves punished by death seems a close approximation of 
the relatively common jurisdictional right of infangeneþeof and can, therefore, hardly be held up 
as an example of inalienable royal prerogative. What are left are the botleas crimes of arson, 
flagrant murder and husbryce. Husbryce is troublesome in its obscurity, occurring only in II Cnut 
64 and in Latin renderings of the same passage in the Quadripartitus, Consiliatio Cnuti, Instituta 
Cnuti and Leges Henrici Primi. Its literal meaning, “house-breach”, and its unemendable status 
suggest that it is some more serious form of hamsocn. One possible interpretation is supplied by 
the Instituta Cnuti which renders husbryce 7 bærnet with the Latin destructio domus et combustio 
illius, suggesting that husbryce may well represent the offence of destroying someone’s house, 
albeit without the use of fire.34 What we can be sure of is that these three were considered 
unusual and seriously dishonourable crimes for which the usual process of compensation had to 
be bypassed. 
Hurnard’s “major crimes” can thus be reduced to a short list of offences. We can certainly include 
murder, arson and husbryce,  and maybe also homicide in church, but little else. What this 
amounts to is nowhere near so overwhelming as Hurnard represents it. They are “major” 
offences, without doubt, but they also seem to be more extreme ones, in all probability occurring 
much less frequently than hamsocn, griðbryce or forsteal. Though these are not insignificant 
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powers, their scope is not sufficiently great to affect the assessment that the pleas reserved by 
Cnut were the Anglo-Saxon monarchy’s main route to involvement in the violent disputes of its 
subjects. Unlike arson, murder and husbryce, which were unforgivably heinous crimes, hamsocn, 
griðbryce and forsteal could cover more mundane affairs. They gave the king the right to a £5 fine 
not only for killings but also for assaults and woundings – for all types of violence – committed 
against those on roads, in houses or under his officers’ protection. They severely limited the 
arenas in which feud could be pursued without royal involvement, making it much easier for 
those wishing to avoid violent confrontations to do so. These were far from the insignificant 
powers that Hurnard made them out to be. They did not go as far as Maitland seems to imply – 
the comparison with later palatine earls is not a justifiable one – but his picture was in some ways 
closer to the truth than that portrayed by his critics. 
d) Domesday and Charter Evidence 
The evidence of Domesday Book does much to confirm this picture. In no less than sixteen places 
do we find mention of one of hamsocn, griðbryce or forsteal, or some clear equivalent, mostly 
confirming the fact that they did indeed belong to the king.35 Worcester’s entry is not atypical. It 
states that breach of the king’s handgiven peace results in outlawry whilst breach of the king’s 
peace given by the sheriff results in a 100 shilling fine, which is likewise incurred by those 
committing forstellum or heinfaram (i.e. hamsocn).36 These fines, it states, are due to the king 
throughout all the county with the sole exception of the lands belonging to Westminster abbey on 
account of a grant made by King Edward. By contrast, the other offences do not appear much, if 
at all. There are no references whatsoever to murder and only one to arson. That reference, 
however, does little to support Hurnard’s interpretation of arson as a “major crime” as it is 
represented as being emendable by the relatively small fine of twenty shillings.37 Of husbryce 
there is no direct mention, though there is the possibility that it may be being referred to in one 
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Oxfordshire passage.38 There is, in essence, no sign whatsoever of Hurnard’s “major crimes” here, 
whereas by contrast the offences reserved by Cnut have a strong presence. Indeed, where they 
do turn up these offences are frequently numbered among the only exceptions to a given place 
being quit of all custom.39 The impression given is that either Hurnard’s “major crimes” were not 
reserved to the king or that if they were they were not seen as significant enough exceptions to 
record.  Hamsocn, griðbryce and forsteal, on the other hand, were recorded frequently, which we 
must surely take as an indication that they were living, relevant and important law. 
The charter evidence bursts another myth. Despite Maitland’s indictment of Edward the 
Confessor’s excessive alienation of Cnut’s reserved pleas, there are not many reliable examples of 
this occurring. There are pre-conquest charters that have been judged to be authentic for a grand 
total of seven distinct recipients: Christ Church, Canterbury; St Augustine’s, Canterbury; Bury St 
Edmunds; Ely; Winchester; Westminster; and Bromfield.40 Even if we relax our criteria and include 
suspicious charters that may be reflecting genuine grants we can only add a further four religious 
houses: Waltham, Malmesbury, Abingdon and Chertsey.41  To go further than this we can try 
looking at confirmations and grants made by William the Conqueror, but this does not 
substantially alter our picture. Other than the recipients mentioned already we can find only one, 
supposedly genuine, confirmation of a pre-conquest grant to St Martin-le-Grand, and two 
seemingly new grants: to Bath and Chertsey jointly and to St Paul’s, London.42 Indeed, William’s 
charters serve to confirm the picture painted by the Anglo-Saxon ones: hamsocn, griðbryce and 
forsteal were granted out, but only very occasionally. Maitland’s charge of “reckless liberality” 
seems rather excessive; though he was partially justified in according these rights such 
significance, the fruits of a century of painstaking charter scholarship show that he was not so in 
his assessment that they were widely granted. However, the fact that these rights were in fact 
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rather closely guarded is not favourable to Hurnard’s interpretation either. Rather, it suggests 
that far from being humble powers applying only to minor brawls and scuffles, these were in fact 
highly-valued and tightly-controlled royal prerogatives. 
e) More Commonplace Jurisdiction 
Given that we can now see Cnut’s “reserved pleas” of hamsocn, griðbryce or forsteal not only as 
significant powers but also as relatively rarely granted ones, it becomes important to see how this 
related to less exalted forms of jurisdiction: the privileges that in the eleventh century came to be 
encompassed by the terms sake and soke. This is an issue that can be, and frequently has been, 
discussed in an immensely complex and rather confusing fashion. This is, in part, the result of the 
terminology itself. The terms “sake”, “soke” and “sake and soke” are usually used 
interchangeably, but their meaning is not always the same: in Domesday Book, it seems, “the 
term *soke+ was used to describe a lord’s receipt of ’customs’ of any kind”43 whereas in the Leges 
Henrici Primi the idea is much more precise, demonstrating, according to Julius Goebel, that “a 
theory of franchise is in full and conscious operation”.44 It also seems clear that the meaning of 
the terms shifted after the Norman conquest, becoming a grant of the right to hold a court as well 
as to receive the profits of justice.45 However, the terms can be approached in a reasonably 
simple and commonsense way by looking at the law-codes. The key here is to get away, briefly, 
from the problem of defining the terms sake and soke and look instead at the development of the 
rights they seem to have referred to. Sake and soke, after all, are actually rather late terms. As 
was noted in chapter one, they first appear in two Yorkshire charters of the late 950s, but do not 
recur in any charters or writs until the reign of Cnut.46  
Tenth-century laws, however, do repeatedly make reference to fines being paid to lords rather 
than to the king. Some of this material has been covered in the discussion of fihtwite in chapter 
one, but it is as well to recapitulate briefly. Æthelstan’s Grately code is a good starting point for 
this. Here we find that the penalty for defending a thief is the forfeiture of the thief’s wergild but 
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that this was to be paid either to the king or “to him to whom it is legally due”.47 We also find, in a 
later clause, that while it is possible to avoid an ordeal through a monetary payment it certainly is 
not for a fine (wite) “unless he to whom it is due is willing to consent”.48 Later, in Æthelred’s 
Woodstock code we find a similar situation. Those found guilty of theft are ordered to repay 
double the value of the stolen goods to their accuser and forfeit their wergilds not to the king but 
to their lords.49 A thief who escapes, however, has to be paid for by his sureties to the same 
amount, the wergild here being said to go ðam hlaforde … ðe his wites wyrðe sy –  literally, “to the 
lord who is worthy of his fine”.50 There is no indication whatsoever that the king might receive 
this wergild payment unless he happened to be the lord in question. We find very similar 
provisions in II Cnut, where once more the thief’s wergild goes to the lord who is “his wites 
wyrðe” or “his weres wyrðe”, but also that a man who marries a widow within a year of her 
husband’s death is to pay his wergild to either the king or  “to the lord to whom it has been 
granted”.51 The principle here seems clear: payments of wite and wergild went to lords frequently 
enough for it to be treated as a possibility – and in some cases almost a certainty – in the laws. 
That this right to wergild forfeitures and to wite payments was what came to be encompassed by 
sake and soke seems perfectly clear. 
This is not in any way a controversial observation – the disagreement on this issue has centred on 
whether the right to hold courts accompanied a grant of sake and soke – but it is surely one of 
some significance. What Hurnard described as the “modest jurisdiction conveyed by sac and soc” 
does in fact appear to include the right to receive some very large payments indeed: the wergild 
of even a ceorl was 200 shillings, not far short of the 240 shillings (£5) payable for the offences 
reserved by Cnut.52 No matter what judicial rights were also conveyed, this must surely be 
recognised as a tremendously valuable fiscal privilege. This, however, is far from being all. The 
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Leges Henrici offers a mass of information on soke but is most succinct in a clause dealing with 
vavassors: 
Vavassors who hold free lands shall have the pleas where the punishment is payment of 
the wite or of the wergild in respect of their own men and on their own land, and in 
respect of the men of other lords if they are seized in the act of committing the offence 
and are charged with it.53 
Though dealing with a special case, this is in essence the basic right of sake and soke according to 
the Leges Henrici.54 It is an essentially personal, but occasionally territorial, right to all payments 
of wite and wergild. 
This is exactly what was argued by Goebel, who saw sake and soke as a non-specific formula 
conveying non-specific rights, which he explained as follows: 
By non-specific rights here is intended the complex of fiscal privileges (exclusive of gerihta 
and thief forfeits) collected in the ordinary court, the public hundred—wites, wergilds, 
overseunessas, miskennings, etc., which slide off modern pens as “judicial profits.” … It is, 
then, from the plea-profits, exclusive of theft and the gerihta, collected in the hundred for 
the king by the local officer that a sac and soc grantee is favoured.55 
Essentially, he is saying, sake and soke covered everything except what he terms the gerihta 
(hamsocn, griðbryce or forsteal and the other powers reserved In II Cnut 12-15), the forfeitures of 
executed thieves and business too serious for the hundred court (those botleas offences where 
the culprit’s life is forfeited to the king). In support of this idea he advances evidence from the 
1060 version of II Cnut which makes clear that three of Cnut’s innovations – the payment of 
healsfang for perjury and the wergild forfeitures for both reaflac and the over-hasty marrying of a 
widow – were in fact specifically included in sake and soke.56 The most dramatic alteration of 
these is for reaflac which goes from requiring a wergild payment specifically to the king, to one 
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ordering the culprit to pay his wergild to the king or “he who has his soke”.57 This, it seems, is 
incontrovertible evidence that reaflac was hardly the inalienable royal plea described by Hurnard, 
and it is probable that the same was true for the harbouring of excommunicates, which was also 
punished by wergild forfeiture. 
If both Cnut’s gerihta and all wergild and wite payments were alienable in eleventh-century 
England, all that remains to the king are the botleas offences. That is, murder, arson, husbryce, 
killing within church walls and theft punishable by death. When it is considered that the not 
uncommon grant of infangeneþeof gave the right to the forfeitures of slain thieves to its 
recipients we are left with a very short list indeed. It surely has to be concluded that Hurnard’s 
idea of “major crimes” so significant that those covered by Cnut’s gerihta and sake and soke 
appear ”humble” before them is a fallacy. A grantee like Æthelnoth, Archbishop of Canterbury, 
who had sake and soke along with griðbryce, hamsocn, forsteal, infangeneþeof and flymena 
fyrmðe would have had the right to receive the fines and forfeitures pertaining to almost every 
type of offence.58 He would have had rights over his men almost as great as the king had over his 
own subordinates. It amounted to something approaching full royal jurisdiction over theft and 
over violence, just without – it seems – the right to hold a court. 
f) Private Courts and Exclusion Clauses 
The scope of the rights that were granted by the crown having been examined, we can now turn 
to the issue that has exercised historians most: that of court holding. As was explained above, the 
current historiographical consensus is that because there is no solid evidence for the existence of 
private courts before the conquest, we must assume there were none. The only possible 
exception to this, and this argued against by Wormald, is that perhaps in situations where a single 
lord held the right to forfeitures from an entire hundred he would then naturally gain control of 
the hundred court. 59 The only real evidence for such a situation is in the Domesday passage on 
Oswaldslow that Wormald has cast serious doubt on.60 Against this absence of direct evidence 
there are only arguments, chief among which is Maitland’s famously cynical dictum, “no one in 
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the Middle Ages does justice for nothing”. “Why”, argued Maitland, “should the sheriff hold that 
court, why should he appoint a bailiff for that hundred, if never thereout he could get one penny 
for his own or for the king’s use.”61 Despite the lack of evidence this remains a very good 
argument. It would be a complete waste of time for a royal official to be sent every month to 
preside over a court from which no money could be extracted. Moreover, as Maitland also points 
out, were this to have happened – as Goebel and Wormald envisaged – we really ought to regard 
the recipient of the profits of justice as immensely lucky. Without the slightest exertion on his 
part, without any involvement in the process of justice, this lord received what must have been a 
sizable, if somewhat variable, income. It seems an unlikely picture. Surely we must imagine that 
the lord needed to go to some effort to secure this money, whether it be presiding over the court 
or simply turning up and advocating his own interests. The idea that such powerful men would be 
content to place so much reliance on the incorruptibility of the Anglo-Saxon hundred court is not, 
in my view, plausible. 
Next to this we can place another of Maitland’s observations, this time on the nature of courts in 
this period: 
We must once more remember that even in the days of full grown feudalism the right to 
hold a court was after all rather a fiscal than a jurisdictional right. We call it jurisdictional, 
but still, at least normally, the lord was, neither in his own person, nor yet in the person 
of his steward, the judge of the court. His right was not in strictness a right ius dicendi, for 
the suitors made the judgements. When analysed it was a right to preside over a court 
and to take its profits. Very easy, therefore, is the transition from a right to “wites” to 
such “jurisdiction” as the feudal lord enjoys.62 
The court holder, then, had two main functions: presiding over the proceedings and collecting the 
profits. In the model of Wormald and Goebel, however, he merely presided, the profits going to 
the holder of sake and soke. What, then, is the significance of this role? Clearly it is a position 
from which much influence could be exerted on the business of the court, but can we really be 
certain that a sheriff’s bailiff in this position would really be able to wield more influence than the 
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agent of the lord who would surely also be attending? Given that the lord in question, in the case 
of a potential “private hundred”, was not just anyone’s lord but the lord of almost everyone 
present, this seems unlikely. In cases where a lord had soke over only part of a hundred we might 
expect the presiding bailiff to have more influence but, even so, the lord (or his agent) would 
surely be present to pursue his own financial interests.63 The real difference, then, between this 
sort of situation and one in which the court is actually presided over by the lord’s man is not 
great. In both the judgements are made by the suitors, in both the profits go to the same lord, 
and in both there is a representative of the lord there to ensure he gets what is owed to him. The 
issue of court holding is, in a lot of ways, a red herring. Because courts became a key element in 
English immunities, historians have been interested in discovering their origins, despite the fact 
that the development in itself need not be seen as that significant. It seems to be an issue more of 
form than of substance.  
The issue of the exclusion of sheriffs and other royal agents is, if anything, even more illusory than 
that of court holding. It has to be asked what, really, does it matter if such agents could be 
excluded or not so long as the holders of jurisdictional rights were able to claim what was theirs? 
As Wormald himself points out, the evidence for sheriffs taking a predatory approach to their 
offices is far greater after the conquest than before, which may be a sign that royal officers, as 
Maitland suggested, had little interest in operating within other lords’ sokes because of the 
absence of profit in them.64 If this was indeed the case the continental entry prohibition clauses 
that have sapped so much historiographical ink would have been superfluous. Nonetheless, there 
are some indications that such exclusions did exist. Oswaldslow’s Domesday entry is unequivocal, 
and though Wormald has cast doubt on its reliability the case against it can only ever be a 
suspicion. It must remain a possibility that the Bishop of Worcester did indeed have “all render 
from jurisdiction” (omnes redditiones socharum) in his “triple hundred” so that no sheriff could 
have any claim there, and that the entire shire did indeed testify to this, even if the bishop did 
have ample opportunity to manipulate the evidence put before the inquest.65  
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And what would such an exclusion mean in practice anyway? Certainly not much more than what 
we already know to be true of sake and soke: that the bishop would be entitled to all the 
proceeds of the hundred court and that royal agents would not be able to extract a penny for 
their own gain. Statements like Yorkshire Domesday’s “neither the king, the earl nor anyone else 
has any customs in all the land of the Churches of St Peter, York, St John, St Wilfrid, St Cuthbert 
and Holy Trinity” are surely close parallels. Without any mention of sheriffs this seems to 
constitute a comprehensive exclusion of outside interference. If it did not actually exclude the 
persons of royal officers it certainly prohibited them from claiming any customs, and this, in fact, 
is all exclusion clauses were ever meant to do. Even the most thoroughly excluded late medieval 
sheriff could, surely, have paid a social call on an immunist bishop within his lands, and he cannot 
have been prohibited from venerating in person even the most highly privileged saint. All 
exclusion clauses ever did was exclude sheriffs in their shrieval capacity; when acting as mere men 
they could come and go as freely as anyone else. The only meaningful aspect of the exclusion, 
then, is the royal agent’s inability to make any claims from the land in question, and this is not far 
from being what was accomplished through the phrase sake and soke alone. The entire issue has, 
to my mind, been hopelessly overblown. The presence or absence of exclusion clauses in the 
continental style can tell us something interesting about Anglo-Saxon borrowings of continental 
ideas, but it does not tell us much that is meaningful about how legal power was distributed in 
pre-conquest England.66 
The historiographical fixation with the trappings of Frankish and later medieval immunities – with 
their courts and exclusion clauses – has distorted our view of the real object of the discussion: the 
extent of the legal powers of Anglo-Saxon lords. Wormald’s assessment of the state of Anglo-
Saxon justice was that “its profits may have been alienated, but the signs are that its servants 
were intrusive and its arenas monopolised”.67 It is not an assessment that, in itself, is in any way 
objectionable: inasmuch as royal agents of one sort or another seem to have presided over most, 
if not all, of a structure of “public” courts, it is a rational assessment. Though the terms 
“monopolised” and “intrusive” are perhaps a little strong, insofar as they represent a comparison 
with the continental state of affairs they seem reasonable enough. The fundamental problem 
here is not the assessment itself, but the weight given to its constituent parts. To my mind the 
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alienation of so many of the profits of justice deserves far greater emphasis than the relatively 
insignificant issues of who presided over the courts and whether a specific privilege excluding 
royal agents existed. On this point, the eleventh-century lords in question would surely have 
concurred. There is a reason that we know far more about the destination of fines than 
mechanisms by which they got there. It is because, quite simply, “immunities” in whatever their 
form were largely fiscal privileges. They were prized not primarily for the prestige of holding 
courts but for the additional income that they provided. From a royal perspective, at least part of 
their aim was quite evidently to give powerful landholders a financial interest in local peace-
keeping. It is just plain implausible to argue that such landholders did nothing other than pick up 
their profits from the local sheriff. Both their own (financial) and the king’s (peace-keeping) 
interests were served by playing an active role of some sort. In this period, landholding and 
personal lordship were the main sources of power. Whether as court presidents or simply as the 
prominent local landholders that they were, it would be very surprising if these lords were unable 
to exercise a high degree of control in courts substantially made up of their own men.  
g) Conclusions 
The picture that emerges from this analysis of delegated legal powers in late Anglo-Saxon England 
is nothing if it is not controversial. The almost sixty-year-old consensus on the significance of the 
offences reserved to the king in II Cnut has been turned on its head. Rather than being 
insignificant aggravations to minor offences like assault, griðbryce, hamsocn and forsteal have 
been argued to be central to royal jurisdiction over violence. Though the interpretation of sake 
and soke followed here is nothing new – being essentially that put forward by Goebel – it has 
been argued that it ought to be afforded more weight than it generally is. This, after all, was a 
substantial privilege: the lucrative right to all wergild and wite payments. The underlying reasons 
for its consistently being underplayed have also been addressed. The logic seems to have been 
that because sake and soke only conferred the profits of justice – and the justice of only 
emendable pleas at that – they were somehow a minor right. Even taken at face value this is a 
grievously unfair assessment. Whatever ideas may be held about the nature of jurisdiction, the 
right to wergild forfeitures is clearly of high economic value. However, it seems skewed by a more 
general historiographical distortion arising from the idea that the right to hold a private court was 
in some way radically different and obviously superior to the mere right to profits of justice. The 
argument put forward here is that this difference, though clearly it does exist, is nowhere near so 
significant as historians have made it appear. Overall, this section has argued, late Anglo-Saxon 
monarchs delegated a very large proportion of their legal powers to the great lords and great 
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churches of their kingdom. They were quite liberal with their older prohibitive rights, particularly 
those covering theft, but much more careful with their newer protective jurisdiction over 
violence.  
Non-Delegated Power 
To get a complete picture of the legal powers enjoyed by great lords and great churches before 
the Norman conquest, we need to look at more than just the rights that were granted out by the 
crown. Why, after all, should we expect lords and churches of the highest rank to be entirely 
beholden to the king for their powers? We need to look at the rather diverse group of privileges 
that do not fit into this category. These range from rights which are fairly clearly autogenous to 
those for which there are traditions, but no firm evidence, suggesting otherwise. Broadly speaking 
there are three categories: immemorial customs, as found in the laws; customs for which there is 
no claim to great antiquity, nor any sign of royal involvement; and privileges later associated with 
early royal grants for which there is no evidence. This categorisation, however, though helpful in 
that it illustrates the heterogeneous nature of these powers, is not massively useful as an 
analytical tool. There is ample scope for overlap not only between these groups but also between 
these powers and those that we think of as delegated. The best approach, it seems, is to examine 
them one at a time. As a perfect example of the mobility of these rights between categories, sake 
and soke makes a good place to start. 
a) Lordship and Soke 
The development of the rights referred to by the term “sake and soke” is an instructive example 
of how delegated power could, it seems, become a right simply associated with lordly status and 
exercised without any pretence of a royal grant. Sake and soke, or more accurately a lord’s right 
to receive the wite for offences committed by his own men, originally appears to have been the 
subject of a royal grant. As Maitland first pointed out, there are a series of charters from the 
eighth and ninth centuries in which general rights are granted with, among the exceptions, the 
payment of angild – the compensation payable to the victim of an offence. He argued 
persuasively that this meant that though the king claimed no right to the wite in this land, this did 
not mean that the victims could go uncompensated. Indeed, some of the charters are explicit on 
the point that nothing “is to go out to wite” from the land in question, the clear implication being 
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that the grantee is entitled to it.68 The exact significance of the angild exemption has been the 
source of controversy – Maitland thought it implied court-holding, Goebel did not – but the basic 
interpretation of these charters as grants of wite is secure.69 
This right to wite, however, seems to have become a fairly standard right of lordship by the early 
tenth century. As we have seen, the possibility of lords receiving wite and wergild payments is 
well represented in the tenth-century law-codes and there are no indications that this was as the 
result of royal grant. Indeed, sometimes, as in I Æthelred’s treatment of theft, the lord is 
represented as the only possible recipient of the fines, the king being excluded.70 To this we may 
add a series of laws on lord-changing that assume the right of lords to receive penalties for 
offences committed by their men. The basic element of these laws is that changing lords when 
not quit of all charges is not allowed, under a penalty of wite, usually to be paid by the new lord. 
These provisions recur in similar, but not identical, forms in laws of Alfred, Edward, Æthelstan and 
Edmund.71 Some of the later iterations of these laws make it clear that, as well as paying a wite to 
the king, the new lord is either to ensure that the old lord is paid by the man in question or to pay 
up himself.72 What appears to be going on here is a progression of increasingly severe laws trying 
to ensure that men cannot get away with committing offences by simply switching to a new lord. 
The assumption underlying all these statements is, of course, that the old lord was meant to 
extract the wite from his men and his interests – as well as those of justice – would be injured by 
that man’s switching lords whilst he still had wite to pay. Interestingly, all lords are here 
represented as possessing similar rights, or at least there is no sign of a differentiation between 
changes of lords holding soke and of lords that did not.  
The advent of the terminology of sake and soke seems to have reasserted royal control over these 
rights. As we have seen, the first grants occur in the late 950s but it is not until the reigns of Cnut 
and Edward the Confessor that they start to become common. Cnut’s version of the lord-changing 
                                                          
 
68
 Maitland (1897), pp. 274-5. The Sawyer numbers of the relevant charters are listed in Wormald (1999c), 
p. 315. 
69
 Cf. Goebel (1937), pp. 348-54. 
70
 I Atr 1:3, 1:7. 
71
 Af 37; II Ew 7; II As 22; IV As 4-5; V As 1-1:1; III Em 3. 
72
 IV As 4-5; V As 1-1:1; III Em 3. 
Chapter Three – The Distribution of Legal Power: A Reassessment 
135 
 
law is perhaps an indication of this shift. No longer is there compensation for the old lord, instead 
an injunction that he not dismiss his men until they are quit of all charges.73 Rather than expecting 
to gain from his men’s misdemeanours, a lord is now cautioned against wriggling out of his own 
obligations of suretyship. The emphasis is precisely the opposite of that in Æthelstan’s and 
Edmund’s laws. I would suggest that this be interpreted as a sign that lordship no longer of itself 
entailed the right to receive fines – that this was coming once more to require a grant – though it 
did still entail a duty to stand surety for one’s men.74 What we have here, at any rate, is a picture 
in which the right to wites seems to come very close to being accepted simply as right of lordship, 
before being reclaimed by the monarchy with the introduction of the term sake and soke. This, 
perhaps, is reflected in the nature of the powers encompassed by that phrase. As we have seen, 
in the Leges Henrici they are primarily rights over a lord’s men with only a small, extremely 
practical, territorial element. Soke applies to a lord’s own men in almost all circumstances; only 
when caught red-handed on another lord’s land will an offender’s fine be destined for pockets 
other than those of his own lord.75  
What this reveals is that even rights that were originally as clearly royal as wites and wergild 
forfeitures could become, in effect, autogenous rights of lordship, possessed simply by virtue of 
being a lord. It is, however, crucial to remember that these were not the only legal rights that fit 
this category. As Æthelstan’s laws make plain, all lords had the right to offer limited protection to 
those fleeing to them and to extract the penalty of their mundbyrd for any breach.76 They also, of 
course, had the right to the payment of manbot should any of their men be slain. These protective 
powers gave them an important role in feuds to place alongside their rights to prohibitive fines for 
theft and other offences. These were not insignificant rights. It ought to be remembered that in 
the early tenth century the king’s interest in feud was not much greater than the offering of 
sanctuary and the protection of his own men, and that a large part of the expansion of this 
interest was accomplished by taking over the protections of others. Lords, moreover, were 
inherently more accessible than the king. Their relative proximity may have meant that the impact 
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of their right to manbot or mundbyrd was felt much more strongly than seemingly greater royal 
powers. They were, after all, major landholders and thus would usually have been powerful men 
in their own districts. It is small wonder that Edmund was keen to gain his lords’ support in his 
attempts to crack down on feud.77 
b) Sanctuary 
If lords had certain rights by virtue of their being lords, so too did churches. Hamsocn, griðbryce 
and forsteal were not the only elements of the English monarchy’s radical tenth-century 
expansion of its role in violence. The other area where a royal takeover of previously private 
protective power is detectable is in ecclesiastical sanctuary: what became known as ciricgrið. As 
the analysis of Wulfstan’s laws in the previous chapter showed, this royal takeover was ultimately 
not a complete one.78 It covered homicidal breaches of ciricgrið that took place “within church 
walls”. Non-fatal breaches, which Wulfstan makes clear were entirely possible, resulted in no 
royal involvement; instead a status-dependent fine was to be paid to the church. All breaches in 
the protected zone outside the church walls again resulted in status-dependent fines. All churches 
in the south of England, therefore, exercised protective legal powers over their precincts, just as 
the king did over his court. All that was missing was the most serious element of their jurisdiction 
covering killings within the church itself; the rest remained and this remainder should not simply 
be dismissed. It may be that, like hamsocn, griðbryce and forsteal, the more practically useful – 
indeed, the more lucrative – element of ciricgrið was not that which covered the most extreme 
offences but the more mundane end of the spectrum. Furthermore, even when thinking in terms 
of serious feud violence we should not dismiss the church’s portion of ciricgrið. Killings inside the 
walls may have been out of ecclesiastical hands, but attempted homicides and woundings were 
not. According to Wulfstan, even with its heart transplanted to the king, the jurisdiction 
accompanying standard ciricgrið was not inconsiderable. 
There is some evidence, however, that certain northern churches did rather better than this, 
possibly because of some royal grant for which we have no evidence, possibly by truly ancient 
custom. The main reason to think this is a document known as Customs of York Minster which, 
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among other privileges, outlines the special sanctuary rights of York, Beverley and Ripon. 
Beverley’s are covered in the most detail. 
The church of St John in Beverley has one mile around it free and quit of all claim to any 
royal custom or to any monetary renders or to any geld which is paid to the king 
throughout England. From the beginning of the mile up to the cross of King Æthelstan, if 
anyone breaks the peace, the penalty  will be 1 hundred  (hundreth) [i.e. £8]; from the 
cross of Æthelstan to the churchyard [atrium], 3 hundreds; inside the graveyard 6 
hundreds; inside the church, 12 hundreds; inside the choir, whoever breaks the peace will 
submit his body to peril, without any possibility of rendering satisfaction by nominated 
sum of money.79 
This is, clearly, a description of a gradated sanctuary “banleuca” (that is, a large circular zone of 
privilege).80 Ripon’s privileges are described in very similar terms, the only major difference being 
the absence of an equivalent to the cross of Æthelstan: all the banleuca outside the graveyard 
(atrium) is covered by the 3 hundred fine. York’s are somewhat different, most obviously there is 
no outer banleuca, the sanctuary extends only as far as the atrium. The compensations here and 
in the church are the same but the choir is covered by a larger fine of 18 hundreds, the 
uncompensatable area being a stone chair, known as the friðstol, by the high altar.81 
Customs, however, is a problematic document. It is a copy of a fourteenth-century letter from the 
chapter of York Minster to the chapter of Southwell Minster, purporting to contain the record of 
an 1106 inquest into the privileges of the Archbishopric of York. In spite of its late date, 
commentators on Customs have been positive about the authenticity of its information.82 Possibly 
they have been too kind; certainly A. G. Dickens’s conclusion that it is an “authentic account” of 
this inquest cannot be justified.83 Though the lists of inquisitors and jurors testify strongly that the 
inquest took place, was recorded, and that this record was used in preparing Customs, there is 
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also clear evidence of later interpolation into the text. Shortly after the introductory matter, we 
find most of the text of a rather suspicious charter of Henry I.84 Wherever this text originally came 
from, it was not Customs. Its presence disrupts the document’s structure, leading to a two-part 
discussion of sanctuary, and its emphasis on the canons’ rights over the archbishop—who is 
credited with calling the inquest—seems out of place. The text following the charter, however, 
has few suspicious signs, makes reasonably modest claims, and its information is partially 
confirmed by less problematic late eleventh-century texts.85 This section, which contains the 
material on Ripon and Beverley, may well represent the text of the original inquest. It must, at any 
rate, have been in existence in the early twelfth century as it was used in Richard of Hexham’s 
description of his own church’s privileges.86 
The Ripon and Beverley sanctuary schemes given in Customs, therefore, are at least as old as the 
early twelfth century, and we do have earlier evidence that supports an Anglo-Saxon origin for 
them: Ripon’s banleuca, for example, appears in Domesday Book.87 Yet, the pre-Conquest 
evidence is contradictory. An archiepiscopal estate-survey, dated by W. H. Stevenson to about 
1030,88 whose section on Ripon begins “at Ripon first the space of one mile on each side”89 
confirms the early existence of the banleuca, but the similarly early eleventh-century text that 
Liebermann called Norðhymbra Ciricgrið offers a very different sanctuary scheme. It states that 
York, Ripon, and Beverley had sanctuaries of the highest rank, killings within church walls being 
botleas (unemendable) and breaches short of killing being compensated by three “hundreds”. It 
adds that churches of lesser rank were entitled to lesser sums, and bans women and weapons 
from churches, but there is no mention of any banleuca.90  
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How can these two documents be reconciled? Wormald’s view that Norðhymbra Ciricgrið was 
“obviously . . . a local application of Wulfstan principles” suggests a solution.91 His argument is a 
solid one: the text gives northern churches a ranking similar to that found in Wulfstan’s work and 
displays identical spatial principles, using exactly the same phrase, binnan cyricwagum, to 
describe where homicide was unforgivable.92 If, then, we see this as part of an attempt to recast 
Northumbrian institutions in a Wulfstanian mould, should we not see it as an attempt that failed? 
There is, after all, no later sign of this Wulfstanian scheme and the official character of 
Norðhymbra Ciricgrið is far from certain.93 This seems, to my mind, the most sensible view and its 
implications are interesting: rather than casting doubt on the antiquity of the scheme in Customs, 
Norðhymbra Ciricgrið serves to strengthen the case. To be able to survive this early-eleventh-
century assault, the banleuca scheme would probably need to have been regarded as a long-
standing custom. If we add that the structure of fines in “hundreds” is extremely close to that in III 
Æthelred, a late-tenth-century code for the Danelaw, a tenth-century origin for the Customs 
scheme seems most probable.94 It is, of course, possible that these Scandinavian fines were added 
to a pre-existing sanctuary scheme. Its similarity to the sanctuary banleuca with concentric 
subdivisions described in the eighth-century Irish Collectio Canonum Hibernensis could be an 
indication of this, but it would also be consistent with a tenth-century origin as the Hibernensis is 
known to have been circulating in England at that time. 95 
If, then, we follow what seems to be the most reasonable course and accept these sanctuaries as 
genuine, how do we interpret them? York is not particularly interesting; it merely claims some 
very high fines for infractions of its peace, which is what we might expect from the Danelaw. It 
does, however, limit the uncompensatable area far more tightly than Wulfstan did, allowing 
compensation even within the choir, and there is no indication of any royal involvement in 
forfeitures resulting from killings at the friðstol. Beverley and Ripon, however, are more 
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significant. We have large sanctuary banleucas within which, it is easy to imagine, any killing 
would be interpreted as a breach of the church’s peace requiring payment of the fine for 
whichever zone the killing took place. We might, in short, think that it gave these churches what 
was effectively a zone of jurisdiction over violence. Unfortunately, interpreting this text is not that 
simple. Another provision in the same passage gives us cause for doubt:  
Moreover, at the three feasts and at Pentecost, all coming and going from their homes 
have peace; fine for breach of the peace, one hundred. Likewise on the feast of St. John 
the Baptist and John the Confessor, and similarly on the feast of the dedication of the 
church of Beverley. All those coming to or going from the two feasts of St. Wilfrid shall 
have peace, and whosoever infringes this peace, within one mile on the inward journey 
and one mile on the outward journey, shall be liable to a fine of one hundred for peace-
breaking.96 
The clear implication is that on these particular feast-days the protection was broadened from its 
usual scope into something more general. This could be interpreted to mean that on every other 
day the protection of the banleuca applied only to those officially in sanctuary; people simply 
going about their daily business would not be covered. According to this interpretation, what we 
have here is a much less significant privilege, one that provided protection only to those who 
claimed it directly and did not give its holders the right to compensation for any and all misdeeds 
within their banleucas. 
I have elsewhere attempted to unravel the different possible interpretations of these rights, and 
there I came to the conclusion that it seems most likely that this more limited protection did at 
some point evolve into the more far-reaching one, effectively becoming a large-scale realisation 
of Wulfstan’s concept of ciricgrið.97 It does seem possible, however, that this was a post-
conquest, possibly even twelfth-century, development.98 The important point here, however, is 
that either way we look at it the churches possessed considerable legal privilege. Even if the 
banleucas were limited to the protection of those who actively sought it, we must acknowledge 
that this makes them some of the most powerful examples of protection that we know of. The 
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sheer size of the sanctuaries and of the fines that protected them are almost unprecedented. 
Indeed, the only possible comparisons are the very similar scale of fines for breaches of grið in III 
Æthelred and the statement  in the fragment known as Pax, discussed briefly in the previous 
chapter, that the king’s grið extends for over three miles around his burhgeat.99 Even if we do not 
allow these churches the level of quasi-jurisdiction that Wulfstan gave to ciricgrið, they were still 
some of the most powerful protections in the country, matched only by the king himself.  
This equivalence to royal prerogative in terms of both nature and degree is important. In a sense, 
it makes them “immunities” in their own right. This effect is enhanced when we consider these 
positive protective rights alongside the laconic phrases of exemption found in Customs – where 
Beverley is “free and quit of all claim to any royal custom” – and Domesday Book where “neither 
the king nor the earl nor anyone else had any customs in all the land of the Churches of St Peter, 
York, St John, St Wilfrid, St Cuthbert and Holy Trinity”. Despite the lack of detail, it is clear that the 
privileges involved are substantial ones indeed. This does seem to imply the right to collect fines 
for hamsocn and griðbryce in addition to sake and soke.100 When these privileges are considered 
together – and the churches’ rights in their capacities as lords are factored in – the effect is a very 
impressive collection of powers in non-royal hands. The protection of the banleucas did not, of 
course, extend over all the lands of Ripon and Beverley, but why should we expect it to, given that 
the king’s protection was similarly limited? In possessing large central protective zones as well as 
a constellation of other legal rights covering almost all offences over a much wider area, Ripon 
and Beverley follow the pattern of royal jurisdiction closely. Maybe they did not have the right to 
forfeitures for the supposedly inalienable “major crimes” of husbryce, morð and arson – though, 
in truth, a literal reading of both Domesday Book and Customs would suggest that they did – but 
the significance of these is, in any case, questionable and in all other respects they must have 
loomed as large to the local population as the king did on his own property. 
c) Feud Rights 
We have looked, then, at the rights of both the church and of lords. What remains are the rights 
of kindreds and, in the case of the Cambridge Thegns’ Guild, groups that mimic the structure of 
kindreds. It needs repeated emphasis, I believe, that the right to extract a wergild was a legal 
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privilege like any other, and a powerful one at that. A thegn’s wergild of 1200 shillings, as has 
been pointed out, was five times greater than the highest fixed penalty in the West Saxon legal 
tradition (the £5 or 240 shilling royal mundbyrd), and even a ceorl’s 200 shillings is not far short of 
that. Just like the lord’s right to manbot and probably also the church’s right to fines for certain 
breaches of ciricgrið, these are not privileges that are in any way dependent on a royal grant. 
They are, rather, exercised as of right, simply by virtue of being a member of a free kindred. 
Because of this, I think, the right to wergild has often been overlooked as a legal privilege – 
discussed separately to the types of legal privilege that were delegated from the centre. The 
regulations of the Cambridge Thegns’ Guild are in a somewhat similar position.101 Though clearly 
not exercised as of right, there are no signs that the £8 addition to guild members’ wergilds was 
reliant on any royal grant. It seems, rather, to have been imposed on the guild’s own authority, 
which was presumably based on the position of its members as dominant figures in the local 
nobility.  
Conclusions 
What, I hope, this chapter has shown is that the legal powers of parties other than the king have 
been significantly underestimated in Anglo-Saxon England. The critique offered here is essentially 
a twofold one. Firstly, that historiographical traditions with a focus on continental and later 
medieval English models for immunities have led to a distorted picture of the late Anglo-Saxon 
period as one free from any significant examples of private legal privilege. Secondly, it has been 
argued that a lack of understanding of the protective powers analysed in chapter two has led 
historians to underestimate the crucial role they played in the tenth and eleventh centuries. The 
first strand is the more general of the two, as the pervasiveness of continental and later medieval 
models of immunity has influenced historians’ expectations in a number of ways. We find its 
effects in the weight afforded to issues such as exclusion clauses and court holding rights, which 
are still seen as the crux of the matter, despite Cam’s attempt to introduce rather more subtle 
criteria.102 We can also see it in the way that delegated power has been studied in isolation, 
marginalising legal rights not granted by the king and as a result not to be found in charters. It has 
also contributed to the second element, in that the strongly prohibitive form that characterised 
                                                          
 
101
 E.H.D. i, no. 136; Thorpe (1864), pp. 610-13. 
102
 Cam (1957), pp. 428-433. 
Chapter Three – The Distribution of Legal Power: A Reassessment 
143 
 
the later medieval immunity has encouraged the misunderstanding of protective legal powers. 
Griðbryce, for example, is interpreted by Hurnard as a minor breach of a uniform peace, through 
an affray or minor assault.103 It is seen, in other words, as a breach of the peace in the way it 
would have been understood in the fourteenth century, or indeed today, rather than a breach of 
a specifically granted protection limited to its recipient. Indeed, the prohibitive mindset seems so 
strong that both Hurnard and Wormald have tried, in the face of overwhelming evidence and in 
two completely different ways, to argue for a royal plea of homicide.104 The idea that something 
that could be termed a “state” might regulate violence by some method other than outright 
prohibition seems to have been a rather difficult one.  
Historians have long agreed that the immunity, in the continental sense, did not exist in Anglo-
Saxon England – that, in fact, is a direct quote from Helen Cam’s 1957 article on the subject105 – so 
in this respect the more recent work  is not much more than an extra nail in an already tightly 
sealed coffin. I do not want to challenge this, but I would question the conclusions we should 
draw from it. The prevailing, Wormaldian, view is that the absence of these immunities implies 
something very positive about the degree of centralised royal control of the Anglo-Saxon justice 
system. Wormald’s negative assessment of the privileges held by the Bishop of Worcester in 
Oswaldslow is followed by a rather telling question “how should all this affect the view we take of 
the power of central government under the last Anglo-Saxon kings and their successors?”106 He 
eventually answers it as follows: 
Maitland’s belief that the immunity had taken a firm hold on the framework of royal 
jurisdiction before the Conquest has had a significant effect on diagnoses of the Anglo-
Saxon body politic in general. One should no longer be satisfied with a simple equation of 
governmental health and lack of immunities. But even if immunities were to be seen as 
germs of decline in the king’s capacity to fulfil his judicial responsibilities, the Anglo-Saxon 
                                                          
 
103
 Hurnard (1949), p. 304. 
104
 Hurnard (1949), p. 300; Wormald (1999e), pp. 340-1. 
105
 Cam (1957), p. 433. 
106
 Wormald (1999e), p. 330. 
Chapter Three – The Distribution of Legal Power: A Reassessment 
144 
 
picture would give us no grounds for finding a further key to the collapse of 1066 in the 
debilitation of royal justice.107 
Despite his protestations to the contrary, Wormald is effectively pursuing the line that lack of 
immunities equates to strong central government. This is precisely the course that his article 
takes: his concern is to demonstrate conclusively that continental style immunities with private 
courts and exclusion clauses did not exist, and then to apply this to our picture of Anglo-Saxon 
royal government. The result is an emphasis on its strength and centralisation. It may be 
extremely cautiously worded, couched in the idea that though his findings were not a positive 
indicator of governmental strength they were able to sweep away a previous negative bias on the 
subject, but there is no question that this context of governmental centralisation was the one in 
which Wormald wished his arguments to be interpreted. An examination of what did exist in the 
place of the absent “immunity” was simply not on his agenda. 
Though in the context of comparisons with France and Germany the continuing “public” nature of 
the English court structure may well redound to the Anglo-Saxon monarchy’s credit, for 
understanding the meaning of legal privileges in an English context it is precisely this issue of what 
was present that matters. Absence of the immunity does not imply the absence of legal privileges 
and, quite obviously, the significance of these legal privileges does not necessarily depend on how 
well they measure up to Frankish standards. So what is the alternative interpretation offered 
here? It is one, first of all, in which court-holding rights and exclusion clauses are not as significant 
as the right to extract fines. Secondly, it asserts that the rights delegated by the king have been 
unduly underplayed by historians. Specifically, we have a picture in which the protective powers 
of hamsocn, griðbryce (or mundbryce) and forsteal constituted the core of royal jurisdiction over 
violence; in which sake and soke and infangeneþeof account for theft in all its forms, as well as a 
host of other payments of wergild and wite; and in which Hurnard’s “major crimes” were 
nowhere near as significant as she believed. But more than this, it is a picture in which the 
protective rights not delegated by the king were also of serious legal significance. Manbot, 
wergild, ciricgrið (particularly the highly privileged sanctuary visible in the north) and the 
compensations demanded by the Cambridge Thegn’s Guild – all these were serious legal rights to 
rival anything that the king was able to give away or reserve to himself. There were some royal 
incursions into such protections, as we have seen, but there seems no reason to believe that as a 
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result of this all private protections ceased to be of any significance. There is nothing to suggest 
that even under Edward the Confessor men in fear could not take advantage of the protection 
offered by an abbot or an earl. 
According to this interpretation, prohibitive rights, mainly over theft but covering other aspects 
too (importantly, fihtwite) were widely shared with lords. Eventually this was done through sake 
and soke in combination with infangeneþeof but previously, it seems, these were all simply 
regarded as autogenous rights of lordship. On the other hand, newer protective rights, such as 
hamsocn, griðbryce and forsteal were much more closely guarded by the kings. This contrast 
between prohibitive and protective rights is worth emphasising. We should not get the 
impression that the protective powers associated with feud were the archaic ones, with the more 
prohibitive ideas that are familiar from modern law being the major force for the advancement of 
royal power. In the late Anglo-Saxon period, at least, it was quite the reverse. We have seen the 
significance of protective powers with regard to violence in the previous chapter, but the main 
point I want to make here is that they were distinctly royal, as opposed to the prohibitive 
innovations involving wergild forfeitures that Wormald emphasises. The indications are that most 
of these, as in the examples of reaflac and the over-hasty marrying of a widow discussed above, 
were regarded as falling automatically to lords with sake and soke. Indeed, it seems like kings had 
not, by the tenth century, just alienated to lords the rights to specific prohibitive offences but 
conceded the principle that all payments resulting from present and future prohibitive 
jurisdiction, short of the few botleas offences, were naturally within the sphere of wites wyrðe, 
later to be soke-holding, lords. The trend with protective rights is precisely the opposite. There we 
find the crown taking over protective duties that had previously been in the hands of others. 
Householders and churches, at least, seem to alienate their protective rights to the king.  
Lords and churchmen, then, could possess extremely high levels of legal privilege and play major 
peace-keeping roles in the kingdom.108 In some especially privileged cases they effectively 
assumed the role of the king with regard to both theft and violence, possibly becoming even more 
formidable with the addition of their own autogenous rights. This is an important conclusion, no 
doubt, but even more significant is the more broad approach that produces it. When discussing 
legal privileges, I believe, we cannot have a full picture unless we go beyond those things 
delegated by central government. We should think of such delegated powers as merely one type 
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of legal privilege alongside which we should place rights of lordship, the powers of kindreds in 
feud and ecclesiastical sanctuary customs. All of these are, quite clearly, interrelated, and all are 
capable of change. Looking at one in isolation can, potentially, lead to a distorted picture. To take 
the example of Ripon and Beverley again, in the thirteenth century there is a radical change in 
both their delegated legal powers and in their sanctuary rights. Can one be understood without 
also looking at the other? I am not convinced it can. What I have argued elsewhere is, in essence, 
that this change marks a reconceptualisation of legal powers that had previously been understood 
as part of sanctuary and were henceforth to take the form of an immunity. Looking simply at the 
delegated powers what we see is a sudden increase in privilege, but if we look at all the relevant 
forms of legal privilege as well as the wider legal context within which they were exercised we see 
something a lot less revolutionary: privileges being updated and reformulated but not, ultimately, 
extended in any very radical sense.109 In the later medieval period, in the age of Quo Warranto 
enquiries, it may be true that legal privilege is mainly a matter of what powers can be 
demonstrated by royal charter, but this is certainly not the case in the Anglo-Saxon period and if 
we are to understand how legal privilege evolved this is something we must take into account. 
A focus on protection, then, has yielded some interesting results in looking at the Anglo-Saxon 
justice system. We have a new model for the way that society as a whole regulated violence 
based on the idea of a network of protections emanating from thousands of different sources 
from kindreds to lords to churches to the king, and offering different levels of protection. We 
might imagine these different degrees of protection as contours that served to guide, however 
imperfectly, the flow of violence in English society. Within this system of protections we find an 
active English monarchy erecting its own strategically placed protections in the hope, not of 
stopping feud altogether, but of providing places of relative safety from which peaceful 
settlements might emerge. In so doing it not only restricted and regulated feud, it established for 
itself an increasingly dominant role in the wider system of protections and a greatly expanded 
jurisdiction over violence. This jurisdiction remained tightly within the control of the crown. 
Though it was shared with some particularly privileged churches, it was not distributed on the 
same level as the prohibitive jurisdiction that came to be associated with the words “sake and 
soke”.  Though there are only a few institutions to which this applies, our new understanding of 
the significance of these protective powers  allows us to appreciate the powerful nature of their 
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privileges, putting them on a footing nearly equivalent to that of the king in his own lands. More 
widely, an appreciation of protection enables us to see the protective powers intrinsic to lordship, 
feud and ecclesiastical sanctuary as the significant legal privileges that they were. Most generally, 
appreciating protective power encourages us to escape from our modern prohibitive assumptions 
about the nature of legal power. In accepting that law can be as much about protecting specific 
people as it is about prohibiting specific actions our sources make more sense to us. Once we 
accept this, it is no longer a problem that theft is generally dealt with through prohibition and 
violence generally through protection; and we no longer feel the need to find prohibitions on 
violence that are inexplicably hidden in the law-codes. Anglo-Saxon society thus looks distinctly 
different when we fully appreciate the role played in it by protective power. 
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Chapter Four  
Dating the Royal Crime of Homicide 
Introduction 
The second half of this thesis is an assessment of the importance of protective power in the 
development of royal jurisdiction over violence after the Norman conquest. In the preceding 
chapters it was argued that royal protections played a central role in the expansion of the king’s 
involvement in violent disputes during the Anglo-Saxon period; the question to be asked in the 
coming chapters is to what extent this process continued. It is well known that by the thirteenth 
century homicide was being prosecuted as a serious royal crime – a  felony1 – and that by Edward 
I’s day the English viewed the feuding customs of their Welsh, Scottish and Irish neighbours as 
positively barbarous, plainly contrary to God and reason, but how this situation came about is less 
certain.2 What we are seeking to explain here is, in effect, the official destruction of the system of 
feud. We have seen how Anglo-Saxon measures may have managed to regulate feud so tightly 
that in practice it became very difficult to take vengeance, or indeed to kill someone in the first 
place, without incurring the wrath of royal justice. However, all these previous measures worked 
within the old system. They may have made feud much harder to conduct but they did not outlaw 
it, and the protection offered by the kin, as represented by wergilds, lay at the heart of the 
system. What takes place by the end of the twelfth century, however, is something very different. 
The system is not one based around a network of protections of varying strengths and from 
different sources, it is one based on royal punishment of what can, by then, reasonably be termed 
“violent crime”.  The next two chapters will explore the “how” and, to some extent, the “why” of 
this dramatic shift – which amounted, in essence, to the assertion of a royal monopoly of 
legitimate violence – but before this it is crucial to examine the “when”.  
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So when exactly did this development take place? In the previous chapter Naomi Hurnard’s and 
Patrick Wormald’s arguments that it had already taken place before 1066 were analysed and 
dismissed because of a lack of evidence, so at what point can we confidently assert that homicide 
was regarded as, and punished as, an offence against the Crown? In answering this question it is 
easiest to work backwards from a point of reasonable certainty to the more ambiguous evidence. 
Taking this approach, a good starting point is the text entitled De Legibus et Consuetudinibus 
Anglie, apparently written mainly in 1220s and 1230s and probably only added to by Henry of 
Bratton in the 1250s, but nonetheless universally known as Bracton.3 This is the formula Bracton 
gives for an appeal of homicide: 
A. appeals B. for the death of C. his brother, that whereas the said A. and C. his 
brother were in the peace of God and of the king at such a place, doing such a thing (or 
“crossing from such a place to such”) on such a day in such a year and at such an hour, the 
said B. came with such persons (to be named) and wickedly, feloniously, in premeditated 
assault and against the king's peace given to him, dealt the aforesaid C. his brother a 
mortal wound in the head with a certain sword (or some other kind of sharp-edged 
weapon, not, according to some, with a club or a stone or other instrument which cannot 
be termed a sharp-edged weapon) so that he died of the wound within three days. And 
that he did this wickedly and feloniously and against the king's peace he offers to prove 
against him by his body, as one who was present and saw, and as the king's court may 
award.4 
Here it is plain that homicide is subject to royal justice, and importantly a number of concepts that 
could potentially be significant in explaining how this came about are highlighted. The victim has 
to be stated to have been in the “the peace of God and of the king”, whilst the accused has to be 
said to have acted “wickedly and feloniously and against the king's peace” and, though it is not 
emphasised as strongly, “in premeditated assault”.  Wounding was treated in precisely the same 
terms as long as the wound produced was not a trifling one; scratches and bruises did not qualify 
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for treatment as felonies and would have to be prosecuted civilly, as “iniuria” rather than felony, 
but still in breach of the king’s peace.5 
The picture we get in the text known as Glanvill, composed in the 1180s (though again probably 
not by the man whose name became attached to the work), is rather less sophisticated, 
suggesting that considerable refinement took place in the fifty years that followed it. It treats 
homicide as follows: 
When anyone is accused of homicide, the trial is ordered and proceeds according to the 
distinction [between appeal and presentment] set out above. It should be known, 
however, that in this plea the accused is not allowed his freedom on giving sureties 
except as a special royal favour.  There are two kinds of homicide. The first is called 
murder: this is done secretly and out of sight and knowledge of all but the killer and his 
accomplices…*The second+ in ordinary speech is called simple homicide.6 
This passage makes it impossible to mistake the author’s meaning at the start of the work when 
he includes homicidium in a list of “criminal pleas belonging to the crown” that are “punished by 
death or cutting off of limbs.”7 This is the earliest point at which it is explicitly stated that simple 
homicide, as opposed to murder, was a royal offence. The concepts found in Bracton do not have 
the same prominence in Glanvill but they do exist in a way that strongly suggests their 
importance, with one passage explicitly classifying homicide as a felony and another saying the 
following on lesser acts of violence: “If lords fail to do justice, then sheriffs also have jurisdiction 
over brawling, beatings and even wounding, unless the accuser states in his claim that there has 
been a breach of the peace of the lord king.”8 This clearly indicates that all forms of violence were, 
at least potentially, breaches of the king’s peace and therefore punishable by the crown. The idea 
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of premeditated assault is not present here, which probably indicates that it had not emerged as a 
concept of importance during the reign of Henry II.9 
Earlier than Glanvill the situation is more obscure. If we are to push the origin of this situation 
back to the early days of Henry II’s campaign against crime at the Assize of Clarendon in 1166, we 
have to be prepared to forgive some terminological laxity.10 Both here and in the Assize of 
Northampton of 1176 there is a strong emphasis on three types of criminals: the robator, the 
murdrator and the latro.11 If we can believe that the term murderer used here in fact applied to 
all homicides then we can accept that Glanvill is reporting the results of Henry’s reforms, but this 
is a very significant leap. If it is indeed the case then it must draw our attention most urgently to 
the development of the term “murder” to a stage where it could be used so loosely – something 
unimaginable in any earlier legal text (and, as we have seen, expressly contradicted in Glanvill). 
The case for finding evidence of royal prosecution of homicide in the Leges Henrici Primi, as put by 
Hurnard, has already been addressed and, though there is other pertinent material there that will 
be addressed in detail in the next chapter, at face value there is nothing in that document to 
suggest that simple homicide was treated any differently under Henry I than it was before 1066. 
We can thus be reasonably sure that in the 1110s, the time when the Leges Henrici were written, 
homicide was not a royal offence but that by the time of Glanvill’s composition in the 1180s, and 
quite possibly by the Assize of Clarendon in 1166, this had changed. 
If we turn now to the rather sparse evidence for actual cases of homicide, the picture that 
emerges is rather similar. In R. C. Van Caenegem’s English Lawsuits from William I to Richard I 
there are sixteen references to homicide, but only five come from before the reign of Henry II and 
none of these qualifies as simple homicide. There is an accusation that Jews killed a Christian boy, 
a slaying on a royal road, the killing of a servant of the king, five brothers wishing to take 
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vengeance on an accidental killer, and a discussion of homicide in breach of sanctuary.12 The 
evidence grows more plentiful as a result of the controversy between Henry II and Archbishop 
Thomas Becket about jurisdiction over offences committed by the clergy. A cluster of cases from 
the period 1162-64 follows the pattern of a cleric killing someone, Henry demanding justice in a 
secular court, and Becket insisting on ecclesiastical punishment instead.13 In one of these 
instances it is clear that the king wanted the man to be executed, but it seems that the charge in 
this case was actually one of insulting behaviour towards a royal officer who had attempted to 
assert the crown’s jurisdiction.14 The implication of these cases does appear to be that homicide 
was a royal offence – the king, after all, evidently saw the incidents as his business – but it is not 
explicitly stated to be so, and the details of the homicides are all left extremely vague, the focus 
being on the dispute between archbishop and king. 
What does seem clear enough, however, is that writers of miracle stories relating to the decade 
after the Assize of Clarendon saw homicidium as something the king would prosecute. This 
association with the assize is explicitly stated in the account of the case of Robert “the Putrid” of 
Banham. The effect of the assize, whether it was Clarendon or Northampton is uncertain, is 
explained as follows: 
By royal command, men who had committed homicide (viri homicidae), theft and the like 
were traced in various provinces, arrested and brought before judges and royal ministers 
at St Edmunds and put in jail, where, to avoid their liberation by some ruse, their names 
were entered on three lists on the judges’ order.15 
Robert was one of these imprisoned men but, by the miraculous intervention of St Edmund, his 
name was not on the lists the following morning and he walked free.  We also find reference to a 
layman, languishing in prison in 1171 after an accusation of homicide, being freed by the agency 
of the (now martyred) Becket; and a woman who having failed the ordeal for homicide in York 
Minster was condemned to death only to be saved by intercession of St William in 1177.16 The 
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evidence of the treatment of homicide in practice, therefore, offers little that is solid to suggest 
royal punishment before Henry II’s reign, but it does hint that some change may have occurred as 
a result of the Assize of Clarendon. This, in turn, suggests that in that document the term 
murdrator used there did indeed refer to all killings, not just what would once have been termed 
murders. This is about as far as a brief survey of the evidence can take us. We can be fairly sure 
that a significant change took place between the 1110s and 1180s, and we have some grounds for 
suspecting that the Assize of Clarendon may have been important in this, but the evidence for 
precise dating is weak. The nature of our records of actual cases – a sparse collection of incidental 
references in miracle stories and chronicle accounts – makes any certainty on this issue 
impossible. We do, however, have another source of information in the Pipe Rolls, the records of 
payments made and debts owed to the Exchequer. It is to these, and the 1130 Pipe Roll in 
particular, it being the sole surviving roll from before Henry II’s reign, that we now turn. 
Homicide, Pardoning and the Pipe Rolls 
The Pipe Roll of 1130 is potentially extremely important for understanding how homicide was 
treated under Henry I. Historiographically, however, its evidence is caught up in the account of 
the development of the king’s pardon for homicide put forward by Hurnard. Because of her belief, 
as discussed in the first chapter, that homicide was already a royal crime under the Anglo-Saxon 
kings, Hurnard assumed that this remained the case under Henry I and did not try to use the Pipe 
Roll evidence in this regard. She did, however, use it to argue that the king was pardoning 
homicide in 1130, and this has obvious implications that need to be explored here. This is the 
passage, from the Buckinghamshire section, that Hurnard believed to be crucial: 
Willelmus filius Rogeri de ponte Alerici debet ii marcas auri ut habeat pacem de morte 
Willelmi del Rotur. Et siquis eum appellauerit defendet se legali lege.17 
William FitzRoger of “Pont Aleric” owes 2 marks of gold so that he may have peace 
regarding the death of William del Rotur. And if anyone appeals him he will defend 
himself legally through the law. 
To Hurnard this was evidently a pardon for the royal crime of homicide: 
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The novelty here lies in the fact that the homicide is not fully assured of remission or 
commutation of his crime. He is given peace of it by the king but is still liable to be 
appealed and has to undertake to answer the appeal in court … and if the appeal 
succeeds the appropriate punishment will presumably follow unmitigated by the pardon. 
Since appeal is not affected, it is evident that prosecution of another kind is remitted 
here, and this must be prosecution at the suit of the king.18 
Following Hurnard’s logic, then, we have a situation in which the king was prosecuting homicide in 
such a manner that a pardon of his suit alone was worth the substantial sum of 2 marks of gold 
(from elsewhere in the same document it is clear that this was equivalent to £12).19 In Hurnard’s 
reading, this payment was for readmission to a general royal peace that had been forfeited 
through the killing. FitzRoger is regaining his friendship with the king, having the royal suit against 
him dropped, but is still liable to be prosecuted by the kinsmen of his victim. 
There is, however, another possible interpretation. Might this not have been a grant of 
protection? In the Anglo-Saxon period we would certainly not be expecting a royal suit for 
homicide, but we might expect a man frightened of vengeance at the hands of the kinsmen of a 
man he has killed to flee to the king and attempt to obtain his peace – his handgrið. Might this not 
be what is happening here? The king could be giving FitzRoger his personal protection against the 
vengeance of del Rotur’s kinsmen, but without prejudicing their right to sue him for wergild 
instead. The same sort of explanation could perhaps be applied to the other two passages that 
Hurnard took to be pardons for homicide. We hear, in the section on Staffordshire and 
Gloucestershire, of certain Ernaldus FitzEnisand paying 10 marks of silver so that he might have 
peace regarding the men he killed; and rather more obscurely, in Devon, of a certain “Roger de 
Mol.” who seems to be offering 200 marks of silver so that he, his brothers and his men can have 
peace regarding the man they killed.20 In neither of these cases is there any mention of a right to 
appeal but it is possible that the peace they are purchasing is protection from vengeance. 
The language, I think, is important here. Why should we be discussing peace at all? The notion of 
a man forfeiting a general peace through crime is not one that is well established for this period 
                                                          
 
18
 Hurnard (1969), p. 16.  
19
 PR 31 HI, p. 37. 
20
 PR 31 HI, pp. 75, 156. 
Chapter Four – Dating the Royal Crime of Homicide 
156 
 
and, as Julius Goebel argued with some vigour, it is not something that we should assume lightly. 
In his view there is “small room for an antic theory of king’s peace” under Henry I: though the 
specific protections known as peaces possessed a legal reality in the procedures and penalties 
designed to enforce them, this is “in contrast with the merely literary or political use of the word 
peace when the compiler [of the Leges Henrici] remarks that the demesne revenue of the crown is 
for reasons of peace, or that for reasons of peace the big crimes are more severely punished.”21 
This view, however, is in direct opposition to that of Hurnard, who sees the Pipe Roll passage as 
an early example of something that becomes well known thereafter. On the specific point of 
peace, however, her case is rather weak. The pardons she quotes from Pipe Rolls of Henry II’s 
reign do not use the word at all; rather, we find men paying simply for the right to defend 
themselves if they are appealed, with no explicit mention of a pardon being made, let alone the 
concept of restoration to the peace.22 Glanvill, however, does refer to outlaws being “restored to 
the peace”23 and in Bracton the theory is quite explicit: in pardoning an outlaw a king may “admit 
him to his peace outside of which he had earlier been placed.”24 Yet these texts are, of course, 
from a period when the idea of a general king’s peace which any significant act of violence 
breached had, as we saw above, been established. Reading backwards from them in our 
interpretation of earlier evidence is, therefore, problematic. 
The idea that our text was a royal protection has the merit of according with earlier ideas and not 
presuming a theory of peace for which there is little evidence at so early a date. It is not, however, 
without its problems. If it was only a grant of peace, why mention the homicide at all? It would be 
an unnecessary detail. The specificity as to what prompted the grant of peace could thus be read 
as evidence that it was a pardon for those particular actions rather than a general grant of 
protection. There is an alternative interpretation, however. This could be a protection that related 
only to a specific incident, the king preventing further violence in a particular feud, in a way 
similar to that envisaged by the declaration of the king’s mund in II Edmund.25 We might, in fact, 
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want to look at this as a protection parallel to that of the protective writs found in much later 
Scottish formularies. Harding describes a number of these, the key feature of which was that they 
took people who had killed in self-defence under full royal protection (sub firma pace et 
proteccione nostra) directed specifically against the kinsmen of the slain and specifying the 
highest penalties for breach.26 These, I think, demonstrate just how close protection and pardon 
could be. Just as a pardon would remove the threat of afflictive sanctions from royal justice, a 
protection was meant to remove the threat posed by other parties who felt aggrieved by a killing. 
Indeed, it is possible to look at these elements as the two halves of a full pardon for a killing. We 
might think, indeed, that this is precisely what Hurnard’s text represents. Given that someone 
bearing the name William del Rotur would most probably be able to claim some French ancestry, 
the king may have been pardoning his rights relating to the murder fine (discussed in more detail 
in the next chapter) and simultaneously protecting FitzRoger from the possibility of violent 
vengeance whilst allowing the slain man’s family the possibility of peaceful redress. We may, 
then, be able to see in the Pipe Roll evidence both the origins of a pardon for homicide, though 
not quite as Hurnard thought, and the use of royal protection in a feud.  
We can support this interpretation by looking at the “amercement”. As is well known, in the 
period following the conquest, the old fixed sums of bot and wite cease to be used. Offenders 
instead theoretically forfeited everything they had to the king, then paid him a flexible sum of 
money, an amercement, for his mercy. This, argued Maitland, was a major step forward from the 
old system – an “advance in the theory and practice of punishment” – because it allowed account 
to be taken of the offender’s particular circumstances and did not insist on fines that would be 
impossible for many to pay.27 That such a change took place in this period seems undeniable: the 
example of the 35 marks, just over £23,  paid for heimfara (i.e. hamsocn) in the 1130 Pipe Roll 
looks a lot more like an arbitrary amercement than a multiple of the £5 penalty specified in the 
laws.28 Likewise, the seemingly arbitrary sums paid pro pace fracta (as well as the 10 marks noted 
above, sums of £9 and 6 pence, 13 marks and 20 marks are also listed)29 are consistent with 
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amercement, not with either fixed £5 penalties nor the supposed unforgivable nature of the 
handgrið.  
Amercements became institutionalised over time, to the point that in the thirteenth century, 
according to Maitland, they were “being inflicted right and left upon men who had done very little 
that is wrong” so frequently and for amounts so small that, in his assessment, “most men in 
England must have expected to be amerced at least once a year.”30 By this point the idea of being 
in mercy was a mere fiction – all understood the term amercement simply to mean an arbitrary 
fine – but this was not necessarily the case in 1130. Indeed, it seems likely that the theory still 
stood that these were indeed payments for mercy, in which case the amercement effectively 
constituted a pardon. Why, then, should we believe that the form ut habeat pacem indicates only 
a pardon when pardons were, in effect, frequently conveyed through the far simpler means of the 
amercement? Far more likely, it seems to me, is that these words about peace meant something 
specific, something different to the usual amercement, and that “something different” was in all 
probability a specific royal protection familiar from the Anglo-Saxon period. 
What clinches this interpretation, I believe, is the rarity of the formula used. We do not find 
people in 1130 buying “peace” for anything other than homicide. When they make payments – 
amercements –  for wrongdoings, that is all they do: they do not buy “peace”. For example, in 
Lincolnshire we find the sheriff rendering account of 35 marks of silver for a certain heimfara and 
10 marks pro pace fracta, as well as “Siwatus de Hoilanda” owing 12½ marks for a false plea.31 
Similarly, in the section on Staffordshire and Gloucestershire, we find Roger son of “Elyon 
Scutellar” rendering account of 7 marks of silver “for the thief he hid” but being pardoned 5 marks 
by royal writ on account of his poverty.32 There is no buying of peace other than for homicide, 
which is surely suggestive of a context of feud and protection, not one purely of purchased mercy 
as in these cases. It seems most likely, then, that peace still remained specific – something that 
could be granted to individuals or to groups, not something that covered the realm as a whole. 
This certainly seems to be what is implied by the payment of 20 marks by “Hugo de Luuetot” for 
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breach of the peace super homines of Roger de Mowbray.33 Clearly at some point Roger de 
Mowbray’s men had secured a royal protection, perhaps because Roger’s father had only just 
died in 1129 and he, probably still a boy, was in a vulnerable position.34 
A grant of peace, then, was not equivalent to a pardon in this period, it was something extra. It 
did not necessarily of itself mean that any royal penalty was remitted, it meant that the grantee 
received royal protection. If we are to look for unequivocal pardons for homicide in the Pipe Roll 
of 1130 we should be looking not for grants of peace but for amercements; that is payments 
described simply as “for homicide”. These do, in fact, exist. Although they are not mentioned by 
Hurnard, there are four clear examples of precisely this sort of payment in the 1130 Pipe Roll: in 
the Yorkshire section Nigel of Doncaster accounts for 20 marks for the forfeiture of his sons, who 
had killed a man; in Carmarthenshire “the men of Catmaur” owed 40 shillings for killing a man of 
the Bishop of Salisbury; in Devon Stephen son of Erchambald owed 10 marks for the killing of a 
man of William FitzOdo; and in Cornwall six men are listed as owing a total of 214 shillings and 2 
pence for the killing of the “sons of Tochi.”35 From these payments, which seem quite clearly to be 
amercements, we might indeed suspect that the crown was prosecuting homicide by 1130.  
The problem with these entries is their terse nature: we cannot be sure that these are 
amercements for simple homicide rather than being included here for some other reason that is 
otherwise unmentioned. For example, we might consider the possibility that, as with the killing of 
William del Rotur, some of these were instances of murdrum where the killers were known but 
were also wealthy and influential enough to secure pardons rather than face death or mutilation. 
In the case of the sons of Tochi this seems almost certain as Geoffrey of Monmouth refers to 
them as “frankigene”, and in the Devon case it is hardly unlikely that the man of a lord named 
William FitzOdo might have had some French blood in him.36 In Wales and Yorkshire, however, 
the murder fine was unknown, but there are possible alternative explanations for both of these. 
Our Yorkshire example might well be concealing something as its concern is solely with the 
amercement for Nigel of Doncaster’s sons’ forfeiture; we are told this forfeiture was related to a 
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killing but this is just an incidental detail, the killing may only have been the salient point of a 
more complex story. The Welsh example could be regarded as exceptional; a penalty applied for 
killing a man of Roger of Salisbury who, because his master was the king’s chief administrator, we 
may reasonably suspect to have been acting as an agent of the crown. 
The evidence, then, shows that amercements for homicide were being paid to the treasury by 
1130 though we cannot be certain exactly what this means. If we look at Pipe Rolls from Henry II’s 
reign we find that this remained the case, though the number of cases in the 1130 roll does seem 
unusually high by comparison.37 If this was, in effect, discovered murderers buying mercy, this 
again points us towards the murder fine as a potentially important mechanism for the 
criminalisation of homicide. This will be examined shortly. The other option is that homicide was 
already a royal offence at this point. This is, of course, a possibility but on this evidence it looks 
rather a weak one. Indeed, this analysis has tended to suggest the continued relevance of the old 
Anglo-Saxon system of regulating violence. The ut habeat pacem formula discussed above seems 
clearly to have indicated that protection was at least part of what was being paid for. 
Furthermore, the context of feud is quite explicit in the case of the sons of Tochi, who we know 
from other sources to have been slain in revenge for their killing of a certain Osulf, and it is 
similarly clear in another entry in which the treasury receives 20 shillings for a concord regarding 
a killing.38 This latter example, though admittedly from Wales, does at least suggest that not every 
homicide was subject to a royal penalty. What these considerations appear to indicate is that the 
system of feud and protection identified for the Anglo-Saxon period remained current in 1130. It 
is, at any rate, not unreasonable on the basis of the evidence examined here to think that a 
specific grant of the king’s peace remained a valuable commodity, and this would make little 
sense if killers would, regardless of whether they breached such protections, expect to face 
execution or mutilation at the hands of royal justice. Whether this continued into Henry II’s reign 
is hard to tell. The Pipe Rolls do not show it to be so, but these are terse sources primarily 
concerned with shrieval accounting, not the law, so the argument from silence carries little 
weight. Indeed, though they contain some useful information bearing on the nature of royal 
justice, the Pipe Rolls – simply because their legal content is incidental to their main purpose and 
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thus limited to the most exceptional cases – can only ever provide hints, not a comprehensive 
picture. 
Conclusion 
The evidence for the period from the Norman Conquest to the early thirteenth century, then, 
shows a fundamental change in the legal status of violence and of homicide in particular. By the 
time Bracton was written all homicides and all the more serious cases of violence (involving 
wounding as opposed to mere bruising) were considered felonies, with the felon’s chattels 
forfeiting to the king and his land escheating to his lord after a year and a day in the hands of the 
crown. The felon, of course, faced execution if he were caught and outlawry if he managed to 
escape.39 What we have is a system in which the crown effectively prohibits all serious violence 
and, without prejudicing the rights of lords to too great an extent, reserves to itself the right to 
inflict punishment and profit from doing so. The contrast with the system of protections that 
operated in 1066 is stark: the old protection of the kindred as expressed in the wergild is now 
meaningless, the manbot and fihtwite are obsolete, and all the other protections belonging to the 
king, the church and the nobility are completely overridden. In theory there was nobody, other 
than resisting outlaws, whom you could attack and kill without suffering this fate: factors which 
had been at the core of the regulation of violence – the victim’s family and status, the time and 
location of the killing – were now meant to be utterly irrelevant. Indeed, in the thirteenth century 
it appears that this was, to a significant degree,  true in practice as well as in theory.40  
The change was a substantial one, but precisely when it came about remains uncertain. Most of 
the essentials had shifted by the time of Glanvill but this was a dynamic process and further shifts 
can be seen in Bracton, just as it seems likely that much of what was to come was already present 
in the Assize of Clarendon’s measures on murdrators. Earlier Pipe Roll evidence does not show 
any conclusive signs of royal jurisdiction over simple homicide. What it does do is show, 
simultaneously, that in 1130 royal grants of special protection remained a valuable commodity in 
the context of feud – something that is not compatible with a general prohibition of all homicide – 
and that some killings resulted in amercements being paid to the king. It has been suggested here 
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that an explanation for this might be that the killers, having slain non-English victims, were liable 
for death or mutilation and were purchasing the king’s mercy – yet another indication that the 
murder fine may have been highly important for the expansion of royal jurisdiction over homicide. 
The shift from the time of the conquest to that of Bracton, then, was a great one indeed, though 
its timing cannot be tied down very certainly. What hints there are do suggest that the Assize of 
Clarendon was important, and there are also a few signs that the murder fine may have had a 
significant role to play. The next chapter takes these hints further and looks in detail at a number 
of possible ways of understanding this shift, analysing the role that protective power played in it. 
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Chapter Five  
Murder, Infamy and the King’s Peace:  
The Legal Roots of “Violent Crime” 
Introduction 
We know, then, that by the late twelfth century the position of homicide had changed radically: it 
had gone from being a matter regulated by a system of protections and compensation payments 
that involved kindreds and lords but not necessarily the king, to something that Glanvill could 
reasonably term a “criminal plea belonging to the crown”.1 As the previous chapter’s analysis 
showed, the evidence suggests that this shift happened during the reign of Henry II, and that it 
may well have been associated with the 1166 Assize of Clarendon’s measures targeting 
murdrators. The questions at issue in this chapter and the one that follows are how and why this 
happened. Here the focus is on specific legal changes and the impact that these had on the 
treatment of violence, whilst in the next chapter the focus is broader, looking at the European 
ideological undercurrents that may have influenced – possibly even driven – these shifts.  
Before we can do any of this, however, we need an appreciation of the rather unusual 
historiographical context within which historians approach the emergence of full royal jurisdiction 
over serious violence. As shall be seen, the state of research is currently such that even a detailed 
examination of the literature does not yield a clear answer as to how this came about. This is, I 
think, to some extent a result of a lack of recent scholarly interest in the subject, which has 
allowed a number of contrasting interpretations to coexist with very little attention paid to their 
contradictions. This chapter’s first task, then, is to bring a degree of clarity to the confusion here, 
unravelling the more involved arguments and drawing out their central strands for analysis. Once 
this is done it will turn to look at the main theories in detail, evaluate their relative merits and, in 
so doing, assess the role that protective power played in the post-conquest evolution of royal 
jurisdiction over violence. Was it, as in the Anglo-Saxon period, the crucial concept, central to the 
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process of change, or were the dynamics of post-conquest legal development significantly 
different to what had come before? 
Historiography and the King’s Peace 
The key questions here, then, are as follows: was there a continuation after 1066 of the Anglo-
Saxon process of expanding royal protections, with English kings increasing the scope of their 
protections so that they covered a greater and greater proportion of violent incidents?  And, if 
this was so, can we see this process eventually resulting in royal protection covering everyone at 
all times,  thus making all violence the concern of the king? Given the language noted earlier in 
Bracton and to an extent also in Glanvill, where it is apparent that homicide and violence could be 
prosecuted as breaches of the king’s peace, it is an intuitive theory. Indeed, it makes a good 
starting point for a discussion of the historiography, as it is identical in its essentials to Sir 
Frederick Pollock’s assessment of the origins of the king’s peace as given in a public lecture in 
Oxford in 1884. Pollock saw the king’s peace as being “enlarged in the age immediately preceding 
the conquest, and tending to become the general peace of the kingdom”2 whilst after 1066:  
The various forms in which the king’s special protection had been given disappear, or 
rather merge in his general protection and authority: for the details that occur in the 
compilations bearing the names of Henry the First and Edward the Confessor, welcome as 
they are by way of supplement to earlier documents, are mere echoes of traditions no 
longer living.3 
On the question of precisely how such a merger took place, however, answers are much less 
readily available. Pollock offered no evidence and very little by way of theory; the closest he 
comes to an explanation of quite how a system of specific protections or peaces could turn into 
one with a single, general peace is to suggest the following: “We may imagine a transition period 
in which the judges were ready, on some very slight suggestion, to presume as between the king 
and the sheriff that the king’s peace had been specially granted to the plaintiff, or to a man 
unlawfully slain.”4 In effect, the Pollock model is that shortly, maybe even immediately, after the 
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Norman Conquest all the old Anglo-Saxon royal protections were merged and expanded into a 
general peace through what were essentially administrative means. Rather than requiring 
stringent proof that the king’s protection had been granted to the victim of a crime, royal justices 
were happy to accept this was the case on the plaintiff’s word, even when the evidence was 
overwhelmingly to the contrary. Because of this process, Pollock implies, the fiction swiftly 
emerged that the entire population was perpetually in the king’s peace. 
The weakness of Pollock’s argument is in its lack of detail. His article, as we shall see, has been 
highly influential but it remains the transcript of a public lecture whose aim was to present a 
theory to a non-specialist audience rather than to convince sceptical legal historians. What 
Pollock does is describe the wide variety of royal protections available in Anglo-Saxon England and 
suggest that they were indeed the root from which the later medieval king’s peace sprang. Aside 
from the few words quoted above he offers no explanation, and for even these words he offers 
no supporting evidence. As such, it is not surprising that, half a century later, Julius Goebel 
thought his assertions were vulnerable to attack. Goebel was perfectly happy to accept that 
numerous royal protections existed under the Anglo-Saxon kings, his scepticism was directed at 
the idea that these combined into a single general peace in the Anglo-Norman period. His words 
are worth quoting at length: 
No one of these measures is an expression of a single theory; each has its own rationale: 
the murdrum is a quasi-military defensive; the protection of bishops and monasteries is 
connected with ecclesiastical prerogative. Royal rights on highways are emphasized for 
reasons of trade and moving troops. The poor and abject are protected for reasons of 
Christian charity. Compared with gestures at coronation by the Conqueror, and by his son 
Henry’s promises in support of general peace, that can be taken as no more than an 
earnest of their good intentions, these objectives had legal immediacy and fiscal 
measurability. The protections were one of many devices for attaining general public 
security but they cannot be taken to be the first extensions of an elastic theory of 
manifold peace. On the contrary, the king’s mund is something that cannot be lightly 
asserted. In Henry’s time, if allegations of breach are made they have to be proved – and 
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not to the other party but to the judge. In other words, the sphere of protection at large is 
governed by conservative considerations.5 
Goebel is here making three of the main points of his critique of Pollock’s theory. Firstly, that the 
evidence for this period is one of disparate protections aimed at specific and limited objectives 
and that, therefore, they cannot be seen as unifying into a single peace. Secondly, that statements 
such as that in Henry I’s  coronation charter – “I establish a firm peace in all my kingdom, and I 
order that this peace shall henceforth be kept”6 – cannot be taken, as they were by Pollock, to 
signify the establishment of a general peace with any legal meaning.7 A running theme in Goebel’s 
work is that we need to be able to identify a mechanism of enforcement if we are to view any 
statement as practicable law; because there is no such mechanism for Henry’s statement it is 
viewed by Goebel as a mere expression of intent similar in nature to Anglo-Saxon rhetoric about 
frið. Finally, he asserts that judges were conservative in their definition of protection; they 
demanded that it be proved rigorously rather than, as Pollock suggested, accepting that it applied 
on even the most flimsy of pretexts. 
The main problem with Goebel’s critique is that it is incomplete. When it was published in 1937, 
Felony and Misdemeanor was envisaged as the first in a set of three volumes, but Goebel 
subsequently abandoned the project. As such, we can never know how Goebel intended to 
explain the existence of what looks very much like a general king’s peace in Glanvill and Bracton  – 
he simply does not tell us. In effect all that he offers us on this particular subject is an attempted 
demolition of Pollock’s theory; we get nothing to put in its place. We can, of course, be 
reasonably confident that Goebel believed the general king’s peace emerged under the Angevin 
kings, and we may extrapolate from his arguments on the earlier period that he did not think 
specific peaces played any significant role. However, these conclusions have only partially 
penetrated modern historiography. Perhaps because of its misleading title (Felony and 
Misdemeanor: A Study in the History of English Criminal Procedure in fact says little about either 
felony or misdemeanour, and focuses more on Frankish criminal procedure than on English), the 
book has not enjoyed the widest of readerships. Those who know it regard it as a true classic – 
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according to Patrick Wormald it was “surely the twentieth century’s best book in English on early 
medieval law”8 – but it remains obscure to many. A number of more recent scholars who have 
looked at the king’s peace have followed Pollock’s theory uncritically, ignoring Goebel’s 
objections. Jack K. Weber in his “The King’s Peace: A Comparative Study” clearly believed that the 
general peace arrived with the Normans;9 David Feldman, a legal scholar investigating the roots of 
modern binding over powers in the medieval king’s peace, thought that by the time of Henry I the 
king’s peace “extended generally, but was enforced particularly strongly in his vicinity”;10 indeed, 
even seasoned historians like David Carpenter are capable of baldly stating that the king’s peace 
became general with the Norman Conquest.11 The current historiographical situation is thus 
rather confused. 
Another reason for this confusion is that the king’s peace is hardly a hot topic in modern 
scholarship. Despite Goebel’s critique, the basic account of specific peaces expanding into a single 
national peace is regarded, by some at least, as a well-known fact in need of little further 
illumination. Paul Hyams was content to note that “this phenomenon of the twelfth century is 
covered in all the modern books”12 before moving on to a discussion of Alan Harding’s work on 
charter forms (to which we shall come shortly). For Hyams, this clearly appeared so firm and so 
well established that he felt no need even to mention which “modern books” he was referring to. 
John Hudson’s The Formation of the English Common Law seems a likely candidate, but in fact the 
treatment of the issue there is limited to a single paragraph. Hudson states, “the development of 
a general king’s peace extending throughout the realm is clear in Henry I’s coronation charter, 
though it may have begun well before 1100 or even 1066.”13 He then, however, goes on to treat 
the development as, at least in part, an ideological one related to the continental Peace 
Movement; his assessment of its practical effects is as follows: 
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However, the assertion of the strong peace was also practical. The king and his officials 
were intent on enforcing peace, and peace hence came to be associated with them. One 
of their methods was to use the death penalty, or at the very least the example of 
punishment by life or limb. Another was prosecution by royal officials. Offenders, most 
notably culpable killers and thieves were subjected to a persecuting regime.14 
This account, in fact, does not agree with Hyams’s assertion that “starting in part from those 
grants of special peace discussed earlier, the king’s peace grew to cover all the king’s subjects … 
and all inhabitants of the realm.”15 Indeed, what Hudson appears to be saying is that the general 
king’s peace was, in essence, no different to the Anglo-Saxon concept of frið: primarily an 
ideological notion of good order that prompted kings to adopt practical measures for the 
enforcement of order, and with no special link to the concept of protection.16 Furthermore, we 
get no hint that the king’s peace ever became more than this, that it ever became a practically 
applicable legal concept rather than an ideological statement of intent. There are different 
pictures being presented here – Hyams’s corresponding roughly to the perspective of Pollock, and 
Hudson’s to that of Goebel – but the issue is so marginal to the authors’ main concerns that these 
differences are either just not remarked upon or, possibly, went entirely unnoticed. The king’s 
peace, it seems, has long been regarded as a base that a general work has to touch briefly for the 
sake of completeness, but one which requires no prolonged attention. 
There are, then, two major competing interpretations here: that which sees the expansion of 
protection into a general peace as key, and that which regards peace as an ideological umbrella 
beneath which a number of essentially unrelated procedural innovations were the effective 
means of bringing about change. What these interpretations represent are the prevailing 
historiographical trends, and these trends, as this brief survey has shown, are characterised by 
never having been fully stated or investigated. They are, in essence, two views of the significance 
of royal protective power in the development of the royal crime of homicide, with Pollock’s model 
stressing its central role and Goebel’s largely denying it any importance. This is, of course, 
precisely the issue with which this chapter is concerned  and much of the discussion that follows 
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will therefore necessarily involve assessing the relative merits of these two competing 
interpretations. It is important, however, to note that – as a result of both Goebel and Pollock 
failing fully to state and support their theories, and indeed the lack thereafter of any coherent 
scholarly debate on the subject – these interpretations should be thought of only in the broadest 
of terms. There are several different ways of arguing for the importance or irrelevance of royal 
protective power. The key here, clearly, is in explanations of the process of change. Pollock made 
the prima facie case for the generalisation of the king’s peace well, but he was vague on the 
specifics of how it took place. Goebel’s critique of these ideas, likewise, focused on undermining 
the idea that such a process was likely or possible. What this chapter looks at are theories as to 
the specific legal developments that brought about the criminalisation of violence . 
On Pollock’s side of the debate, where the general king’s peace of the thirteenth century is 
regarded as the result of an expansion and merger of specific eleventh-century royal protections, 
there are essentially three different theories for the processes involved. One is that of Pollock 
himself, in which judges allowed, even encouraged, litigants to allege breaches of the peace in 
their claims regardless of the actual circumstances of their cases. Another, alluded to earlier, is 
Alan Harding’s attempt to identify, in a Scottish context, the expansion of royal protection with 
protection granted to land by charter. The suggestion is that through its grant by charter the 
king’s peace came to predominate to such a degree that it was, in effect, general, and that 
trespass in Scotland, and quite possibly also in England, developed out of a single action for 
breach of this general protection.17 Finally, there is the idea that the murder fine, in giving royal 
justice an interest in all cases of homicide unless it was actively proven that the victim was 
English, paved the way for royal jurisdiction of a more general nature. As Hessel E. Yntema, who 
first suggested this theory in 1923, expressed it “the murder law supplied a significant means, as 
well as a source of jurisdiction, by which central authority was enabled to break down the system 
of private compositions for homicide”.18 As we have seen in the previous chapter, there are 
enough hints both in 1130 Pipe Roll and in the Assizes of Clarendon and Northampton to suggest 
strongly that such an interpretation might be correct.  
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The arguments on Goebel’s side of the debate, on the other hand, are less easy to quantify. The 
interpretation as a whole is based on a clear assertion of the need for concrete evidence of 
procedural change and an intense distrust of the sort of vague notions about merging and 
expanding peaces visible in earlier scholarship. The one theory he does put forward which bears 
on the emergence of the crime of homicide is based on the introduction of trial by battle into 
England by the Normans. He argues that with it also came the rule that the landed property of the 
loser in such a battle escheated to his lord, with the defeated party also liable to afflictive 
sanctions. Essentially, the theory is that the application of this scheme to homicide cases resulted 
in convicted killers forfeiting both life and property – basically the situation under the late 
common law of felony.19 Other than this there are a great number of other procedural changes – 
from justices in eyre to juries of presentment – which go towards creating accounts of twelfth-
century legal change where the expansion of royal protections into a general peace does not play 
a role, but they do not have any specific application to homicide or violence. Most such accounts 
do not look at homicide in any detail. This is quite probably the result of the arguments in favour 
of a royal crime of homicide under the Anglo-Saxons first put forward by Naomi Hurnard (though 
Goebel, to an extent, pre-empted her stating bluntly that feud was “non-existent”); if this was the 
case there was no great twelfth-century shift for historians to explain.20 
As the preceding chapters have shown, however, there was indeed a major shift in the way that 
homicide and violence were dealt with and we do need to explain it. There are even, as we have 
seen here, two competing schools of thought on how we should go about doing so, and a number 
of different theories as to the specific processes that were at work here. This chapter looks at the 
four of these theories identified above. First, because of the strong hints in this direction noted in 
the previous chapter, it looks at the murder fine, cutting through the complex historiographical 
debate as to its origins to look at Yntema’s largely neglected arguments for its influence on 
homicide. Secondly, it moves on to examine Pollock’s rather vague idea that judges connived in 
the application of the king’s peace to cases where this was unjustified by the facts, attempting to 
find some evidential basis with which to back up the idea. Thirdly, and more briefly, it will look at 
Harding’s theory that the protection given by charters was important in spreading the royal 
peace. Finally, shifting to an interpretation in which protection plays no part, Goebel’s own 
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argument about the fate of those who lost judicial duels shall be analysed, and its importance for 
the development of royal jurisdiction over simple homicide assessed. 
The Murder Fine 
The analysis of the preceding chapters has on a number of occasions thrown up the possibility 
that the murder fine might prove to be, as Yntema argued, of considerable importance in 
explaining the creation of the royal crime of homicide.21 The language of the Assizes of Clarendon 
and Northampton – both of which refer only to “murderers” but seem from the evidence of 
Glanvill, and from case narratives found in miracle stories, to have applied to simple homicide as 
well – suggests that the concepts of murder and simple homicide were no longer so clearly 
distinguished as they had been. Similarly, one plausible reading of the 1130 Pipe Roll evidence 
involves the murder fine as a vehicle for royal jurisdiction over homicide. The murder fine, 
however, is one of the most controversial aspects of Anglo-Norman law, with the debate as to its 
origins still unresolved. In order to appreciate its significance we first need a clear understanding 
as to its likely origins, so it is to this that we shall turn first.  
a) Origins and Historiography 
Though the murder fine is controversial, there is common ground amongst both scholars and, to 
an extent, primary sources on its form in the immediate post-conquest period. The Leges Henrici 
Primi describes its operation as follows: 
If any Frenchman or Norman or indeed any person from across the sea is slain, and the 
matter turns out so disastrously that it becomes a case of murdrum, and the slayer is 
unknown or takes to flight, so that he is not surrendered to a royal justice within seven 
days for the execution of whatever is just, 46 silver marks shall be paid; 40 marks shall 
belong to the king and 6 to the relatives of the slain man.22 
On these particulars there is no controversy: all the Anglo-Norman sources agree on the size of 
the penalty and on the fact that in order to qualify the slain man must be a foreigner.23 These 
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sources do disagree on precisely who pays the 46 marks, the debate being between the lord of 
the location in which the body is found and the hundred as a whole. This need not concern us too 
much as the disagreement is hardly insurmountable – most of the texts explain that the burden 
falls first on a lord, vill or manor, and transfers to the wider hundred if those resources were 
insufficient – and because in the 1130 Pipe Roll it is apparent that it is the hundred that, in 
practice, paid.24 The basic outline of the institution after the conquest is clear enough. 
The controversy surrounds the roots of the custom. Was it a Norman innovation or was it 
something they drew from the Anglo-Saxon past? The idea that it was, in fact, a revival of an 
English custom can be seen in a number of early twelfth-century sources. Henry I’s coronation 
charter of 1100, for example, contains this statement: “I remit all murder fines which were 
incurred before the day on which I was crowned king; and such murder fines as shall now be 
incurred shall be paid justly according to the law of King Edward.” 25  The Leges Edwardi 
Confessoris, which may well be a product of the reign of King Stephen, gives the following account 
of the murder fine’s origins: 
Murder fines were devised in the time of King Cnut, who, after he had acquired the land 
and pacified it with him, sent his army home at the request of the barons of the land. And 
those same [barons] were sureties to the king that those whom he retained in the land 
would have a lasting peace. Thus, if any of the English slew any of those men, justice 
would be done on him if he could not acquit himself by the ordeal, whether of [hot] iron 
or water. If, however, he fled, payment would be made as was described above.26 
This view, moreover, has recently been revived by Bruce O’Brien, who argues that this account 
was, in essence, correct. However, this remains controversial: it goes against the opinion of 
Maitland and, more recently, of George Garnett, both of whom believed it to be a Norman 
innovation,27  and has since been challenged from a completely different angle by Alan Cooper. 
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Cooper’s view is that O’Brien’s arguments for a pre-conquest origin are good but that his 
attribution of the initiative to Cnut is not; he sees murder as the crime of killing strangers and the 
murder fine as a mechanism designed to ensure its punishment.28 
Regardless of its origins, however, there is one particularly pertinent fact about the murder fine. 
Firstly, after the conquest it was beyond doubt a specific protection for Frenchmen and other 
foreigners; the text known as the “Ten Articles of William I” reproduces what looks to be the text 
of a royal writ in which the workings of the murder fine are introduced as follows: “I desire 
likewise that all the men whom I brought with me or who have come after me shall enjoy the 
benefit of my protection (sint in pace mea et quiete)”.29 As such we can, to an extent, see it fitting 
into the Anglo-Saxon pattern of royal protections increasing in scope and importance. Crucially, 
we can tell that it did not perform this same function of protecting foreigners function before 
1066 from this passage in the same text as translated by A. J. Robertson: 
But every Frenchman who in the time of King Edward, my kinsman, was admitted to the 
status of an Englishman (fuit in Anglia particeps consuetudinum Anglorum), which they 
call “in lot and in scot,” shall be paid for according to English law. This decree was enacted 
at Gloucester.30 
Though the “Ten Articles” as a whole is clearly not a genuine royal document, it is very probable 
(given the use of the first person and the mention of a place of issue) that these sections draw on 
a genuine writ of William I. This provision does, in any case, constitute a highly implausible subject 
for a twelfth-century forgery. What it shows is that Normans who were resident in England and 
abiding by English customs before the conquest could expect no protection from this measure 
(the idea that they had to be “admitted” to the “status of an Englishman” is a stronger reading 
than the text justifies). This surely must show that they did not enjoy this protection under the 
law of King Edward, otherwise it would have been customary and hence entirely unobjectionable 
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for them to continue. However Henry I imagined that the murder fine worked in Edward’s day, it 
could not in practice have been applied to the killing of resident Frenchmen.  
This observation makes Cooper’s interpretation look less than plausible. If Edward’s Norman 
favourites could not benefit from a protection extended to strangers, who could? Cooper seems 
to argue that the fine was not applied on the grounds of identity, but rather on the absence of a 
pre-existing relationship between killer and victim: he treats stranger as a term which could apply 
to anyone, English, French or otherwise.31 Cooper’s Anglo-Saxon murder fine is, in fact, much 
more far-reaching than the post-conquest version; he sees it as a “pre-emptive measure [which] 
required hundreds and lords to be responsible for the security of strangers in their territory.”32 It 
is a neat theory but its basis is unsound. Why, we might ask, would the incoming Normans limit 
such an important peace-keeping tool by renouncing their right to payment if the stranger 
happened to be English? Considering that William’s main policy for his new kingdom was one of 
legal continuity this seems a most unlikely decision.  
The arguments for some pre-conquest root for the murder fine, however, are rather stronger 
than Cooper’s argument might suggest. O’Brien, perhaps seeing the difficulty of arguing for the 
murder fine’s existence under Edward the Confessor, argued that Normans revived a custom 
initially instituted by Cnut in similar circumstances of invasion. The evidence adduced for this view 
is variable in quality. We can, I think, safely follow Cooper in dismissing O’Brien’s arguments on 
two points: there is no reason to suppose that Cnut, any more than William, would have 
introduced the fine only in the south of England rather than throughout the kingdom; and the 
argument that Archbishop Wulfstan disapproved of Cnut’s measure because it made morð an 
emendable offence (and hence failed to record it in any of Cnut’s law-codes) is pure conjecture.33 
Furthermore, O’Brien’s method of drawing conclusions on the legal meaning of morð from literary 
texts is rather suspect: as was noted in chapter two, there is no reason for us to follow O’Brien in 
thinking that, legally speaking, murder was in any way peculiarly “a crime against lords.”34 It must 
additionally be emphasised that the lack of pre-conquest evidence for the murder fine, especially 
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in Cnut’s otherwise notably comprehensive code, is important evidence against its existence.35 
The only plausible way around this – if we dismiss the rather odd idea that Wulfstan objected to 
the measure – is to suggest, as O’Brien briefly does, that it may have been imposed only in the 
very earliest years of Cnut’s reign and fallen out of use before Wulfstan came to write.36 Though 
possible this seems neither probable nor, if it were correct, likely to have left a tradition strong 
enough for the Normans to revive. 
There is, however, some evidence for a pre-conquest context that is not so easy to dismiss. This is 
the geographical distribution of the murder fine: Pipe Roll evidence from the twelfth century 
makes it clear that it was not collected in any county north of the Humber nor in the Welsh 
borders. The arguments about Cnut’s need to protect his men in the south more than the north 
may be weak, but this is a distribution that requires explanation. Cooper’s suggestion that it 
indicates a link with the West Saxon kingdom of the tenth century is, in fact, rather more 
promising. However, the most pertinent fact about the murder fine’s geographical range is that it 
is coextensive with the institution of frankpledge, a post-conquest institution of suretyship whose 
early origins have been the subject of some debate.37 O’Brien’s arguments on this point are 
powerful: the roots of frankpledge were in a fusion of the Anglo-Saxon institutions of borh and 
tithing that occurred earlier than 1066 – indeed, the two institutions were always so closely linked 
that “it is unclear how they could have separated in order to have fused again after the Norman 
Conquest”.38 This seems reasonable as borh and tithing both seem to share the common goal of 
making communities responsible for the subjection of their members to law: the suretyship of 
borh shifts financial responsibility to sureties should the culprit flee, whilst the chief duty of the 
tithing seems to have been to apprehend offenders and produce them for trial. The distinction in 
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function is not a particularly clear one and, as O’Brien argues, the personnel involved would often 
have been the same.39 
This link with frankpledge, and through that to its Anglo-Saxon antecedents, could well be crucial. 
We could read the murder fine not as something that evolved in parallel with these mechanisms 
of collective responsibility, but rather as something that emerged out of them. The geographical 
distribution of murdrum could be as it is simply because it required the surety structure of 
frankpledge to work and could, therefore, only be imposed where those West Saxon institutions 
existed. We might well imagine that, towards the end of the Anglo-Saxon period, when a clear 
royal offence had been committed without the local frankpledge tithings producing anyone to 
answer for it, a financial penalty might have been imposed collectively on those tithings that had 
failed in their duty. That such a mechanism may have existed does not mean that the murder fine 
itself existed fully-formed, though we might imagine that an incident of morð or the killing of a 
royal agent might provoke a response that would have looked rather similar. This, indeed, is not 
far from the description of the frankpledge (or friborg) system in the Leges Edwardi Confessoris: 
[The institution of friborg] means that all [the people] in all the vills of the entire kingdom 
had to be under the suretyship of the tithing, so that if one of the ten should commit an 
offence, the nine would produce him for trial. But if he should flee, and they say that they 
were not able to produce him for trial, a term of thirty-one days shall be given to them by 
the king’s justice. And if they were able to locate him, they would bring him to the justice. 
…  If however he cannot be found within the above-mentioned term, the chief [of the 
friborg+ … would take two of the better men in his friborg, and he shall likewise take from 
each of his three closest neighbouring friborgs the chief and two of the better men, and 
he shall clear himself and his friborg by those twelve, if he can do so, of the crime and 
flight of the aforementioned evildoer. But if he cannot do it, they shall restore the 
damage that he had done out of the property of the offender, as much as it can provide, 
and [then] out of their own. And they shall make amends to the justice according to what 
shall have been legally adjudged to them.40 
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This, of course, is a description of an incident in which the culprit is known and flees, but we might 
well imagine that a similar collective liability might have applied if the tithings failed even to 
provide a suspect. If we can go this far, would it not be reasonable to see the murder fine as a 
modification of this system to afford protection to the incoming Normans?41 The mechanism is, in 
its essentials, already in place; all William needed to do was to define the offence (killing a 
Frenchman) and the penalty (46 marks). O’Brien argues that it was Cnut who took advantage of 
this inherited procedure to create the murder fine but, as has been noted, the evidence for the 
fine’s presence before the conquest is extremely slight. It seems more sensible to attribute the 
grafting of the murder fine onto frankpledge to a period when there is no doubt of its existence. 
b) Interpretation 
The Normans, then, may have inherited much of the mechanism for collective punishment that 
underlies the murder fine from the Anglo-Saxons, but it was very probably they who used it to 
create a new offence of killing Frenchmen. This was important, but so too were the new 
procedures that accompanied this innovation: namely the assumption that every corpse was 
foreign unless Englishry could be proven and the strict time-limit within which the slayer had to 
be produced.42 This gave the fine a much more serious aspect, particularly because as time passed 
the distinction between French and English became less clear-cut and, it seems, rather more to do 
with social status than nationality: fewer and fewer aspiring families whose kinsman had been 
slain would have felt particularly inclined to swear to his Englishness, particularly if there was the 
slightest hint of Norman blood. Foreign status did not need to be proven, it could only be 
disproved and even this required the cooperation of the victim’s family; as such we ought to 
distinguish it from the more conservatively defined protections of the Anglo-Saxon period. 
Indeed, we might reasonably expect it to have a better chance of increasing its scope, acting as a 
vehicle for the extension of royal jurisdiction over simple homicide. That such a development 
occurred appears to be confirmed by the Dialogue of the Exchequer, a text written in the late 
1170s taking the form of a dialogue between a master and disciple: 
D: Does the secret death of an Englishman, like that of a Norman, give rise to a murder 
fine? 
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M: It did not do so originally, as I have told you. But nowadays, when English and 
Normans live close together and give in marriage to each other, the nations are so mixed 
that it can scarcely be decided (I mean in the case of the freemen) who is of English birth 
and who is of Norman; except, of course, the villeins, who cannot alter their condition 
without the leave of their masters. For that reason whoever is found slain nowadays, the 
murder fine is exacted, except in cases where there is definite proof of the servile 
condition of the victim.43 
As Frederick Hamil long ago noted, this statement is rather odd in that it does not accord well 
with other evidence – there is little reason to believe that presentment of Englishry was ever as 
simple a matter as proving servile status – but the general notion that most slayings of freemen 
came to be treated as murdrum seems fairly unobjectionable.44 
The crucial point, from our perspective, is what happens to the killer when the local population 
do, in fact, produce him. The Leges Henrici Primi seem quite clearly to envisage that he would be 
liable to afflictive punishment but could possibly ask for mercy from the king: “Even though the 
offender asks of the king that he be granted his life and limbs, the fine for murdrum shall 
nevertheless be paid in the way we have stated.”45 Other entries make it clear that this must be a 
reference to a situation in which the killer is produced after the seven day period of grace in 
which the hundred can hope to avoid the fine, but there seems little need to doubt that this 
liability in life and limb applied to all those who killed Frenchmen and was, in effect, the measure 
that the collective fine was originally intended to enforce.46 This, as was suggested above, might 
provide a context for the payments for homicide in the 1130 Pipe Roll, such as Stephen son of 
Erchembald’s 10 marks for the killing of William FitzOdo’s man.47  
It is this dual nature that makes the murdrum so important. Most historiographical attention has, 
naturally, been focussed on the most administratively visible element of the communal fine, but 
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the creation and development of the offence which led to it is less well appreciated. Originally, it 
seems, murdrum was like the Anglo-Saxon morð – a homicide that was hidden in the sense that 
the killer did not publicly take responsibility for it. As such the murder fine’s name made sense: it 
was a fine assessed for a homicide where the killer refused to take responsibility. There is nothing 
new in this. What few people have asked, however, is what happened in situations where the 
killer did accept responsibility. In such cases it seems clear that execution or mutilation were in 
order, yet because the slayer admitted it the offence for which the offenders were being punished 
could not truthfully be termed morð or murder. What it was, in theory, was simple homicide 
aggravated by the fact that the victim was protected as a Frenchman. By the time Richard 
FitzNigel was writing, however, it appears that the higher echelons of surviving English society had 
so merged with that of the Normans that few freemen could be termed English. We find, 
therefore, that homicide where the victim was not of servile status would normally lead either to 
a murder fine (if the community was unwilling or unable to name the killer,) or to the punishment 
of the killer by the crown (should he be handed over within the time-limit) or often both (such as 
when the killer was named, and thus outlawed, but not produced in time).  
What we have, in essence, is a dramatic expansion of the king’s jurisdiction over homicide 
through a protection for Frenchmen that expanded to cover most of the free population. This, it 
should be acknowledged, is exactly what Yntema argued for in 1923.48 Though his conclusions do 
not seem to have had much impact on modern scholarship – his article being criticised by O’Brien 
for “rather indiscriminate use of the legal evidence”49 – it seems from this analysis that Yntema’s 
argument is both valid and of considerable significance. Yet the murder fine raises as many 
questions as it answers. It was, at heart, a distinctly odd hybrid of several different concepts, 
welded together to meet the immediate needs of a conquering aristocracy. It was quite clearly a 
protection, as William explicitly stated it was to be, but it was both more and less than that: more 
in that it was combined with the mechanisms of frankpledge to produce a collective penalty 
whose application was assumed rather than needing to be proved; less in that its association with 
murder (or morð) meant that, unlike all Anglo-Saxon royal protections, it applied only in cases of 
homicide. There could, clearly, be no payment of a murder fine if the victim survived an attack, no 
matter how seriously hurt he might be. The morð element, of course, also justified the imposition 
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of afflictive penalties in a way that a simple protection might not, but even so its inclusion was a 
serious limitation. Though the murder fine can and should be seen as a key factor in the creation 
of a royal crime of homicide, and in the expansion of royal protection, it cannot be seen in a 
similar light for non-lethal violence. The disparity between William’s statement that all his 
followers were in pace mea et quiete and the fact that the murder fine did not protect them from 
non-lethal violence, however, is worth bearing in mind. It created an ambiguity: was the king’s 
protection for the non-English limited to the mechanism of the murder fine or was that, in fact, 
only one aspect of a more comprehensive protection? 
Expanding Protections: Hamsocn, Griðbryce and “Tickets” 
In the light of this analysis Pollock’s model of the expansion and merging of royal protections into 
a single, all-enveloping king’s peace, looks rather underdeveloped. It is based primarily on 
drawing a connection between the various royal protections of the Anglo-Saxon period, as 
analysed in chapter two, and the necessary inclusion of accusations of breach of the peace in 
cases of homicide and violence, which, as we saw in chapter four, is visible in both Glanvill and 
Bracton. In particular, the statement in Glanvill that “sheriffs also have jurisdiction over brawling, 
beatings, and even wounding, unless the accuser states in his claim that there has been a breach 
of the peace of the lord king” makes it seem highly plausible that general royal jurisdiction 
emerged out of what had once been the more limited offence of violently breaching the peace or 
protection that the king, usually through an agent, had specially granted to somebody.50 Bridging 
the gap between these specific Anglo-Saxon protections and the situation in Glanvill is not, 
however, something Pollock attempted in any great detail; his only pronouncement on the 
subject, as noted above, was the following: “We may imagine a transition period in which the 
judges were ready, on some very slight suggestion, to presume as between the king and the 
sheriff that the king’s peace had been specially granted to the plaintiff, or to a man unlawfully 
slain.”51 Other than this speculative theory, Pollock can offer nothing, nor did Maitland add 
anything of substance in his treatment of the issue.52 Since Pollock, in fact, only Hessel Yntema 
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and Alan Harding have contributed anything on the mechanisms by which he king’s peace might 
have expanded, and both of these took an entirely different approach to Pollock.  
Thus, though there is a good prima facie case that an expansion and generalisation of royal 
protection did occur, the case for the process that Pollock suggested is currently based only on 
supposition. The best that can be said is that the Glanvill passage shows that an allegation of 
breach of the peace had a practical procedural meaning: by the 1180s, plaintiffs’ choices as to 
whether or not to allege breach of the king’s peace  may not have been in any way related to the 
facts of their cases but they did have an immediate jurisdictional effect, bringing a case before 
royal justices or leaving it in the hands of the sheriff or lord. This is, in effect, what is known to 
legal scholars as the “ticket” system, in which certain forms of words, such as those referring to 
breach of the peace and felony, rather than having any factual relevance, function simply as 
tickets that send cases to higher jurisdictions.53 The idea that such tickets may have grown out of 
earlier legal concepts that use similar terminology is clearly reasonable, and it is this inherent 
plausibility rather than any direct evidence of their growth that has sustained Pollock’s rather 
casually stated model for over 125 years, in spite of Goebel’s critique and in the absence of any 
serious attempts to justify it. 
Such an attempt can be made, however, on the basis of the following passage from the Leges 
Henrici Primi: 
Concerning grithbreche and hamsocn. Often through the ignorance of litigants causes are 
transferred to the jurisdiction of others in a higher court (transeunt in ius aliorum): as the 
result of an overstatement of the case (exaggeratione rerum) when, for instance, they 
specifically undertake to prove grithbreche or hamsocn or something of that kind which in 
fact goes beyond the jurisdiction of those holding courts (quod socam et sacam eorum 
excedit), because of an outrageous desire to inflict injury, although a penalty could more 
suitably be applied by imposing the wite; through a denial of justice (diffortiatione recti); 
through an error in making an accusation (miscrauatione); through charges improperly 
made (presumptis accusationibus); through delay (tarditate), when for instance a person 
who is established in a judicial office or in some other position of authority frequently 
puts of claiming from the offender, while he may, what the injured party just as often 
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pursues painfully but without satisfaction; causes also pass to a higher court in the case of 
a verbal error in pleading (transeunt etiam in mislocutione), known as miskenning, a 
practice which has flourished more rankly in London.54 
Now, the one thing that is clear in this passage is that the author believed there to be a problem 
with people using at least two of the protections reserved by Cnut (griðbryce and hamsocn), and 
others similar to them (forsteal is the most likely candidate), to gain access to higher courts and 
maliciously to expose their adversaries to more serious penalties. These Anglo-Saxon protections 
were being used under Henry I as “tickets”, exactly as they were later to be used under his 
grandson. The only significant difference is that here they are not an accepted part of the system 
but are regarded as an abuse, at least by the author of the Leges Henrici. 
What is less clear is how this perceived abuse of the offences of hamsocn and griðbryce relates to 
the rest of the author’s complaints. The section as a whole is, after all, entitled “De grithbreche et 
hamsocna”, so it seems reasonable to ask if the point being made here was in fact a more 
extensive one. It is possible to read this entire paragraph as a tirade against a series of abuses 
related to the use of hamsocn and griðbryce as “tickets”. In such a reading the references to cases 
transferring to other jurisdictions in mislocutione, miskenninge, presumptis accusationibus and 
miscrauatione can all be taken to refer to the central subject of the perceived abuse of hamsocn 
and griðbryce. It is easy to imagine that in the use of such offences as “tickets” a conservative 
author would indeed have detected erroneous accusations of one kind or another and chosen to 
characterise them as such. If we follow this line of argument, the complaints about denial of right 
(diffortiatio recti) and the brief excursus on delays may be about the ways judges encouraged or 
even bullied litigants into committing this abuse. We might imagine that a plaintiff wishing to 
claim damages from his opponent but not wishing to expose him to unjustified royal penalties 
would be unwilling to make a false allegation of, say, hamsocn. He might, indeed, worry that once 
the king had claimed his share there would be less money available for his own compensation. 
However, if the court-holder made it clear that such an allegation was required and, in its 
absence, persistently denied him justice or, to quote directly, “frequently puts off claiming from 
the offender, while he may, what the injured part just as often pursues painfully but without 
satisfaction”, then we might well imagine the plaintiff would relent. Indeed, there seems to be 
little other reason for a court-holder to delay in such a way other than to put pressure on an 
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accuser. Without some such motive it is hard to understand, as claiming from the defendant 
would usually be to the court-holder’s own profit. 
This paragraph could, in short, tell us not only that hamsocn and griðbryce were being used as 
tickets by the 1110s, but also give us some insight into the some of the methods that were used 
to promote their use in this way. We might even be tempted to go so far as to suggest that the 
specific complaints about London are evidence for this process being promoted particularly 
vigorously by royal agents operating there. However, it is advisable to be wary here. The chapter 
heading may indeed be “De grithbreche et hamsocna” but the text itself is not at all clear that this 
is the central theme. Indeed, the passage on hamsocn and griðbryce is only one item in a list 
whose theme is the transfer of cases to other jurisdictions, not necessarily, as Downer’s 
translation suggests, to higher ones. It is the chapter heading alone that justifies interpreting the 
whole passage as a commentary on the use of hamsocn and griðbryce as tickets, and we cannot 
be certain that the heading relates closely enough to the text to warrant this. This interpretation, 
then, must remain only a possibility. We can be sure from this text that hamsocn and griðbryce 
were being used as tickets in the early twelfth century – and this is the most important and 
pertinent fact here – but we can only suspect that this was brought about by courtholders 
effectively coercing plaintiffs. We do know that the author of the Leges Henrici disapproved of the 
practice, characterising it as an abuse, and from this we can reasonably extrapolate that its 
legitimacy was more widely contested, with conservatives insisting on the strict application of 
Anglo-Saxon standards and others – whether we think of them as modernisers or perpetrators of 
fraud – advocating a much more generalised interpretation of royal protection. 
It seems clear, then, that Pollock’s model of an expanding king’s peace has considerable merit. 
The evidence of Glanvill and Bracton indicates that breach of the king’s peace had become what 
Milsom termed a “ticket” that sent cases away from local courts to the king’s justices, whilst the 
Leges Henrici Primi provides compelling evidence that this process had its roots in the Anglo-
Saxon protections of griðbryce and hamsocn, and probably also forsteal. The general king’s peace 
was not, then, just a vague ideological umbrella beneath which a plethora of unrelated measures 
took shelter, but something that was intrinsically linked to protective power. The king’s peace of 
Bracton’s day was the direct descendent of the king’s grið of Archbishop Wulfstan’s, not just a 
watery equivalent of tenth-century rhetoric about frið that did little more than proclaim a royal 
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mandate to ensure good order. 55  This is not to say that these older ideas about royal 
responsibility for a general peace were unimportant; the next chapter looks at these in detail and 
they were undoubtedly present but they were certainly not alone. It looks, also, at the crucial 
points of ambiguity. We have seen here that opinion on the extent of the king’s peace varied in 
the time of Henry I, and the conservative viewpoint of the Leges Henrici author is clear enough, 
but what of those who thought differently? What did the men who tried to make griðbryce and 
hamsocn function as tickets think about statements like William I’s putting all his followers in pace 
mea et quiete, or Henry I’s extending meam firmam pacem to his whole realm? These are 
important questions, but for now they must wait as there are two more theories about the 
creation of royal jurisdiction over violence that remain to be considered. 
Protection and Charters 
The one scholar since Goebel who has devoted serious attention to the emergence of the general 
king’s peace is Alan Harding. His approach is a complex one. Focusing on Scotland, his 
methodology was to dissect the elements within charters and compare them with the forms of 
brieves (the Scottish equivalent of English writs) in the hope of revealing patterns of 
development. Simplified somewhat, his basic argument on the points at issue here is that we can 
see the transition from specific protections to a general peace in the proliferation of written 
grants of protection. He points out that in a number of texts “protection of land and rights shades 
into protection of persons” and argues that such protection was “an essential part of any 
charter”.56  The suggestion is that through its grant by charter the king’s peace came to 
predominate to such a degree that it was, in effect, general, and that trespass in Scotland, and 
quite possibly also in England, developed out of a single action for breach of this general 
protection. According to Harding, the brieve De protectione domini regis infricta could “stand in 
the place of the whole host of writs of trespass in the English register because in Scotland so 
many things were regularly placed under the king’s protection.”57  
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The general thrust of Harding’s case is clear enough, but he never in fact goes quite as far as to 
say that grants of specific peace actually created a general peace. On the contrary, he specifically 
states that a truly general peace did not arrive in Scotland until 1357, and then by a royal 
pronouncement.58 Hyams quite succinctly sums up the subtlety of Harding’s argument: “The 
simple number of such grants [of protection by charter] encouraged the proliferation of specific 
grants of peace to resemble a general peace over all inhabitants of the realm.”59 Harding’s case 
has many more facets than this; his primary concern was to show that much of Scottish law was a 
law of tort and that this “depended on the one original idea of the contempt of the peace and 
protection given by the king”.60 How exactly this came about was relatively peripheral to his main 
concerns, but for our purposes it is central. What he offers is another model for the transition 
from a system of specific protections to one of a general peace,  a model we can set beside the 
ideas put forward by Pollock and Yntema examined above. 
The key point to examine here, then, is whether we can in fact see the king’s peace spreading in 
the way Harding suggests. Did the king grant his protection out by charter with sufficient 
frequency for this model to be plausible? To answer this we need to be clear about what, 
precisely, we understand by protection. Harding, it seems to me, used a definition that was simply 
too loose. He dissected what he identified as the archetypal grant of protection – “the mature 
protection of the fourteenth-century formularies”61 – into ten distinct parts. The first of these is 
the grant of protection itself. This is an explicit statement that the grantee has the king’s peace; 
for example, this phrase taken from a grant to the Priory of Huntingdon (1136 X 1147): et volo ut 
habeant meam firmam pacem.62 Second is a very general command that the beneficiary be 
allowed to enjoy his property undisturbed.63 Thirdly, there is a prohibition on interference with 
the property, such as this phrase from another mid twelfth-century charter: et super hoc prohibeo 
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ne ulles eis inde vim vel contumeliam faciat.64 Fourth is  a statement of a penalty for any such 
interference, ranging from full forfeiture to defined sums of money.65 Fifth is a command that 
royal agents “do right” to the beneficiary in the event of such interference, and sixth is an 
injunction to the king’s servants to defend the property as though it were the king’s own.66 
Seventh is an instruction that the grantee not be impleaded except for before the king; eighth 
makes the grantee immune from poinding (the seizure of assets in lieu of an unpaid debt); ninth is 
an order that debts owed to the grantee be enforced; and finally the tenth element is an order to 
the king’s servants to restore any fleeing serfs to the grantee’s manors.67 
The question that must surely arise is the extent to which all these elements really are intrinsically 
related to the king’s peace. This is particularly doubtful when it comes to instructions about the 
return of serfs or poinding, but it also can be questioned for the far more crucial aspect of the 
measures against interference in property. In the presence of an explicit grant of the king’s 
protection the relationship seems beyond doubt, but where such explicit phrasing is absent we 
are faced with a large conceptual leap. If a charter merely prohibits interference in the lands 
being granted, even with a penalty specified for such acts, are we really justified in regarding this 
as a grant of the king’s peace? It seems to me that the prohibition of interference by others in 
land being granted is fundamental to the purpose of all land charters, not something specific to 
possession of the king’s peace. Indeed, the desire that the grantee enjoy the property conveyed 
by charter together with a prohibition on interference is a commonplace, occurring even in the 
very earliest Kentish charters: this is from the oldest English charter for which an original survives, 
a grant by King Hloþhere to Brihtwold, Abbot of Reculver, in 679: 
May you hold and possess it, and your successors maintain it forever. May it not be 
contradicted by anyone. With the consent of Archbishop Theodore and Eadric, my 
brother’s son, and also of all the leading men, as it has been granted to you, hold it thus, 
you and your successors. May whoever attempts to contravene this donation be cut off 
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from all Christendom, and debarred from the body and the blood of our Lord Jesus Christ, 
this charter of donation remaining nevertheless in its firmness.68 
The form is different but the intention remains the same. Just as it would be entirely 
unreasonable to regard this as a grant of the king’s peace – rather than just a grant of land – so, I 
would argue, it would be unreasonable in the twelfth century. Even if we were inclined to do so, 
perhaps persuaded by the presence of a threat of forfeiture, it is a leap too far to suggest that 
such a threat to those interfering with granted lands meant that everyone associated with those 
lands was believed to be under the king’s peace. 
Harding, in identifying all these elements of “the protection”, ends up conflating the specific 
protection of the king’s peace with the guarantee of safe possession that was the very essence of 
the royal charter. In a sense this is understandable – charters did protect grantees from 
interference – but to confuse this protective function with the formal protection afforded by a 
grant of the king’s peace is not justifiable. The only one of Harding’s ten elements that can be said 
to convey the king’s peace is the first, where it is explicitly stated.69 It is such explicit grants that 
we must look for if we are to assess the extent to which the scope of the king’s peace was 
extended through charters. When we do this, we find that though there is evidence for such 
grants, they are a long way from being typical. For example, there is a writ of William I to Abbot 
Æthelwig of Evesham stating that he is to hold that abbey’s lands in Warwickshire honourably and 
“cum mea bona pace et protectione”.70 We can add to these a few other genuine grants from the 
Conqueror’s reign, including those favouring the Barking, St Paul’s in London, and Selby.71 There 
are other cases which are less certain, such as what may be royal protection covering a river 
flowing through the abbey of St Peter’s, Gloucester, and there are also some forgeries such as 
grants to Durham and Westminster which may be based on earlier documents, but it is impossible 
to escape the conclusion that these were the exceptions rather than the rule.72  The truth of the 
matter is that the vast majority of land grants did not include explicit grants of the king’s peace in 
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the way that the writ to Abbot Æthelwig did, and as such it is very difficult to accept that such 
grants were a primary factor in the generalisation of the king’s peace. We can certainly accept 
that they contributed, but the idea that they hold the key to understanding the process seems to 
me to be unwarranted. 
The Appeal and Infamy 
The final stage in this analysis is to look at the alternative to the model of expanding protections 
that has thus far been favoured here. Can we see major advances taking place in royal jurisdiction 
over violence by routes completely unrelated to protection? This was, there can be no doubt, a 
period of considerable procedural innovation. We find, for example, in the reign of Henry I, first 
the establishment of local royal justices then the beginnings of the system of the “general eyre” in 
which royal justices would itinerate around a series of counties hearing a range of pleas.73 We find 
the introduction of new forms of prosecution in the form first of official prosecutors and then, 
under Henry II, of collective accusation by “juries of presentment”.74 We also find a crucial 
development in the emergence of a new role for justices in the general eyre towards the end of 
Henry II’s reign: rather than just presiding over county courts where the suitors made the 
judgements according to local customs as seems to have been the case under Henry I, these 
justices judged cases themselves according to royal law and in so doing created a degree of legal 
uniformity for the entire kingdom 75 All this is well known and it need not detain us here for long. 
Though undoubtedly all of these were very important in the business of prosecuting a case 
relating to violence they are all, ultimately, changes to the way that cases were judged, not the 
principles of what constituted a punishable offence. Royal justice may have been made more 
effective by these measures but, in themselves, they had no direct effect on royal jurisdiction. 
There is, however, one example of a procedural change which might well have had an effect on 
the treatment of violence in law and it is to this that we now turn.  
This potentially crucial development is the Norman importation into England of the custom of trial 
by battle, or the “appeal”. This is a central plank of Goebel’s argument that the Norman kings’ 
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control of legal procedure was the foundation for their expansion of royal jurisdiction. His 
argument is, in essence, that the Normans brought not only the mode of proof with them but also 
ideas about the appropriate punishment for the infamy incurred by failing at that proof. Goebel 
states his case with some force: 
This is innovation, for the Anglo-Saxons although familiar with infamy did not treat 
forfeiture as a general consequence of infamy but specified it from time to time as a 
punishment for this or that offence, and certainly had not pushed the effects of infamy 
beyond procedural disqualifications. On the continent, however, judicial combat, infamy 
and exheredation had nested together so long in post-Frankish procedure that once the 
form of proof was introduced in England, the incidents of conviction followed as of 
course.76 
Thus, Goebel argues, regardless of the offence over which the duel was fought, the loser’s 
property would escheat to his lord simply as a consequence of the infamy that attached to the 
vanquished party.77 This, alongside royal control of outlawry, was at the heart of Goebel’s central 
argument that “the Norman kings cut into the whole problem of public order in England via the 
control of procedure”.78  
His argument fits quite well with the views of more modern scholars, though some of their 
interpretations are a little more extreme. Paul Hyams characterises the appeal as a “dramatic 
challenge by which a man threw down his gauntlet to commit himself to proof, a genuine 
commitment of life and members by calling out his enemy to fight within the four benches of the 
court. … All concerned knew that the loser faced physical penalties – mutilation or death.”79 
Hyams, however, sees the appeal as one of three options available to any seriously aggrieved man 
in the age before the common law, the others being direct action (i.e. feud vengeance) or a much 
less risky strategy of complaining to a powerful figure in the hope of gaining compensation 
(Hyams terms this “proto-trespass”).80 According to Hyams, then, someone who was defeated in 
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an appeal would not only have to fear exheredation, the punishment Goebel identifies as 
traditional on the continent for infamy, but would also be subject to serious afflictive penalties. 
Logically, then, someone successfully appealed of homicide would potentially face the death 
penalty, and as historians are convinced that the appeal was, in the words of John Hudson “the 
main form of procedure concerning homicide, wounding and the like”, there is a clear case for 
regarding the appeal and the concept of infamy as crucial to the development of royal jurisdiction 
over homicide.81  
The evidence itself is not quite so clear-cut. The idea that appeals were the main form of 
procedure for homicide comes from an early writ of William I that deals with the introduction into 
England of the continental custom of trial by battle. Its main purpose was to set out the rights of 
the English to whom this was an unaccustomed novelty, the general gist being that they could 
choose whether to participate or to opt for a more traditional alternative. Following the greeting, 
it opens with this statement: 
If an Englishman summons a Frenchman to trial by combat for theft or homicide or for 
anything for which it is fitting that there should be trial by combat or judicial suit (dom) 
between two men, he shall have full permission to do so.82 
Theft and homicide, then, seem to be treated as two prime examples of things for which it is 
fitting that there should be trial by battle. Though the term “appeal” is not used in this passage, it 
is clear that what is being talked about is exactly what later sources would refer to as such. The 
term, however, is used later in the same document, albeit only in the Latin of the Quadripartitus 
version. Though the original Anglo-Saxon uses the verb beclipian to mean challenge or summon 
throughout the document, the Quadripartitus consistently uses compellare (complain) until the 
final section on outlawry where it switches to appellare (appeal). Goebel believed that this was no 
accident and that there was, in fact, a technical distinction being drawn here: “complaint” 
characterising a set of offences, some of which could potentially be relatively minor, and “appeal” 
being reserved to the serious offences that could lead to outlawry.83 Though this is not present in 
the original, and thus can have no real bearing on the law under William I, it is worth noting as it 
                                                          
 
81
 Hudson (1996), p. 71. 
82
 Wl Lad 1. 
83
 Wl Lad 1-3:2. Goebel (1937), p. 412. 
Chapter Five – Murder, Infamy and the King’s Peace: The Legal Roots of “Violent Crime” 
191 
 
seems to indicate that – at least in the mind of the man who wrote the Quadripartitus and Leges 
Henrici Primi – appeals only took place for the most serious offences. This we shall return to 
shortly. 
Firstly, however, the more pressing issue is whether Hyams’s characterisation of the situation 
regarding appeals, or trials by battle, is correct: would the defeated party necessarily face 
mutilation or death? This is certainly not how our source represents things. Indeed, the only 
reference to what happens after battle is as follows: “*if a Frenchman challenges an Englishman+ 
and if the Frenchman is defeated, he shall give the king £3”.84 This is a long way from mutilation 
and death; what it appears to amount to is hefty fine for bringing a false accusation. Goebel, 
however, interprets this passage differently: 
Finally, the rule that the defeated Frenchman pays 60 shillings [i.e. £3 (Goebel uses the 
Latin text)] is sensible only if taken for the usual Norman penalty for the loss of a land 
action: it would be absurd as a statement of the economic sanction for conviction of 
crime, for here the closely contemporary Domesday puts the offender in mercy for life, 
limb or chattels.85 
On this, I think, we have to take issue with Goebel. Firstly, there is no hint that the Frenchman is 
paying for being “convicted” of anything, he is the accuser in this scenario and his only offence is 
to have brought an accusation that was subsequently proven to be false. There is no suggestion in 
this document that the accused, if defeated and hence convicted, would have to pay this sum. 
Nor, importantly, is there anything to support Goebel’s contention that this document, for some 
unspecified reason, neglected to mention a more serious penalty for being vanquished in battle. 
The Domesday passages to which he refers simply do not support his assertion. The first, for 
Oxfordshire, mentions life and limbs being in the judgement of the king as a penalty for killing 
someone to whom the king’s personal peace had been given, and forfeiture of body and property 
for a killing within someone’s own house.86 The second, for Cheshire, only mentions outlawry and 
forfeiture of land and goods for killing in a house.87 All this proves is that the penalty for these 
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particularly serious breaches of protection through homicide was to put the offender in mercy. In 
no way does it show that the necessary result of an appeal, regardless of the offence involved, 
was one of execution or mutilation.  
From this evidence, it seems, we would do much better to regard trial by battle as simply a 
method of proof, used as a direct parallel to the ordeal or proof by compurgation. If the accused 
failed the proof he faced the penalty set down for his offence. If, on the other hand, he 
succeeded, his accuser could be liable to a penalty for bringing a malicious accusation. It is in this 
way that we understand the handful of references to Anglo-Saxon penalties of mutilation for 
being defeated in an ordeal: one is the penalty for a false accusation (loss of a tongue), the others 
are a gruesome variety of penalties for notorious criminals who fail the triple ordeal – their crime 
being that their notoriety was proven to be justified.88 The situation with regard to trial by battle 
in the immediate aftermath of the conquest does not look substantially different, and from this 
evidence it looks rather like historians’ readings of these earlier texts are being influenced by their 
knowledge of the later common law “appeal of felony”, where the stakes were undoubtedly as 
high as Hyams and Goebel represent them.  
However, we have yet to account for the evidence of the Leges Henrici Primi. Though our reading 
of William’s writ on exculpation seems a reasonable one, it may be that circumstances had 
changed by the time the Leges Henrici were written, perhaps over forty years later. One of the key 
passages on this point is as follows: 
Anyone who commits a theft, who betrays his lord, who deserts him in a hostile 
encounter or military engagement, who is defeated in trial by battle (uel uictus erit) or 
who commits a breach of the feudal bond (uel felonia fecerit) shall forfeit his land.89 
However, we should also note this statement – “anyone who wages battle and by judgement 
loses shall pay sixty shillings in compensation”90 – which is clearly contradictory, and the following 
passage: 
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Trial by battle shall not take place unless the property in dispute is at least 10 shillings in 
value, or unless the charge is one of theft or of a misdeed of this kind or concerns a 
breach of the king’s peace (de pace regis infracta) or the dispute is over matters which 
may involve a penalty of death or mutilation.91 
From this evidence it not only looks like there was a degree of confusion as to the penalty for 
defeat in battle but also appears that homicide may not even have been included among the 
offences for which battle was an appropriate form of proof. It looks rather like a procedure used 
for land claims or for the more serious offences that were already familiar in Anglo-Saxon 
England. We might think that this would be the reason for the distinction the same author 
introduced into William’s writ on the subject, between “appeal” for the most serious offences 
involving outlawry and “complain” for the rest. 
However, this rather confused situation is muddied yet further by another passage from the same 
document: 
Homicide shall be denied by an oath of exculpation equal in value to the value of the 
wergeld; this suffices for the purpose of clearing the accused or making an answer in the 
case of charges of this kind; the accusation of the slain man’s relatives shall be by way of 
offer of battle or by a fore-oath.92 
Here it seems clear enough that accusations of homicide can be made through an offer of battle. 
At first sight this may seem conclusive but it should also be noted that the author seems to 
envisage the offer of battle leading not to a duel, but to an oath of exculpation equal in value to 
the wergild. Presumably the offer of battle could also be accepted, and in these conditions 
perhaps the loser would indeed face forfeiture, but our author seems to see the normal mode of 
proof as the exculpatory oath. Indeed, in the passage analysed in detail in the last chapter he 
makes it clear that the primary alternative to such an oath was not trial by battle but payment of 
wergild.93 It seems, then, that only when the accused wanted to deny the charge of homicide and 
avoid the liability to wergild would there be any possibility of battle, and even then it would only 
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occur if the accused could not muster the support necessary for the oath or if he so relished the 
prospect of facing his enemy that he chose to fight. 
What is apparent, then, if we believe the Leges Henrici Primi on this point, is that battle was not 
as central to the prosecution of homicide as has been thought. The various statements on this do 
not sit at all easily together but the impression in all the sources is of a rather hazy distinction 
between the most serious crimes, for which battle was definitely appropriate, and other offences 
for which there is evidence pointing in both directions. This accords roughly with the assessment 
of L. J. Downer, the Leges Henrici’s most recent editor, who on the basis of the evidence cited 
here and a rather more ambiguous passage, argued that trial by battle applied only to capital 
cases.94 I would suggest that homicide fits best into the rather murky category of other offences. 
This fits well with the structure of William I’s writ, which treated the most serious offences as a 
separate category, and with the Leges Henrici’s statements about the offences for which battle 
was appropriate. It would be going too far to claim that homicide cases could not be the subject 
of judicial combat, but it does seem fair to suggest that there was something qualitatively 
different about such battles that separated them from those covering serious offences. It is 
possible that this did relate to the penalty for defeat; perhaps the rules in William’s writ 
continued to apply to less serious cases, with men fearing only the 60 shilling penalty even after 
the punishment of forfeiture for infamy was added to the more serious offences.  
Even at the most maximalist reading of the evidence, however, it is still hard to see the appeal as 
being so crucial as Goebel represented it, particularly for homicide. The Leges Henrici Primi 
represented offer of battle as the proper mode of accusation but gave an oath as the usual 
method of defence. On this evidence Hyams’s outline of a system in which litigants could choose 
the procedures that suited them seems to be only partially correct: the accuser did indeed have a 
choice of options, but even after he had chosen the appeal the defendant could still choose 
between paying wergild, making an oath of denial or accepting battle. Even if we do see this final 
option as the riskiest of all, opening both parties to the possibility of forfeiture rather than just a 
£3 fine for false accusation, we are still a long way from royally punished homicide. The penalty of 
exheredation meant an escheat of the defeated party’s lands to his lord, which is indeed the same 
fate as the property of a defeated felon would undergo a century later. However, there is no sign 
here of the other ingredients in the punishment of felons as described by Bracton: the property is 
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not held in the king’s hands for a year and a day, there is no forfeiture of chattels, and most 
importantly there is no sign whatsoever of afflictive sanctions – no prospect of execution or 
mutilation.95 This is very much the maximum view that the available evidence will allow us and we 
must, surely, conclude that even this is not quite so significant as the literature would suggest. 
The escheat of property would, no doubt, have been a serious business to a man who – unable to 
gather the support necessary for an oath of denial and unable to pay a wergild – was  defeated in 
a judicial duel, but it hardly prefigures the punishment of felony in the way that Goebel and 
Hyams imply. A contributory factor, yes, but not the root cause. 
As we have seen, however, the maximalist reading is far from being certain and it may not even 
be likely. If in punished infamy we are looking at an importation from Normandy, the impression 
we get is that it is not one that sat easily in English law. Two sets of sources give two different 
interpretations, but in neither is Goebel’s idea of infamy fully accepted. Indeed, William’s writ 
accepts the idea of battle but contains no sign of infamy or forfeiture, whilst the Leges Henrici is 
very unclear on the issue as to when trial by battle is appropriate at all, and in both there are hints 
of a distinction between the most serious offences – which were botleas under the Anglo-Saxons 
anyway – and lesser ones. I am inclined to believe that infamy was indeed introduced into 
England from Normandy, but that it was done, initially at least, in such a way as to have minimal 
impact on English procedures, applying only to offences where its addition was of little 
importance given the seriousness of the punishments for the offences themselves. That it then, 
through use, gradually extended into something that resembled Norman custom more closely is 
certainly a possibility – the confusion in the Leges Henrici might indicate that such a process of 
change was underway in the 1110s. But this is conjecture; the evidence does not permit any clear 
conclusion to be drawn. There is enough, however, to suggest that the idea of exheredation for 
infamy was present in some form and it is plausible that it may have exerted an influence on 
Anglo-Norman appeal procedure that carried over into the later “appeal of felony”. We do not, 
however, given the state of the evidence, have to afford it anything approaching primacy in our 
consideration of the evolution of comprehensive royal jurisdiction over violence.  
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Conclusions 
From this analysis, then, the picture that emerges is one in which protections play a major role. 
The murder fine, insofar as it was a protection covering William’s French followers, fits well into a 
picture of specific protections expanding to a point where they were approximating a general 
protection of the entire population. Likewise, the process of using older protections such as 
hamsocn and griðbryce as “tickets” to take cases to higher courts, regardless of their factual 
details, is clearly in evidence in the Leges Henrici Primi, and the connection of this with the later 
use of allegations of breach of the king’s peace in Glanvill is extremely suggestive. The other 
possible routes for the expansion of royal jurisdiction over violence examined here, the 
punishment of infamy incurred by defeat in an appeal, and the granting of royal protection in 
charters, do not seem so promising. These look like more minor contributory factors, at most. It 
is, as Pollock thought, in the expansion of protections that we find the best explanation for the 
late twelfth-century appearance of royal punishment of homicide and other violent offences.  
The fact that our later sources indicate a clear division between homicide and other forms of 
violence could well be, at least in part, a result of these processes. The expansion of the murder 
fine to cover – if we believe the Dialogue of the Exchequer – killings of all free men is a vital 
development, but only for homicide. No matter how serious an assault was, and no matter how 
foreign the victim, as long as no killing occurred the murder fine could not be applied. This left a 
gap – perhaps a degree of ambiguity regarding how far the royal protection that lay behind the 
murder fine also applied to non-lethal violence – that may well have been filled by accusations of 
breaches of royal protection as seen in the Leges Henrici. Who did and who did not have the 
king’s protection when it came to non-lethal violence seems to have been a matter that divided 
opinion during Henry I’s reign. Such accusations of breach of the peace could, no doubt, be 
applied to homicides as well as assaults, and this may well be reflected in the fact that homicide 
came to be both a breach of the peace and a felony, whereas we know from Glanvill that assault 
and wounding were, at least in the early stages of the common law, only being breaches of the 
peace. We might, in other words, want to see the felonious element of thirteenth-century 
homicide emerging from the murder fine (with its link to the old botleas offence of morð) and its 
peace-breaking side coming from royal protections whose roots can be traced back to Edmund’s 
reign and beyond. 
What, then, does the Norman conquest mean in terms of the way violence was treated in English 
society? We can look at this in a number of ways. First and foremost, it is important to note that 
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not much seems to have changed immediately. We still have the same system of protections 
regulating violence and feud, and we still find the king occupying much the same place that he 
had done before. Indeed, the one concrete  change accompanying the conquest – the murder fine 
– does fit in rather well with the general Anglo-Saxon trend of gradually increasing the scope of 
royal protective power. After the conquest, indeed, we still find the same system of protections 
outlined in legal texts as well as finding both protection and feud in action in the 1130 Pipe Roll. 
The picture of English society’s approach to violence in this period, then, is broadly similar. From 
another perspective, though, we find a lot of change. There is the potential Norman importation 
of infamy for those defeated in appeals, of course, but also the murder fine, which, though a 
protection, is not at all like an Anglo-Saxon protection. It is a hybrid of a protection for William’s 
followers, the botleas offence of morð and the collective surety mechanisms of frankpledge. It is 
innovative in a number of ways, not least of which is the presumption in favour of protected 
status for any corpse, requiring positive proof of Englishry for the fine to be remitted. This in itself 
is a radical departure from the more conservatively defined protections of the Anglo-Saxon 
period, something that made it inherently more likely that the fine’s applicability would expand 
rather than contract. Quite apart from this, the collective element made this an extremely 
powerful measure, something that any local population would ignore at its peril. In requiring 
communities to produce killers for punishment, under threat of a massive collective penalty, it 
went a long way beyond all Anglo-Saxon measures except, perhaps, those of the Danelaw.96 This 
was a major procedural innovation, not just the creation of another protection. 
This, in fact, is the major theme of the expansion of royal jurisdiction after 1066. Except for the 
murder fine we do not find new protections of any great significance, but we do see considerable 
change in the way that old protections were applied. In the Leges Henrici we find a snapshot of 
the situation in the second decade of the twelfth century. It shows a degree of confusion 
surrounding the rules of trial by battle, quite possibly because they (like the free population of 
England) were in the midst of a process of gradual Normanisation. Moreover, it gives us a picture 
of a legal system in which the extent of royal protection was being contested, with some 
conservatives applying older Anglo-Saxon standards and another group insisting on applying royal 
protection of some sort to almost every case. However, if we add into this mix the fact that 
variable amercements had now replaced the old system of fixed bots and wites, we can 
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appreciate that increased royal involvement may not necessarily have led to vast rises in the 
amounts that those convicted of violence had to pay.  We need not imagine, for example, that 
each time griðbryce was invoked an additional £5 fine was added to the defendant’s liability, but 
we should nonetheless recognise the fact that such an accusation did bring the matter within the 
king’s jurisdiction.  
Possibly this royal involvement was something that litigants actually wanted; royal justice offering 
a final and binding settlement where the mess of lower jurisdictions was more likely to bring only 
delay and confusion. We might want to see those who pushed the use of protections as “tickets” 
not as the unscrupulous abusers of power condemned in the Leges Henrici, but as progressive 
reformers, cutting through the confusion that had been created with the addition of a variety of 
manorial and feudal courts, as well as private courts for soke-holders, to England’s system of shire 
and hundred moots. The Leges Henrici author, after all, also expressed this opinion:  
The vexations of secular legal proceedings are beset by wretched anxieties of such 
number and magnitude, and are enveloped in so many fraudulences, that these processes 
and the quite unpredictable hazard of the courts seem rather things to be avoided.97 
It is, of course, likely that there is some degree of exaggeration here but there is probably some 
truth in what the author is saying. His solution may have been to research and set down the law in 
a definitive form so that all confusion ceased, but the signs are that other minds sought to bring 
order through the expansion of royal jurisdiction by essentially procedural means. 
On this point, then, I think we can realistically combine the theories of Pollock and Goebel: royal 
protections were expanded greatly in the Anglo-Norman period, but this was done primarily 
through tight control of, and innovation in, procedure. We should not imagine concepts simply 
merging in an abstract fashion but look instead at how they can be shown to have operated in 
practice for contemporary litigants. Under the Norman kings, it seems, this was the very field in 
which serious change was being undertaken, in terms of the expansion of the scope of the murder 
fine, the use of royal protections as tickets and, indeed, in the introduction of some form of 
punishment for infamy. These, I believe, were the legal roots of the monopoly of legitimate 
violence that seems to have emerged under Henry II. It seems from the evidence that the reign of 
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Henry I – known even to contemporaries as the Lion of Justice98 – was a crucial one in which there 
was significant experimentation with the justice system and the expansion of royal jurisdiction. 
That Henry II was able to draw on his grandfather’s reign for legal innovations such as justices in 
eyre is well known; it thus seems perfectly plausible, indeed highly probable, that he did 
something similar with regard to jurisdiction over violence. We can see here, just as with more 
well known institutions, a situation in which experimental innovations visible under Henry I 
emerge under Henry II as fully-fledged institutions. The next chapter looks at how the wider 
European ideological climate contributed to all of these developments and, eventually, allowed 
Henry II to complete the destruction of the old system of protections. 
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Chapter Six  
Ideology and the Criminalisation of 
Violence 
Introduction 
Whereas the last chapter looked at the process of legal change under the Anglo-Norman kings in 
the context of specific offences and procedures, this one looks at the way these changes related 
to wider ideological trends. It looks at the role of ideas and concepts that were not legally 
forceful, in the sense that they were reflected in concrete legal procdure , but may nevertheless 
have been considerably influential. Their presence on some level is beyond doubt: the terms 
“peace” and “felony” are absolutely central to the royal jurisdiction over violence as “crime” in 
the thirteenth century, and both have long ideological pre-histories. For example, the proposition 
that the continental Peace Movement (initially just the Peace of God but later also encompassing 
the Truce of God) had an influence on the establishment of a legally meaningful general peace is 
not one that can be left uninvestigated. Likewise, the idea central to the concept of felony, the 
betrayal of a lord, can be linked to Carolingian uses of loyalty oaths and, as we shall see, it has 
been suggested this was also of fundamental importance in the Anglo-Saxon legal system. This 
chapter looks at how these ideas developed in the long term and, crucially, how they interacted 
with the process of legal change under both the Anglo-Norman kings and Henry II. The aim is to 
gain a deeper understanding of both the processes identified in the previous chapter and of the 
final step – seemingly taken by Henry II around the time of the Assize of Clarendon in 1166 – by 
which simple homicide was prohibited outright by the crown. Homicide, as we know, was 
eventually prosecuted as both a breach of the peace and a felony, and it seems that wounding, 
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though not a felony in Glanvill, had become one in Bracton’s day simply by analogy.1 The origins 
and influence of these two concepts shall here be examined in turn.2 
The Idea of Peace 
The previous chapter has stressed the importance of the expansion in scope of specific royal 
protections in creating a situation in which an allegation of a breach of the king’s peace was a 
crucial part of the prosecution of homicide and – seemingly – an option for the plaintiff in any 
case of serious violence. This, broadly speaking, conforms to Pollock’s view of the origins of the 
king’s peace, telling against the interpretations which view the peace as a mere ideological 
umbrella beneath which legal change was effected by a series of administrative or procedural  
measures that had no conceptual connection with the protective understanding of peace. 3 It does 
seem from the evidence examined in the previous chapter that there may be considerable merit 
in this: we do see specific peaces expanding in scope and becoming very close to comprehensive. 
The idea that the general peace we find in Bracton and Glanvill owed something to these 
expanded specific peaces does not seem very far-fetched. If this was so, it seems that the later 
“peace” was more than just an ideological gloss for pragmatic policies of legal change, it was 
something far more substantial: in theory, a giant protection covering the entirety of society. This, 
however, raises more questions than it answers. General ideas of peace were very old by the 
twelfth century and had not, it seems, originally been much more than an inspiration to good 
government and a justification for firm practical policies enforcing law and order. What was it that 
made this change? Equally, though we have identified specific legal powers in which we can see 
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royal protections expanding under the Norman kings we have yet to explain why they did so. Why 
was it that some influential figures were pushing for the old offences of hamsocn and griðbryce to 
be asserted even in cases where, from the perspective of conservatives like the author of the 
Leges Henrici, there was nothing in the specifics of the case to justify it? The last chapter may, 
therefore, have told us something of the processes by which specific peaces were generalised, but 
what drove them is still something of a mystery. An examination of ideological trends regarding 
“peace” will, I hope, shed some light on the subject.  
a) Frið and Theft 
To understand the importance of the idea of peace for the establishment in England of something 
that at least approached a royal monopoly of legitimate violence, we need to understand the way 
the concept developed both over the long term and in a wider European context. A good place to 
start this is with the Anglo-Saxon concept of frið. This term for peace is occasionally used to mean 
protection, but more usually it is used in a much looser sense, referring to an absence of hostility, 
a state of friendly relations, or the absence of disorder.4 It is often used in legal sources in 
reference to the ideal state of the kingdom, such as when Edward the Elder’s second code 
explains how in Exeter the king had exhorted his witan to consider “hu heora frið betere beon 
maehte ðonne hit ær ðam wæs” (how their peace might be made better than it had been), or in 
Æthelstan’s Exeter code’s complaint that “ure frið” had not been kept as well as he would have 
liked.5 These references are far from alone; Æthelred’s legislation in particular makes frequent use 
of the idea that its purpose was “friðes bot”, the “improvement” or “amendment” of peace.6 
Nobody today would attempt to interpret frið as anything so legally concrete as the later 
medieval king’s peace – as Goebel pointed out, “only a rosy imagination can read into passages 
where it [frið] appears a concept of folk peace, let alone a notion that peace and law are 
synonymous”7 – but we can perhaps try to be a little more specific about what the term 
conveyed. It is most often, when used in this way, associated with theft. Archbishop Wulfstan, 
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writing in both Æthelred’s and Cnut’s codes, explained that friðes bot should be promoted in such 
a way “as shall be best for the householder and worst for the thief”.8 Similarly, Æthelstan’s use of 
the term was clearly associated with his prolonged campaign against theft, something underlined 
by the fact that Edmund specifically thanks God and the witan for the frið they had come to enjoy 
with regard to theft.9 Edgar, too, though not quite so explicitly, seems to associate frið with 
theft.10 However, though the link with theft is the strongest, frið also seems to be used with 
respect to feud by Edmund and to issues surrounding coinage by Wulfstan, so it would be wrong 
to claim it had any tightly defined specific meaning.11 We can say, however, that when Anglo-
Saxon lawmakers identified threats to frið it was most often theft that worried them. The 
important thing to grasp here is that peace, at this point, was a concept essentially unconnected 
with the mechanisms that were being used to bring it about, including protective power. Though, 
as we have seen, Anglo-Saxon law had plenty of specific “peaces” these were all related to 
violence, whereas the general idea of frið seems to have been most associated with theft. Theft, 
unlike homicide, was the subject of strong royal prohibitions. Whereas violence was something 
that kings got involved in only in certain aggravated circumstances – most frequently the breach 
of a protection – it was the act of theft itself that was punished. In the tenth century the idea of 
peace was purely an ideal. It influenced law only in that it prompted kings to take action to 
improve the peace of their realms. It did not have procedural reality: thieves were not punished 
as breachers of the peace, or even of a peace; they were simply punished as thieves.  
The strength of the king’s ideological position as a punisher of thieves is well illustrated by the 
rather extreme position adopted in Æthelstan’s Thunderfield code. He says, quite explicitly, that 
thieves are in no way to be judged worthy of life; whatever their gender or social status, so long 
as their guilt is established they can only expect death. Even if they claim the protection of a 
church, a noble, or the king, they can only expect to live for the few days that their protector is 
entitled to offer. If they flee they are to be pursued to their death by all, with all those daring to 
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harbour them forfeiting their lives as though they were thieves themselves. If the thief is a free 
woman she is to be thrown from cliffs or drowned; if a slave, the thief is to be put to death by 
eighty fellow slaves, men being stoned and women burnt, with these slaves each paying three 
pennies to their lord under threat of scourging.12 The ruthless cruelty of this code is quite 
astounding, surpassing in its barbarity anything that survives from the period,13 but it does 
demonstrate well the unwavering self-confidence of the monarchy when dealing with theft. The 
twenty-seven execution cemeteries from our period recently studied by Andrew Reynolds, with 
their numerous examples of decapitations and hand amputations (which may be indicative of 
punishment for theft), are a testament to the reality of this royal power.14 The contrast with 
Edmund’s inability simply to prohibit homicide in his code is particularly instructive here: whereas 
thieves were generally accepted to be evil-doers whom it was the king’s duty to punish in the 
name of peace, those engaged in feuds could only be subjected to firm exhortation and tighter 
regulations; they could not be “criminalised” in the same way as thieves. If we look ahead 250 
years, however, we find a different situation: thieves may still expect severe punishment but, 
according to Glanvill, killers are the ones singled out for particular attention. Unlike all other 
suspected felons, a homicide would not be released if he found sureties but rather, in order to 
intimidate (ad terrorem), he would be imprisoned until trial.15 We are looking, here, at a major 
shift. The king gains a much stronger position with regard to homicide, and this move is roughly in 
parallel with the development of the idea of peace: from something which in the tenth century is 
a vague ideological notion mainly about theft, to a point where even relatively trivial acts of 
violence, such as brawls, can be characterised as breaches of the peace in a legally punishable 
sense.16  
b) Peace and Violence 
The association of a general notion of peace with theft certainly seems to be dominant in the 
Anglo-Saxon period, but there are signs that some saw the royal mandate to preserve peace as 
                                                          
 
12
 IV As 6-6:7. 
13
 Though it is possible that an even more grisly code belonging to Edgar has perished. See Wormald 
(1999a), p. 125. 
14
 Reynolds (2009), pp. 151-79. See Ine 18, 37; Af 6; IV Eg 11; III Atr 4:1; II Cn 30:4.  
15
 Glanvill, xiv.1. 
16
 Glanvill, i.2. 
Chapter Six – Ideology and the Criminalisation of Violence 
205 
 
applying to violence as well. A precedent for this can be found in Charlemagne’s legislation 
against feud. In the Admonitio Generalis of 789, seemingly in connection with the instruction that 
there be peace, concord and harmony throughout the whole Christian people (ut pax sit et 
concordia et unianimitas cum omni populo christiano),17 Charlemagne ordered the following: 
In accordance with the prohibition in the Lord’s law, there are to be no killings within the 
land, neither by reason of vengeance nor by that of avarice nor by that of brigandage. And 
wherever they are found they are to be punished by our judges, by virtue of our 
command, in accordance with the law. And let no man be killed except in accordance with 
the law.18 
The ambiguity of this – given that no new penalties are stated we might wonder what was meant 
by “in accordance with the law” – is worth noting but need not trouble us too much here. It is also 
a feature of the treatment of homicide in the Capitulare Missorum Generale of 802, which initially 
takes an even more homiletic approach to the subject, admonishing one and all to “abandon and 
shun homicide, by which a multitude of the Christian people perish” and dwelling on the grave 
spiritual dangers of killing, declaring that “we would wish to punish with the harshest of penalties 
the man who dares to perpetrate the evil of homicide”. Then, however, it moves on to slightly 
more practical measures: 
Nevertheless so that sin should not increase, even, and an abundance of feuds come into 
being among Christians, let the guilty man, whenever, at the devil’s instigation, homicides 
occur, immediately set about making his amends and with all speed pay for the evil he has 
perpetrated with appropriate composition to the relatives of the deceased. And this we 
firmly command, that the relatives of the person who has been killed in no way dare to 
add to the evil which has been committed by resorting to feud or dare to refuse to make 
peace with him who asks it, but that, after he has given his pledge, they accept the 
composition provided and in return grant perpetual peace; but the offender is to pay 
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composition without delay. … Should anyone scorn to make fitting amends, however, he 
is to be deprived of his property pending our judgement.19 
Charlemagne, then, seems quite clearly to have regarded the suppression of homicide as the duty 
of a Christian ruler, but it is interesting to note that though he declared he would have liked to do 
so through punishing killers, what he actually tried to do was to enforce composition 
settlements.20 
The association of these Carolingian measures against homicide with the king’s duty to maintain 
peace is something that is difficult to demonstrate with full certainty. The 789 capitulary’s 
statements on homicide follow five chapters after an extended discussion of peace, part of which 
was quoted above, and the logical link does seem clear enough. However, the chapter 
immediately preceding it is one decrying the evils of hatred and malice, which leads into the 
prohibition of homicide just as well.21 In the later document, though peace is mentioned in the 
relevant chapter (the kin of the victim are to offer perpetual peace in exchange for composition) 
and nearby (in the context of peace and protection for the poor) it is impossible to read it as an 
idea explicitly underlying the measures against homicide.22 Thus, it is important to note that 
Wormald’s theory that Charlemagne prohibited feud outright, because he had seen what 
Christian “peace and unanimity” implied for vendetta, is not a certainty.23 It does not, however, 
seem very unlikely and Wormald’s interpretation does fit well with the Anglo-Saxon laws of 
Edmund, which, after stating that the king and his witan had been deliberating on how best to 
exalt Christianity, introduces its measures on homicide as follows:  
First then it seemed to us most necessary that we should most firmly keep between us 
our peaceableness and harmony (gesibsumnesse 7 geðwærnesse) throughout all my 
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dominion. I and all of us are greatly distressed by the unlawful and manifold fights 
(gefeoht) that there are between us.24 
As was discussed in detail in the first two chapters, Edmund then went on to produce a code 
packed with measures designed to regulate feud more tightly. That he did so because of a 
concern with peace seems beyond doubt, but it is perhaps interesting to note that the peace in 
question was not frið, the word usually used for the general peace of the realm for which the king 
had responsibility, but gesibsumnesse, a word for peace intimately linked with the concept of 
kinship but not one with any wider associations with the king or the realm.25 Later in the code 
Edmund does thank his witan for their support in establishing the frið they then enjoyed from 
thefts and asks them for similar support in respect of his current measures, which may mean that 
he saw them as an extension of that frið, but again this is uncertain. 
The relationship, then, between the peace for which the king was ideologically responsible and 
the suppression of violence was not anywhere near so clear as the relationship between that 
peace and the suppression of theft in this period. It is impossible to assert that no such tradition 
existed but the evidence is ambiguous, meagre by comparison to that associating frið and theft. 
This itself may well go some way towards explaining the relative weakness of Edmund’s position 
on feud when compared to Æthelstan’s extreme self-confidence in tackling theft: it was accepted 
that kings were responsible for frið and that frið entailed the suppression of theft, but it was far 
more contentious to assert that the royal duty to maintain frið applied to the suppression of 
violence. If we are to explain how kings came to claim such complete jurisdiction over homicide 
and violence, we need to look at how this understanding of peace shifted.  
Part of such a shift is almost certainly visible in the emphasis on the term grið in the laws written 
by Archbishop Wulfstan in the early eleventh century. This term, which meant both “peace” and 
“protection” was used where we would previously expect the concept of mund, which meant 
“protection” alone. Breaches of protection, which as we have seen were primarily related to 
violence, can from this point onwards also be regarded as breaches of peace, and indeed by the 
Norman conquest this concept is completely dominant, with the term griðbryce having taken root 
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and displaced mundbryce entirely. To some extent, then, we can see an important shift here 
towards a more protective understanding of peace, though the distinction between the clearly 
protective grið and the much vaguer frið did ensure some separation of the concepts, at least for 
Old English speakers. What this may reflect is, in fact, some influence from the continent. When 
Wulfstan wrote forðam Godes griðe is ealra griða selost to geearnigene 7 geornost to healdenne 
(“for the peace of God is of all peaces the most especially to be sought after and the most 
zealously to be upheld”) it seems unlikely to be coincidence that his language was so very close to 
the rhetoric of the contemporaneous continental Peace Movement.26 It is to this that we now 
turn.  
c) The Influence of the Peace Movement 
When looking at the Peace Movement there can be little doubt that the idea of “peace” was 
being directly and specifically associated with violence. The outlines of the movement are well 
known;27 although initially the Peace of God was concerned with protecting church property as 
much as it was with controlling violence, its aims and ambitions expanded as it developed. 
Emerging from this, the Truce of God, which was first proclaimed at the Council of Elne-Toulouges 
in 1027, was almost exclusively aimed at violence, its defining characteristic being the prohibition 
of all violence at certain holy times. As the movement developed these temporal prohibitions on 
violence expanded to cover more and more time, theoretically, at least, outlawing violence for 
much of the year. By 1054 and the Council of Narbonnes the development of the Peace 
Movement reached its logical conclusion: “no Christian should kill another Christian, for whoever 
kills a Christian undoubtedly sheds the blood of Christ.”28  Without practical enforcement, 
however, such ideas were no more likely to be efficacious than Charlemagne’s pronouncements 
over 200 years earlier, probably much less so, but there is a distinction to be drawn. Though we 
might question how it worked in practice there can be no doubt that the Truce of God measures 
prohibiting all violence on certain days were something of an innovation. Whereas the Peace of 
God had drawn to a large extent on Carolingian priorities in terms of the protection of the church 
and the poor – the early councils’ measures being comparable to later Carolingian legislation – the 
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Truce of God represented a departure, a declaration that even the traditionally unprotected 
fighting classes were illegitimate targets at certain times. The Truce, in establishing the idea of a 
protective peace that would in effect outlaw feud entirely, albeit only at certain times and even 
then with doubtful efficacy, set a new precedent: this was something that laws could do. Not even 
Charlemagne had dared to try to punish simple homicide himself as a breach of his protection – 
all he did was try to enforce compensation agreements – but in the Truce of God large periods of 
the year were deemed to be times when any killer was to be punished as a violator of peace, not 
just coerced into paying compensation. This precedent, and the fact that the internal logic of the 
movement led inexorably towards the idea of a permanent all-encompassing peace, made the 
ideology of peace that emerged from the early eleventh century a potent force when it came into 
the hands of well-organised secular rulers. 
There are a number of well-known examples of such secular rulers taking responsibility for, and 
extending their own jurisdictions through, the Peace Movement. The cooption of the Peace 
Movement by the French monarchy in the twelfth century has been outlined in some detail by 
Aryeh Graboïs; it was an incremental process in which Abbot Suger of Saint-Denis played a key 
role by enforcing the Truce of God in his capacity as regent between 1147 and 1149 whilst King 
Louis VII was on crusade. In this period, Graboïs argues, the Truce of God effectively 
metamorphosed into the peace of the realm. The final step in this process was the institution of 
peace legislation in the king’s own name, so that Louis became not just the enforcer of God’s 
peace but the creator and custodian of the peace of the realm – now the king’s peace. This 
occurred at the council of Soissons in 1155 but the peace in question, it must be noted, was very 
much in the old style of the Peace of God: it did not cover the entire realm, effectively prohibiting 
all violence at all times, but was a peace enforced by a series of specific protections, covering 
churches and their lands, merchants and their men, peasants and their goods. It was an extensive 
peace, that is clear, but it was not all-encompassing.29 There is a very similar case in Frederick 
Barbarossa’s great imperial Landfriede of 1152, which seems to have been even more ambitious 
than the French effort, attempting to outlaw homicide entirely, prescribing death to anyone who 
killed within a peace that was to hold in every part of the Empire.30 The creation of these two 
great peaces in the 1150s, at precisely the time when Henry II was coming to the English throne 
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and beginning his task of re-establishing the laws of his grandfather, may well have considerable 
relevance to developments in England during his reign. 
Even more directly pertinent to English concerns, however, is the progress of the Peace 
Movement in Normandy. Goebel argues convincingly that it was the Peace and Truce of God, 
initially introduced into Normandy in the 1040s, that underlay ducal jurisdiction over violence as it 
is detailed in the text known as Consuetudines et Iusticie, the record of an inquest into ducal rights 
that took place in Caen on 18 July 1091. The vital step here seems to have been taken at the 
Council of Lillebon in 1080, where the Truce of God was renewed with the bishop instructed to 
enforce it. Crucially, however, if his judgements were ignored the bishop was explicitly given 
recourse to secular authority.31 Though Goebel sees Robert Curthose’s reign as a period of weak 
government marked by “savage contempt for law”, he views the period of Henry I’s uncontested 
rule (beginning in 1106) as one of renewal. By the end of the reign, he argues, and specifically in 
an ordinance of 1135, it is clear that there are two distinct interests in breaches of the peace by 
homicide: the specific claims of the church (consisting of the first £9 of the offender’s chattels) 
and the less clearly defined ducal right to exact a penalty through “the application of misericordia 
by bargain”.32 As Goebel puts it, “secular procedure and the duke’s own justice *made+ a reality of 
the Peace of God in Normandy.”33 Its effect, moreover, was specific to homicide, giving the duke 
jurisdiction – though still very much financial rather than afflictive, and within the context of a 
settlement with the victim’s family – that covered not only certain protected categories of people 
and places, but also the whole population for about half the week.34  
From this basis in the Peace Movement, Goebel argues, full ducal jurisdiction, complete with 
afflictive penalties and excluding ecclesiastical involvement, was to emerge, most probably under 
Henry II.35 In Normandy, then, we have jurisdiction over homicide evolving specifically as a breach 
of a more or less general, albeit time-limited, peace. The implications of this for England are quite 
obvious. When we later find Glanvill and Bracton talking about breach of the peace in a general 
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sense, we would be foolish to dismiss out of hand the idea that the Norman example had some 
influence: the similarities are just too great. Indeed, in some respects the Norman evidence can 
offer much closer parallels with the thirteenth century than the earlier English material can. In 
terms of specific measures the evidence for direct adoption of Norman custom in England is not, 
as we have seen, particularly strong. There may be a strong possibility that the notion of infamy 
as a consequence of failure in an appeal was, eventually, imported in some form, but this is an 
exceptional case connected with the institution of trial by battle and the evidence, in any case, 
suggests a degree of resistance to those elements that would most seriously alter English custom. 
I would suggest that the main significance of the continental developments was ideological: 
Anglo-Norman kings and Anglo-Norman aristocrats were used to the idea that for a considerable 
portion of the week, as well as on specific festivals, feuding was limited by a general peace that 
was increasingly enforced and controlled by the duke. No king of England would be willing to cede 
so much jurisdiction to the church as to allow it the first £9 of any offender’s chattels, but is it not 
likely that he might see the Norman example of a general peace over homicide, even if it only 
applied half the time, as a precedent worth following?  
The case for Henry I’s reign is particularly interesting because of this statement from his 
coronation charter: “I establish a firm peace in all my kingdom, and I order that this peace shall 
henceforth be kept”.36 As we have seen, Goebel’s argument is that this was “no more than an 
earnest of *his+ good intentions”, on the grounds that there is no evidence of any measures by 
which this was given procedural reality.37 But can we really accept that all Henry’s contemporaries 
would have seen it this way? Might not some of his ministers, familiar with the workings of the 
Treuga Dei in Normandy, have seen the statement as an unambiguously legal one, just as Pollock 
did almost 800 years later? Similar, albeit slightly less far-reaching, questions can be asked about 
William I’s statement that all those who followed him to England were in pace mea et quiete.38 
Did this, as its context suggests, only apply through the mechanism of the murder fine, and thus 
leave his men unprotected from violent attacks falling short of homicide, or was there more to 
William’s peace than this? Fundamentally, the point is that these statements can be read in either 
way, and there are signs in the evidence that there may have been some confusion or even 
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conflict on this issue. Men like the author of the Leges Henrici Primi certainly interpreted them as 
having little legal effect, but it may be that the encouragement of pleas of hamsocn and griðbryce, 
in circumstances that such conservatives disapproved of, reflects a school of thought that took 
these declarations more literally. There are, as we have seen, considerable hints that some 
influential people in the early twelfth century were trying to expand the scope of royal protection 
into something like a general peace – might they not have been trying to make a legal reality of 
Henry’s declaration? Thus, though Goebel is right to assert that we cannot see in the coronation 
charter alone any procedural measure instituting a general peace, there is evidence to suggest 
that during the course of Henry’s reign some of his ministers may have tried to provide one. The 
continental context of the Peace Movement may thus have shaped the way that at least some 
influential legal minds saw Henry’s “firm peace”, and through this had a significant influence on 
English legal development.39 
The developments of the 1150s and their potential influence on Henry II should also be taken into 
account. Here we have Frederick Barbarossa and Louis VII, the English king’s peers, seizing the 
initiative in asserting their own legally enforceable peaces, whilst oddly enough Henry – the man 
who seems to have done most to make a reality of such a peace in  his own realm – so far as we 
know made no equivalent pronouncement. The closest he comes is introducing the Assize of 
Clarendon as being “pro pace servanda et justitia tenenda”, which is clearly not the same thing, 
adding up to little more than Anglo-Saxon phrases about friðes bot.40 Why, then, does he fail to 
declare the peace that seems so evidently to have been the result of his reforms? One possibility 
is that he believed he did not need to because his grandfather had already done so in his 
coronation charter. We can be certain Henry II knew this document because he confirms it, in 
general terms, after his own coronation, in a charter of 19 December 1154.41 What would he have 
made of it? Considering the context of the 1150s in France and Germany – and Henry I’s fearsome 
reputation as the “Lion of Justice” – it does not seem unlikely that Henry II would have read his 
grandfather’s “firm peace” as something with both the same level of legal ambition as his 
contemporaries and the same direct connection to the Peace Movement. Henry was, after all, 
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essentially French. His youth was mainly spent in Anjou and he was, of course, already Duke of 
Normandy (from 1151) and Duke of Aquitaine (from 1152) by the time he became King of 
England: the idea that Peace and Truce of God’s influence could have escaped his attention, or 
that of the counsellors he brought with him, is unthinkable.42 In Normandy he ruled as an enforcer 
of a general peace directed against homicide, and although it may only have applied at certain 
times the ideal of its perpetual application was well understood.43 When Henry II came to the 
English throne promising to restore the peace of his grandfather to a realm recovering from a 
devastating civil war, it seems most likely that he thought of this peace in similar terms to the new 
royal peaces on the continent, and those were intimately associated with the familiar ideals of the 
Peace Movement. 
The context of the Peace and Truce of God, then, looks as though it could be of considerable 
importance for the expansion in England of specific royal peaces into one general king’s peace. 
There are good cases for looking at both the expansion of Anglo-Saxon royal protections under 
Henry I and the establishment of a formal and legally meaningful king’s peace under Henry II as 
being influenced by the ideas of general peace contained within the Truce of God. The ruling 
elite’s exposure to the ideas in Normandy cannot be doubted, and it would be rather odd if they 
did not carry some form of the concept of a general protective peace back across the channel 
with them. It cannot, of course, be proven but it is not an unreasonable suggestion that the 
efforts to expand the scope of griðbryce evident in the Leges Henrici Primi were inspired by the 
idea that the king’s peace actually did extend to everyone and at all times. Clearly, in that period, 
such an idea would have been a contested one, but the peculiar context of Henry II’s coming to 
power may have changed that significantly. Henry had a mandate to restore the peace of the 
kingdom to the state that it had been under his grandfather; he had a thoroughly French 
background and would have been familiar with the protective idea of peace in the Truce of God 
not only from his youth but also from enforcing it for several years as Duke of both Normandy and 
Aquitaine; and, furthermore, he had the example of what his continental contemporaries were 
doing in establishing their own peaces to guide him. It is, of course, a possibility that these factors 
are utterly unconnected to the fact that by the time of Glanvill violence was being prosecuted as 
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“breach of the peace of the lord king”, but it would be an extraordinary coincidence.44 Far more 
likely, I would argue, is that the legal developments outlined in the last chapter were to an 
important degree guided by the notion of a protective general peace inherent in the Truce of God, 
and by the trend on the continent for secular rulers to claim such general peaces as their own. 
Felony and Oaths  
The other crucial concept to examine here is that of felony. Thirteenth-century homicide, after all, 
was not prosecuted simply as a breach of the peace but also, and primarily, as a felony. The 
origins of the term are obscure but it seems that under Henry I it meant something like “betrayal 
of one’s lord” (L. J. Downer uses the phrase “breach of the feudal bond”).45 Quite how this came 
to denote the most serious crimes in the English legal system is hard to tell; we do not have any 
hints that it was used as a “ticket” in the same way that breach of the peace was, so it is very 
difficult to suggest a path by which the common law situation might have evolved. The 
historiographical background and one possible explanation are summed up nicely by Patrick 
Wormald: 
Like everyone since, Maitland was uncertain how a word whose basic meaning is “broken 
faith with a lord” became a term for “crime of any considerable gravity”. He hesitantly 
thought the link lay in “the rule that the felon’s fee should escheat to his lord”. But this 
fails to explain why larceny should be treated as severely as treason itself. An explanation 
is to hand in a feature of Old English jurisprudence mentioned above: the twelve-year-
old’s “oath and pledge” whereby loyalty entailed disavowal of theft. A “king’s enemy” is 
thus one who plots conventional offences against his people as well as treason against his 
person. Crime is indeed a breach of faith, so punished like any other form of infidelity. By 
Angevin times this theory could well have infiltrated the mind-set and vocabulary of a 
post-conquest Establishment that had first crossed the Channel with more 
straightforward notions of disloyalty.46 
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To Wormald, then, the key was the idea that any crime was a breach of an oath of loyalty to the 
king, and was represented as treachery as a result.  A potential problem with this view, however, 
is the degree to which it stretches the available evidence, pushing for an extremely far-reaching 
interpretation. David Pratt, attempting to summarise Wormald’s argument (which appears in a 
number of locations but has never been stated in full), sees the key concept as that of 
hlafordsearu, treachery towards a lord, as expressed in Alfred’s domboc.47 Pratt argues that the 
punishments outlined by Alfred – death and forfeiture of property for plotting against the king or 
harbouring the king’s enemies, and the same for plotting against one’s own lord – were “at the 
heart of Wormald’s view of later English law, postulating a single system of justice behind the 
more disparate written evidence”.48 The effect of these measures against hlafordsearu when 
combined with the evidence of a general oath of loyalty was, to quote Pratt once more, “to 
equate crime in general, including theft, with hlafordsearu against the king”.49 These are claims of 
fundamental importance to our view of late Anglo-Saxon justice, and as such it is essential that 
they are well supported by evidence. 
To an extent the case is a powerful one. The Carolingian precedent for the use of oaths of loyalty 
whose implications extended beyond simply not plotting against the king is strong. This is from 
Charlemagne’s programmatic capitulary of 802: 
And that it [the oath of loyalty to be taken by all men over the age of twelve] is to be 
expounded publicly to all, in such a way that everyone can understand, how important 
and how many are the matters which that oath comprehends – not only, as many have 
hitherto thought, fidelity to the lord emperor as regards his life and not bringing an 
enemy into his realm for hostile purposes and not consenting to, or remaining silent 
about, another’s infidelity towards him, but that all should know that the oath has the 
following meaning within it:50 
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The text then goes on to stipulate that all should maintain themselves in God’s holy service and 
that that nobody should: steal anything that in any way belongs to the emperor; steal from or in 
any way harm churches, widows, orphans or pilgrims; allow their benefice from the emperor to 
go to ruin; disregard military service; thwart the emperor’s commands; or contrive to pervert the 
course of justice in the courts.51 Pratt also points out capitularies from 853 and 854 which show 
that the bond of fidelity was deemed to have been broken through theft, and provide the texts of 
oaths specifically targeted at theft.52 
This precedent, combined with the English evidence, is certainly suggestive. In England we again 
get a general oath of loyalty; this is from III Edmund: 
In the first place, all shall swear in the name of the lord, before whom that holy thing is 
holy, that they will be faithful to King Edmund, even as it behoves a man to be faithful to 
his lord, without any dispute or dissension, openly or in secret, favouring what he favours 
and discountenancing what he discountenances. And from the day on which this oath 
shall be rendered, let no-one conceal the breach of it in a brother or relation of his, any 
more than in a stranger.53 
The text then goes on to discuss the communal obligation to pursue thieves, the prohibition on 
changing lords before being quit of all legal charges, a number of measures on theft focusing on 
cattle, and the necessity of surety. All of these could plausibly be interpreted as being duties 
implied by the oath, though this is not stated explicitly.54 In Cnut’s code, however, the focus on 
theft is explicit; it is stated simply that “it is our desire that everyone, over twelve years of age, 
shall take an oath that he will not be a thief or a thief’s accomplice”.55 The English picture is not 
quite so explicit in the extension of the oath’s implications beyond the basic element of loyalty to 
the king, but otherwise it seems similar to the situation in Carolingian texts. 
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 The problem is the key connection between the oath of loyalty and a general equation of crime 
with treachery. Even the Carolingian evidence is not very clear on this: Charlemagne’s 
specifications for what was conveyed by the oath of loyalty do go beyond what might have been 
expected but they do not go so far as to comprehend everything that we would think of as crime. 
Apart from the duties towards the church and the clearly related protection of widows, orphans 
and pilgrims, all involve offences that could easily be represented as being against the emperor 
himself. In England, all that is clear from the texts is that the harbouring of fugitives is considered 
a betrayal of the king – significant in itself but not obviously indicative of a unified system of 
justice based on this concept. Furthermore, it must be important that in both countries the 
extension to include theft involves a new and specific oath. This surely implies that the old general 
oath had not successfully created an understanding that theft was a betrayal of the king – if it had 
done so there would have been no need for the specific oath. It strikes me that the interpretation 
of this evidence is rather more tenuous than Wormald and Pratt suggest. To state that “crime in 
general, including theft” was equated with lord-treachery seems unreasonable: apart from the 
harbouring of fugitives, theft is the only case for which there is clear evidence that an oath was 
important, and even then the oath involved was separate from the oath of loyalty. To claim, as 
Pratt does, that this equation was explicitly demonstrated by the list of botleas offences in II Cnut, 
on the grounds that lord-treachery was set alongside husbryce, arson, open theft and æbere morð 
is also highly questionable: surely we must conclude that it is listed as a separate offence and 
that, if anything, this implies that the other offences mentioned were not understood as lord-
treachery.56 
My intention here is not to dismiss entirely the work of Wormald and Pratt. Much of their picture 
of a highly organised system of Anglo-Saxon justice, relying on communal obligations and 
reinforced by oaths, is convincing. What, I think, ought to be looked at more carefully is the idea 
of a wider theory of crime. For Wormald this is a central thesis. He pushes for the appreciation of 
an Anglo-Saxon shift “from a polity where injury is redressed to one with a developed notion of 
crime and punishment, [and which] performs at least one of the functions of a ‘state’”.57 This 
seems to me to be pushing beyond what the evidence can actually show us, both in general terms 
and specifically on the issue of violence, the focus of this discussion. Whereas there may be some 
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merit in seeing theft as a crime that could be regarded as betrayal of the king on the grounds that 
it breached an oath, and whilst a good case can be made for seeing harbouring of fugitives or the 
failure to pursue thieves in a similar light, there is no good evidence that any of this applied to 
royal policy towards violence. There, as we have already seen in great detail, the focus was on 
protection; and though breach of protection could, I am sure, be seen as infidelity to the king, 
there is no evidence to suggest that this was a dominant concept for contemporaries. Indeed, by 
comparison with the Angevin use of the term “felony” to designate serious crimes – which is quite 
explicit in characterising them as treachery towards the king – the Anglo-Saxon case relies on 
heavily on inferences and generalisations that must always remain possibilities rather than 
certainties.  
The Anglo-Saxon material, then, offers little explanation for how the term felony came to be 
applied to simple homicide, though it does provide a model for understanding the term’s 
application to crime in general. This model, it needs to be emphasised, works a great deal better 
for the late twelfth century than for the pre-conquest period for which it is intended. Here we 
have a term, felonia, whose essential meaning is lord-treachery being combined with what seems 
to be a continuation of the old loyalty oath. As Wormald notes, the Conqueror is known to have 
exacted a general oath at Salisbury in 1086, whilst the Assize of Northampton –the very text in 
which the term “felony” first appears in its later familiar sense – also insists on a general oath 
from “earls, barons, knights and freeholders, even villeins”.58 It is no part of my argument that this 
is unconnected with the use of lord-treachery under the Anglo-Saxons and Carolingians, but I do 
not think it is fair to see this as something that had been entirely prefigured in West Saxon 
legislation, as Wormald seems to. The inclusion of simple homicide as a felony in Glanvill is a clear 
departure from the Anglo-Saxon tradition. Before Henry II’s reign there is no evidence for 
homicide being treated as such. Anglo-Saxon England may well have had a justice system in which 
some offences – such as theft, harbouring fugitives, and failure to pursue thieves – were regarded 
as infidelity to the king, maybe even breach of an oath, but these offences were a limited set and 
violence stood apart, being regulated by royal protection far more than royal prohibition. We 
might want to look at these offences as crimes in Anglo-Saxon England – there seems little reason 
not to, given how they were prohibited and punished by the crown – but we should be careful to 
avoid extending this appellation beyond what the evidence justifies. The key development being 
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studied here, after all, is the process by which homicide and other violent offences were 
criminalised.  
Probably by the time of the Assize of Northampton (if we overlook its use of the term 
“murderer”), and certainly by the time of Glanvill, homicide had joined the list of offences that 
can undoubtedly be termed crimes. Theories about lord-treachery and oaths go a long way 
towards explaining why this category of serious crimes came to be associated with the word 
“felony” instead of older terms like botleas, but they do not offer any help for explaining why 
homicide joined the category. For this, I think, we do better to look at the murder fine, which 
seems in time to have rendered most killings of freemen botleas so far as the slayers were 
concerned. It was the murder fine that led to homicide becoming a serious crime, it was the 
importance of the concept of lord-treachery that led to serious crimes being termed felonies. 
What remains puzzling is why these two shifts seem to have occurred simultaneously, with the 
term felony seemingly being introduced at the precise moment when simple homicide was added 
to the list of serious crimes. Was this coincidence, or was the changed content of the list related 
to the change in terminology? It is really very hard to say. There seems no clear link between the 
term felony and homicide, so perhaps the best theory is that Henry II’s reign saw a serious 
reconceptualisation of the justice system.59 Much had changed since the Norman conquest – not 
least the fact that the majority of slayers probably now faced afflictive justice – and the old 
terminology no longer fitted well with what was probably a rather confusing and incongruously 
anglophone system. The solution of discarding the old Anglo-Saxon terminology and introducing 
new concepts and vocabulary seems a likely one, and it may be that felony was introduced 
primarily for that reason, simply as a new – and, for francophone legal professionals, more 
comprehensible – term for designating the most serious offences. That these offences were 
known as felonies may well be linked to Carolingian and Anglo-Saxon ideas of lord-betrayal and 
the prosecution of theft, but the fact that homicide was included in this category seems more 
likely to be because of the murder fine and the other developments outlined in the last chapter. 
There may, in other words, be no direct connection between the developments that led to the 
emergence of the term felony and the emergence of punished homicide. It is, at any rate, difficult 
to show any connection between the concepts before they were united under Henry II. 
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Conclusions 
The twin pillars by which violence was to be prosecuted in later medieval England – felony and 
breach of the peace – thus emerge rather differently from this analysis of their ideological 
importance. Peace, in the form of the Peace Movement, emerges as absolutely critical to the 
expanded ambition of twelfth-century justice regarding violence. The Truce of God, in particular, 
encouraged the idea that violence be prohibited generally by a single protective peace and, even 
if this initially only applied at particular times, that the logical climax of the movement was an 
unbroken general peace against homicide was clear even in the middle of the eleventh century. 
The ambitious scope of the Peace and Truce of God influenced the secular rulers who were called 
upon to provide secular sanctions and, in Normandy in particular, clearly shaped expectations of 
the nature of justice regarding violence. There are signs of these increased expectations of the 
law under Henry I, and we would be well advised to take them seriously given how men familiar 
with the Truce of God in Normandy could have viewed Henry’s declaration of a firm peace in 
1100. Henry II, coming to power at a time when his rival European monarchs were trying to 
assume full control of the peace within their own realms, and possessing a mandate to restore the 
order of his grandfather’s reign, was almost certainly influenced by expectations of peace formed 
on the continent. He had not only the administrative ability and the strong legal inheritance 
necessary to push royal control over violence forward, he had a strong ideological motivation to 
do so. 
Felony, by contrast, emerges rather differently. In emphasising the Anglo-Saxon and ultimately 
Carolingian roots of what occurred under Henry II, it is worthwhile to note the strong possibility of 
a degree of continuity between felony and an earlier, albeit more limited and less clear, 
understanding of crime as lord-treachery. However, the concept itself cannot offer any 
explanation for the expansion of the most serious offences to include homicide. For that we need 
to look at ideas of peace, as we have seen, and at technical legal developments such as the 
murder fine. What the close correlation between the first text in which homicide is clearly a royal 
offence and the first use of the term felony, in its common-law sense, tells us is that there was a 
radical renovation of the English legal system under Henry II in which much was rationalised and 
reinterpreted using concepts and language comprehensible to the contemporary ruling class. 
Though the case is not entirely clear, felony probably does show how Carolingian ideas adopted 
by the West Saxon royal house came to underpin the common law’s approach to crime. As such, 
its importance cannot be doubted, but its relationship with the process by which homicide was 
criminalised is only a tangential one.  
 221 
 
Conclusion 
The conclusion that emerges most strongly from this study is the key role played by protective 
power in regulating violence. Building on the crucial arguments put forward in the opening 
chapter for the absence of the royal prohibition on homicide that both Naomi Hurnard and Patrick 
Wormald had argued for, chapter two showed how the system that regulated feud in Anglo-Saxon 
England was one primarily, indeed almost exclusively, founded on protections. The two 
exceptions, fihtwite and morð, do need to be taken into account, but it should be remembered 
the practical relevance of morð remains in doubt, whilst the fihtwite may well have grown from 
protective roots. Other than these offences, all the powers used to regulate violence, royal and 
otherwise, were protective and as such it is reasonable to think in terms of violence being 
controlled and channelled by a wide network of protective power. This network included not only 
the king but all lords, free kindreds and churches, as well as – it seems – some guilds and towns. 
The prevention of violence was achieved using protective power and protective power was 
something exercised by free society as a whole, not just the crown. This said, however, the second 
chapter also showed how the crown came to gain a dominant role within this web of protections. 
By protecting houses, churches and main roads, and by expanding the sources of the king’s 
personal protection to include royal officers, the king of the English became easily the foremost 
protector in the land and in so doing he gained considerable jurisdiction over violence. This was, 
however, protective jurisdiction, not jurisdiction as we would now envisage it. There was no 
offence of homicide or wounding over which the king had special rights, but rather a series of 
different royal protections, sitting alongside those of others, which could be breached by violence 
and would, as a result, lead to situations in which violence was regarded as an offence against the 
king. 
As chapter three showed, this new understanding of the regulation of violence, with the crown as 
simply the leading player in a much wider network of protective power, can be placed at the heart 
of  a far-reaching reassessment of the distribution of legal power in Anglo-Saxon England. The 
acknowledgement of the significance of the royal protective powers of hamsocn, griðbryce or 
mundbryce, and forsteal leads inevitably to reassessment of Hurnard’s influential demolition of F. 
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W. Maitland’s view of jurisdictional privilege under the Anglo-Saxon kings.1 We can no longer 
agree with her in dismissing these offences as essentially minor, and must acknowledge that some 
ecclesiastical institutions, in possessing these delegated royal powers, had extensive privileges. 
There was, in fact, very little royal legal power of significance that would not be exercised by an 
institution with a grant of hamsocn, griðbryce and forsteal alongside the more commonplace sake 
and soke, toll and team, and infangeneþeof. The few botleas offences found in the laws, and for 
which there is no evidence of delegation, cannot be shown to have been of any significance in 
practice, which is in marked contrast to the frequent appearances of the royal protective powers 
in Domesday Book. The recognition of these protections’ importance thus leads directly to a 
favourable reassessment of the significance of the legal powers delegated by the king to a handful 
of privileged institutions. It is only, however, with the application of some common sense to the 
long-standing historiographical fixation with court-holding rights and exclusion clauses that we 
get a real appreciation of the nature of delegated power: these things may not have existed in 
England, but their absence should not detract much from our view of the significance of 
delegated legal powers. Holding courts in this period meant presiding, not judging, and it is hard 
to see that role as intrinsically more influential than what could be achieved by a powerful local 
lord promoting his interests from a less official position. Nor is it clear that the right physically to 
exclude royal officers is significantly different to the abnegation of their right to exact financial 
dues. There seems, in short, little reason to think that powers delegated by the king were 
insignificant. Our focus on protection, however, also highlights the inadequacy of looking at 
delegated power alone. The protective powers exercised by all lords, kindreds and churches were 
just as significant as anything the king could grant. For a complete picture of legal privilege we 
need to take into account sanctuary rights, both ecclesiastical and lay, as well as the protections 
of wergild and manbot that covered every man in feud. In essence these were no different to the 
core royal powers of hamsocn, griðbryce and forsteal. 
The first section as whole, then, offers a new way of understanding the regulation of violence in 
Anglo-Saxon England, an account of the rise of royal jurisdiction within that system,  and a radical 
reassessment of the distribution of legal power more generally in Anglo-Saxon society. The 
second half of the thesis is perhaps slightly less controversial, but its scope is similarly broad. Its 
first concern was to find the point at which we can reasonably believe that homicide was a royal 
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crime – an offence punishable by the crown wherever, whenever and against whomsoever it was 
committed. The evidence, both processual and normative, suggests that Henry II’s reign was the 
time, with unequivocal evidence first appearing near the end of his reign in Glanvill but with 
strong indications that when the 1166 Assize of Clarendon spoke of “murderers” it in fact meant 
all killers.2 This, however, the subsequent analysis suggests, may well not have been as dramatic a 
step as it first appears. The murder fine seems quite clearly to have expanded its scope 
dramatically, and if we believe the Dialogue of the Exchequer it encompassed the killing of all free 
men by the 1170s.3 It may well be, then, that almost all killers were being punished as 
“murderers” , in the sense that their actions would have resulted in the levying of the murder fine 
had they escaped, well before the Assize of Clarendon. The murder fine was, of course, in large 
part a royal protection, and it was not alone in expanding its scope. It can be seen in the Leges 
Henrici Primi how the offences of hamsocn and griðbryce were being used even in cases where, in 
the minds of conservatives such as the Leges Henrici’s author, the circumstances did not justify it.4 
In short, these Anglo-Saxon royal protections were being used as “tickets” to place cases under 
royal jurisdiction in just the same way as breach of the king’s peace was under the later common 
law. This may not have been of the highest importance for the development of a crime of 
homicide – the murder fine providing a route to royal jurisdiction that must have been a lot 
simpler in most cases – but for non-lethal cases of violence this may well have proved highly 
influential. It provides, at least, a very plausible model for how “brawling, beatings, and even 
wounding” would come to be regarded by Glanvill as a part of royal jurisdiction if, and only if, the 
accuser included an allegation of breach of the king’s peace in his plea.5 
In allowing the use of accusations of breach of the king’s peace as tickets in all circumstances, 
courts under Henry II – and its seems some under Henry I – were making an administrative and 
procedural change. They were not, however, doing so in an ideological vacuum and the 
implication of this system of tickets must have been clear enough at the time: the king’s peace or 
grið now extended everywhere, to everyone and at all times. A general peace was thus created 
not by legislative decree, but seemingly by some potentially rather dubious administrative means.  
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We might even be tempted to see its emergence as an accidental by-product of some very 
pragmatic tinkering with procedure. This, however, is only one way of looking at it. The final 
chapter here showed that there is good reason to think that ideological considerations may have 
driven this development. The Peace and Truce of God were, after all, at the centre of the 
regulation of violence on the continent at this time and the idea of a general peace against 
violence – though not its practical manifestation – was clearly present in the mid eleventh 
century. The process, too, of the royal takeover of responsibility for peace was well underway in 
the twelfth century. Emperors, kings, dukes and counts first functioned as the secular arm, giving 
force to the church’s peace, and then went on (in the case of King Louis VII and Emperor Frederick 
Barbarossa) to seize the initiative and proclaim their own royal and imperial peaces.  
The idea that a king should enforce a general peace against violence would thus hardly have 
seemed outrageous to the Anglo-Norman cross-channel aristocracy, and it is quite possible – 
probable, even – that in the early evidence for the use of griðbryce and hamsocn as tickets we are 
seeing  an attempt to give practical legal force to Henry I’s coronation declarations about placing 
the entire realm within his firm peace.6 The establishment of this as commonly accepted legal 
doctrine after the disorder of Stephen’s reign may well owe something to the example of 
Henry II’s continental contemporaries attempting, rather less successfully, to do something 
similar. The heightened influence of the Peace Movement may, in short, be what drove post-
conquest kings (as opposed to their predecessors) to convert the Anglo-Saxon position of 
dominance in a wider system of protections into a fully enforceable general peace. Or, to put it 
another way, post-conquest kings were able to make the full implications of the Peace and Truce 
of God a reality in England, while their European contemporaries failed, only because of the 
strong legacy of protective power they inherited from their Anglo-Saxon predecessors. The Peace 
Movement, then, seems to have worked like a powerful ideological fertiliser on the already rich 
soil of Anglo-Saxon protective power. 
The Norman conquest thus emerges here as heralding something of a step-change in the progress 
of protective power. The pattern of expansion under the Anglo-Saxon kings was, in some senses, 
continued after 1066: we find a new protection covering all those who had followed William 
across the channel and all those who would come after, and we find an expansion of the scope of 
protections – visible in particular under Henry I – that to some extent has earlier parallels. The 
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expansion of the king’s mund, probably under Edmund, so that it could be granted not only by the 
king but also by royal officers is in a sense similar to the later expansion of griðbryce into a 
generally applicable “ticket”. There is, however, a qualitative difference in the types of change we 
see after the conquest, most importantly in their tendency towards generalisation. Anglo-Saxon 
royal protections may have multiplied and expanded but they remained things to be taken 
literally, whereas under the Normans we see a move away from this and towards a degree of 
fictionalisation: hamsocn, it seems, no longer needed to take place in a house; griðbryce could be 
committed against someone who had not previously sought out the king’s grið; the murder fine 
no longer required the victim to be obviously foreign. After the conquest we do see the same 
sorts of processes at work as before, but added to them is a drive towards the idea that the king’s 
various protections should be generally applied, protecting everyone, everywhere, all the time. 
The driving force for this, it has been suggested here, was the presence of this ideal in the 
continental Peace Movement, the assumptions underlying which the Norman aristocracy, and 
particularly the clergy, brought with them. 
So, what do all these findings amount to when taken together? We are looking at a transition 
from a broadly based system of protections regulating violence, in which the king was just one of 
many players, to a system in which the crown effectively prohibits all violence as crime. It may be 
that initially the establishment of full royal jurisdiction over violence was seen in protective terms 
– the king’s protection now covering everyone evenly – but the result of this change was so close 
to prohibitive power over violence that it must swiftly have come to be seen as such. Felony, after 
all, is the dominant concept in dealing with homicide and wounding in Bracton, and though that 
text makes liberal use of accusations of breach of the king’s peace it is clear that there it is specific 
acts that are being prohibited rather than specific people being protected. What we see is a shift 
from a system in which violence was regulated using the protective power that characterised the 
system of feud, to one where, in spite of a largely fictional idea of peace, prohibitive power and 
the idea of crime are dominant. This is, then, in a legal sense, the end of feud and the 
criminalisation of violence. But it was no cataclysm; the increasing royal dominance of the 
network of protections that underpinned feud under both Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Norman kings 
seems eventually to have produced a situation in which the crown had de facto jurisdiction over 
most serious violence. Only once this state of affairs had been achieved was it rationalised into a 
de jure crime of homicide. It was an important step, it is true, but it should be seen as the last of a 
series of important steps, the culmination of a much longer process reaching back well before the 
Norman conquest.  
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The irony here is that though the outcome of this process was the effective abolition of the old 
system of protective power, the process itself was characterised by protection’s meteoric rise. 
Protective power did not gradually fade into obscurity, it increased its importance right up until 
the moment of its extinction, when it became so general that it was, in effect, no longer a 
protection. Protective power’s demise was thus a bit like that of a supernova, collapsing under its 
own weight at the very point that it shines its brightest, then swiftly fading from view – an 
unusual trajectory for a historical phenomenon. However, satisfying though it is to be able to 
model protection’s progress in such cosmic terms, we should nonetheless be alert to the 
possibility that some less dramatic developments were at work here. It was royal protection, of 
course, not the practice of feud, that reached critical mass towards the end of our period. From 
the limited evidence we have, feud itself seems likely to have followed a rather less dramatic – 
more white-dwarfish – course of gradual decline. We can perhaps identify two separate strands 
here, the gradual build-up of royal protective power and the erosion of that belonging to other 
parties, to free kindreds in particular. Much of the time these two  strands are so entwined that it 
is difficult to separate them. For example, as we saw in chapter two, complex protections, though 
they did serve to expand royal protection to some extent, their main purpose was clearly to limit 
the use of protective power by kindreds. This, however, seems only to have been effective in 
rather limited circumstances, removing the threat of violence – the basis of protective power – in 
cases where composition settlements had been reached, where thieves had been slain, and 
where men had grievances against their lords.  
Perhaps more significantly, in certain instances the expansion of simple royal protections was 
directly at the expense of private protectors. The introduction of hamsocn, for example, seems to 
have meant that ordinary householders no longer protected their homes, and likewise ciricgrið 
for churches. Even the expansion of the king’s mund so that it could be offered by royal officers 
must, in effect, have meant that such men no longer exercised their own protection. In cases 
where private protections had not been displaced by new royal ones, the emergence of new royal 
protections must – simply because of the increased demands on the resources of offenders – 
have had some effect on the ability of other protectors to extract their own penalties . There are 
indications that such royal penalties would be prioritised in such settlements, which must in some 
cases have left lords and kindreds with little or nothing by way of wergild and manbot. Indeed, 
even if the division of an offender’s resources was in practice more equitable, there must often 
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still have been a material diminution in the level of financial compensation that non-royal 
protectors could hope for.7 Far more than significant that this, however, were royal claims to 
exclusivity in certain cases. Edmund’s insistence on making his new protections botleas also had 
the effect of negating the rights of kindreds to wergilds, lords to manbots – indeed the right of 
any other protector to what they were due. Though this was retreated from afterwards, 
presumably because it aroused opposition, the same cannot be said for the similarly 
unemendable murder fine after the conquest.8 In some senses the very increase in the scope of 
royal protection had the effect of limiting the protections belonging as of right to others.  
Moreover, it is certainly possible that factors other than the expansion of royal protective powers 
influenced the decline of feuding. This, indeed, has been the line that recent literature has 
emphasised. Wormald, as we have seen, makes rather a lot of the idea that Edmund’s laws struck 
a serious blow at kin responsibility, allowing kins to disown killers and avoid liability for their 
deeds and thus not only making legitimate vengeance next to impossible but also weakening the 
bonds of kinship that drove men to seek it in the first place.9 In fact, he makes a more general 
case for the weakness of English kindreds, relative to Celtic ones, being at least in part the result 
of an assertive West Saxon monarchy in the seventh century.10 This relative feebleness of English 
kindreds is well-known; in the words of W. L. Warren, by comparison to Welsh and Irish examples, 
“English kindred groups appear half-formed and never achieving the cohesion, identity and status 
of clans”.11 If we add to this want of proper familial feeling social trends which seem to have been 
pushing the free peasantry towards serfdom, even before the arrival of the Normans, there is a 
reasonable case for suspecting that the exercise of protective power by at least the lower rungs of 
English society was becoming increasingly difficult throughout the period.12 However, we must 
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not take this too far. English kindreds may not appear in our sources in the same developed way 
that Irish or Welsh ones do, but no-one would seek to deny their existence, and the reduction in 
the status of the peasantry was hardly a cataclysmic event. We still must account for the 
existence of some free ceorlish kindreds in the twelfth century, even if their numbers and the 
strength of the ties that bound them were not as great as they had been in the past.13 These 
parallel developments are worth bearing in mind, of course, as they certainly had an influence on 
the working of the law in practice, but they do not materially affect the picture of developing 
protective power advanced here. 
The final question I want to consider here is that of what the transition from feud to crime meant 
in practice for violence in English society. Was the great increase in royal protective power leading 
to the theoretical criminalisation of feud really more a matter of theory than reality? The absence 
of good evidence for the practical treatment of violence in this period makes this impossible to 
answer conclusively. We cannot know for sure whether violent feud was common even in the 
tenth century because we simply do not have the types of sources where we would expect to see 
it happening. Indeed, in terms of evidence for the reality of feud violence, the best we have for 
the Anglo-Saxon period is one prolonged Northumbrian feud, undoubtedly with political 
dimensions to it, that was carried out by opposing kindreds of the very highest status. Feud 
among ceorls, even among ordinary thegns, cannot be shown to have existed. What we can be 
sure of, however, is that by the end of the period people, usually of relatively low status, were in 
practice executed for the felony of homicide.14 Though we cannot be sure of how things stood 
before, we do know that in the thirteenth century the royal prohibition on homicide was very real 
indeed, at least for those of low status. For those of higher status, however, there are questions 
to be answered. We know from the feud of Uhtred and Thurbrand that, in the eleventh century, 
there were some men of the highest rank who could kill each other, and breach multiple royal 
protections in the process, without suffering any consequences as a result of royal justice. Thus 
from our one clear case, we can tell that at the highest level, and in a relatively far-flung area of 
the kingdom, the law appears to have been meaningless in the eleventh century.15  
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Did this sort of noble independence change significantly as a result of the late twelfth-century 
royal prohibition on violence? Howard Kaminsky argues not, suggesting that nobles still feuded 
and killed each other in spite of the supposedly felonious nature of their acts, and that, rather 
than suffering royal penalties, they tended to end such disputes by negotiation.16 Kaminsky’s 
evidence of noble feuding, of course, does not affect the fact that the majority of the population 
could not ignore royal prohibitions with such ease – nor can we here go into the factors that seem 
to have made the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries more liable to noble law-flouting than the 
thirteenth17  – but it does raise an interesting question about the wider effects of the shift in the 
mechanisms that regulated violence from protective to prohibitive power. If, to begin with, we 
look at the distribution of legal power in society, as we did in chapter three, it seems likely that 
we can identify some clear consequences of the relatively sudden irrelevance of protections. The 
effects can be quite obvious: we find, for example, that the three key protective powers reserved 
by Cnut – hamsocn, griðbryce and forsteal – cease to be the highly-prized privileges that they 
once were, with clearly prohibitive rights to inflict punishment, such as the privilege of operating 
a gallows, emerging as the must-have jurisdictional privilege of the early thirteenth century.18 
Indeed, hamsocn, griðbryce and forsteal ceased to have any real meaning once violence was 
covered with a blanket prohibition, as the terms’ later histories show: hamsocn gains an 
association with burglary but its violent connotations become, it seems, increasingly fictional;19 
the king’s special protection that underlay griðbryce continued to exist, but its importance 
became more to do with other privileges that came to be associated with it, such as immunity 
from certain types of prosecution or distraint;20 and forsteal, undergoing yet another bizarre 
transformation, became the offence of buying goods outside of markets and evading tax by selling 
them on at a profit.21   
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If we turn to ecclesiastical sanctuary we again seem to have a major shift in customs roughly 
coinciding with this shift to prohibitive power. Churches do away with time-limited protections 
and instead claim the right to protect permanently, usually through allowing felons to “abjure the 
realm” and to go into exile unharrassed by royal justice or, in a handful of more privileged cases, 
by allowing permanent residence within the confines of the sanctuary.22 To the extent that such 
sanctuary rights offered protective jurisdiction on the Wulfstanian model of ciricgrið, it seems 
that this too was replaced with more modern rights to hang felons.23 Finally, as we have just seen, 
the shift to prohibitive power, looked at in the long term, seems to have had a tangible effect on 
the abilities of those who would previously have been able to engage in feuding to exercise 
protective power. Quite simply, the protective rights of kindreds and lords to wergild and manbot 
do seem to have been entirely eliminated by the royal prohibition on homicide, to the extent that 
in the late thirteenth century Edward I and his ministers were expressing what seems to be 
unfeigned horror, incomprehension and outrage at the existence of these customs among 
England’s Celtic neighbours.24 The continued presence of noble feuding may tell against this 
interpretation but it remains to be seen whether this is in fact feud of the sort that involves 
wergilds and other payments for breach of protection, or actually more of a ritualised form of 
property dispute.25 Further study is needed here. We should not, in all events, be too surprised 
that an armed class might violently assert its power in protective terms even within a system that 
prohibited violence – nor even that such actions might be regarded as legitimate by a substantial 
section of society – given that this is basically how some sociologists represent the modern 
mafia.26 There is, then, much to suggest that for the holders of protective privileges, from kindred 
groups to sanctuaries to immunities, the shift from protection to prohibitive power was a truly 
major event. 
More widely, we might question the extent to which this legal shift from protective to prohibitive 
power had a social or cultural impact. The concept of protection had penetrated deeply into early 
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and high medieval society, being intimately linked, as we saw in the introduction, with emotional 
models concerning the concepts of honour and shame.27 Indeed, protection, perhaps necessarily 
in view of its practical importance in feuding,  informed the understanding of personal 
relationships from kinship to lordship to guild membership, and probably even friendship.28  We 
even find the concept moulding accounts of how and why long-dead saints exerted their power.29 
Protection thus appears as a major theme in sources as wide-ranging as chronicles, heroic poetry, 
chivalric chansons, and miracle collections.30 Can a practical shift away from protection in the way 
that society regulated violence perhaps have had a knock-on effect on the importance of 
protection in other contexts? Paul Hyams has, in effect, argued that this was unlikely; that in his 
research the vengeful emotions and calculations of risk that guided people’s actions when dealing 
with violence changed little if at all over our period and that though royal prosecution of homicide 
was clearly effective in the legal sphere “there is no good reason ... to confuse political and 
administrative change with cultural change.”31 He may be correct, but it seems to me that this is 
an issue that could profitably be pursued further. Expectations of the emotional effect that 
violence would have on people must surely to some extent be conditioned by socially defined 
notions of honour and shame, and these at least were intimately bound up with protection. 
Similarly, it is not unreasonable to suggest that people’s expectations of the behaviour of 
powerful figures from lords, to the king, to miracle-working saints, must have been conditioned 
by their understanding of the sort of power they wielded. A shift from identifying such figures as 
great protectors to stern prohibitors does not seem too unlikely, given that the earlier protective 
role of all such figures is well established. Nor does it seem to me to be intrinsically unlikely that 
conceptions of kinship and lordship – possibly even associated ideas like friendship – might have 
shifted as the element of practical protection was removed from them. Finding the evidence to 
demonstrate such a widespread socio-cultural shift might be difficult, but there is surely a 
question here that needs to be answered. 
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The effects of the shift from protective to prohibitive power, however, will have to wait for 
further study. The focus of this investigation has been firmly on protective power and its 
pervasive influence in the tenth, eleventh and twelfth centuries. Violence and its regulation, I 
would argue, cannot be understood in this period without a firm grasp not only of the king’s 
protective jurisdiction but also the vast web of non-royal protections within which it operated. It 
is not just that it was largely protective power that regulated violence in the system of feud that 
had existed in Anglo-Saxon England for centuries, it is that Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Norman kings 
built their jurisdiction over violence using the very same sort of power. They were participants in 
this web of protective power in just the same way that many others were. The Norman conquest 
did have a crucial influence here – it led to the importation of Truce of God ideology which would 
leave twelfth-century kings dissatisfied with this less than dominant position, just as it led to the 
all-important creation of the murder fine – but both of these developments were slow burners 
whose full effects were not felt for decades. Indeed, the essential continuity across the conquest 
can be seen in the evidence of the 1130 Pipe Roll that protections from violence were still 
important even at the very height of Henry I’s power. Increasing royal protective power may have 
challenged the wider scheme of protections but it did not destroy it until at least a century after 
1066. The emphasis on protection here is radically different to the traditional concerns of legal 
historians charting the origins of the common law, and there can, of course, be no doubt that 
other legal changes and procedural reforms during this period were crucially important for justice 
as a whole, violence included. What I have offered here is in no sense an attempt to replace such 
general narratives but, specifically on the shift in the treatment of violence that took place 
between the late ninth and early thirteenth centuries, there is a great deal that does need 
revising. The criminalisation of violence was a legal transformation of the most fundamental 
importance; it deserves considerably more attention than it has been given by historians and, if it 
is to be properly understood, it requires a full appreciation of the role of protection. Quite simply, 
if we do not understand protective power in this period, we cannot properly understand violence. 
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Æthelberht of Kent to That of William the Conqueror (London: 
Macmillan and Co.). 
Van Caenegem (1959) Van Caenegem, R. C., ed., 1959. Royal Writs in England from the 
Conquest to Glanvill: Studies in the Early History of the Common 
Law. (Selden Society 77; London: Quaritch). 
Chronicles and Histories 
Arnold (1882-85) Arnold, T., ed., 1882-85. Symeonis Monachi Opera Omnia, 2 
vols. (London: Longman). 
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